PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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The USSR . . . . . Urban and Rural Housing
China . . . . . The Vision Of the Future
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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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Housing in the USSR

EDITORS' NOTE: In the two articles below, the authors discuss problems in the field of Soviet housing and their implications for urban and rural development. Mr. Barry addresses himself to shortcomings in the quantity and quality of Soviet urban residential construction and discusses the conditions that prevail respectively in the state, private, and cooperative sectors of housing. In the second article, Mr. Wädekin traces the debate regarding "rural reconstruction," which involves the question of whether traditional or urban-type housing (such as apartment complexes) will predominate in the Soviet countryside of the future. He demonstrates that overall shortages of manpower and building materials are among the factors militating against proposals toward a rapid and radical "urbanization" of Soviet rural areas.

Cities and Towns

By Donald D. Barry

Back in 1957 Nikita Khrushchev, then in ascendancy as leader of the Soviet state, declared:

We know that we have an acute shortage of housing. . . . The program for the development of housing in the USSR . . . sets the task of insuring a considerable increase in available houses, with the aim of ending the housing shortage in the next 10 to 12 years.[1]

Three years later, the party youth newspaper *Komsomolskaia pravda*, revealing the results of a poll of Soviet citizens on their living standards, reported:

Problem No. 1 turned out to be housing construction. More than half of the number polled—[or] 739 persons—underscored it.[2]

An Associate Professor of Government at Lehigh University (Bethlehem, Pennsylvania), Mr. Barry has contributed articles on Soviet politics and law to Survey *(London),* Soviet Studies *(Glasgow), and* The New York Times Magazine. *He did some of the research for the present article on a recent visit to the Soviet Union.*

[1] *Izvestia* (Moscow), Nov. 7, 1957, p. 3.
[2] *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 7, 1960.

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Six years later, Khrushchev's successor as premier, Aleksei Kosygin, in setting forth the goals of the latest five-year plan, stated:

One of the greatest social problems . . . is the housing problem. . . . The projected program of housing construction for 1966-1970 will allow the improvement of living conditions or the provision of new homes for about 65 million people, in comparison to 54 million people in the previous five-year period. . . . However, the housing problem still will not be wholly solved.[3]

These passages show that if there is one subject on which the Soviet leaders and the Soviet populace have been in full agreement over the years, it is the seriousness of the housing problem in the USSR. Khrushchev, with his well-known penchant for boastful over-optimism, predicted that the problem would be all but solved by the time of the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. His successors have been more realistic in refraining from such forecasts; indeed, they have shown an increasing tendency to say as little on the subject as possible in public pronouncements. Thus the celebrations of November 1967 passed without the housing situation even being mentioned, let alone solved. And no wonder—for despite considerable efforts to stimulate housing construction over the past decade, the jubilee year was also the ninth straight year in which the planned target for new housing was not met.

Soviet politicians don't really need public opinion polls to prove to them that housing is the primary domestic problem in the nation. Even the most insensitive political antennae would pick up the strong signals which course throughout the country, as citizens communicate their views by word of mouth, by letters to the press, and by complaints and pleas transmitted through the channels of the party and government hierarchies. When conversation among Soviet citizens turns to material things, the term "*otdelnaia kvartira*" (a private or separate apartment) is sure to be the most popular—or unpopular—subject.

A review of the available information on Soviet housing will indicate the magnitude of the problem. One index of measurement is the so-called "sanitary housing norm"—*i.e.*, the amount of "living space" supposedly guaranteed by Soviet law to those residing in cities and urban settlements (by definition "living space" is restricted to actual living quarters, as opposed to total "useful space," which includes kitchen, bathroom, storage areas and the like).[4] The size of the norm is set by the laws of the fifteen Soviet republics, and there is some variation from one republic to another. The norm for the Ukrainian SSR, for instance, is 13.65 square meters of living space per person (about the size of an 11-by-13 foot room). However, most of the republics have followed the lead of the Russian republic, establishing a norm of nine square meters (about 10-by-10 feet).[5] Some Soviet writers have claimed that the sanitary housing norm represents a theoretical minimum guarantee to citizens; but since the laws state that living space over the norm may be taken from families possessing it, it seems fairer to regard the norm as a maximum. The argument is in any event academic, since even the smaller norm of nine square meters has never been achieved in actual practice. According to Soviet economist D. L. Broner, at the end of 1964 urban living space in the USSR amounted to 6.8 square meters per person.[6] An American expert on Soviet housing policies, Timothy Sosnovy, has calculated slightly lower estimates of 6.31 square meters for 1964 and 6.42 square meters by the end of 1965. According to Sosnovy, these figures represent a significant improvement over the 1950 average of 4.67 square meters, but they mean that urban per capita living space has just begun to catch up with the 1923 average of 6.45 square meters.[7]

Translated into actual conditions, these statistics indicate extreme overcrowding in housing facilities, with all of the attendant implications concerning

[3] *Izvestia*, April 6, 1966, p. 5.

[4] For accounting purposes, a distinction has traditionally been made between housing "in cities and settlements of an urban type, on state farms, and on forest industry farms" on one hand, and housing on collective farms on the other. For the sake of convenience, the present article will refer to the first category as "urban housing," the main subject of the study.

[5] Nine square meters is also the minimum established by all-union law. See Iu. K. Tolstoi, *Sovetskoe zhilishchnoe pravo* (Soviet Housing Law), Leningrad, Leningrad University, 1967, pp. 77-78.

[6] D. L. Broner, *Zhilishchnyi vopros i statistika* (The Housing Question and Statistics), Moscow, "Statistics" Publishing House, 1966, p. 8. Since USSR-wide statistics on living space (as defined in the text) are not published, Broner arrived at this figure by applying a correction factor of .7 to the published figure of total useful housing space. Using the same procedure, one can obtain a more recent figure of 7.2 square meters for the end of 1967; this is calculated from data on urban population (130.9 million) and total urban useful housing space (1,343,000 square meters) published in *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1967 godu* (The USSR in Figures in 1967), Moscow, "Statistics" Publishing House, 1968, pp. 7 and 138.

[7] T. Sosnovy, "Housing Conditions and Urban Development in the USSR," *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Part II-B, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1966, p. 544; and "The Soviet Housing Situation Today," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), No. 1, Vol. XI (1959), p. 4.

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SPACE PROBLEM

Caption: "If we give him the closet as a darkroom, where will we put grandma?"

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 29, October 1966.

— Если стенной шкаф отдать ему под фотолабораторию, куда же тогда денем бабушку?

Рисунок Е. ЩЕГЛОВА

sanitation, privacy, and reasonable family relations. Sosnovy calculates a 1965 average of about 2 1/3 persons per room in Soviet urban communities, a substantial excess over the maximum standard of 1.5 persons per room endorsed in a number of Western countries.[8] In many areas of the USSR the sharing of toilet and kitchen facilities by several families is common, and the occupation of a single room by more than one family is by no means unknown.

One of the major factors that has held down per capita living space is the continued flood of Soviet citizens from countryside to town. Between 1939 and 1961 the proportion of the Soviet population living in cities rose from about one-third to more than half. During the 1960's this proportion has continued to rise at the rate of almost one percent per year.[9] For decades the Soviet authorities have taken strenuous measures to prevent migration to the larger cities. As early as 1931, for example, the party Central Committee tried to slow the tide by prohibiting the location of new industries in the main urban centers.[10] In Moscow and Leningrad, regulations have been adopted to prevent out-of-towners from establishing permanent residence, leading many to circumvent the law by such practices as contracting marriages of convenience with urban citizens in order to gain resident status. The failure of the authorities' efforts to stem urban growth is most evident in Moscow itself, where the population has mushroomed in the past three decades from about 4.5 million to over 6.5 million.[11] Similar though not quite as spectacular, growth has taken place in Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkhov, Gorky, Novosibirsk, and other cities.

Problems of Quantity

The crux of the housing problem is the failure of new residential construction to keep pace with the needs of this burgeoning urban population. Compared to past performance, the volume of

[8] "Housing Conditions and Urban Development in the USSR," *loc. cit.*, p. 545.

[9] See *Narodnoe khoziaistvo v SSR v 1963 godu* (The Economy in the USSR in 1963), Moscow, "Statistics" Publishing House, 1965, p. 8; *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1967 godu*, p. 7.

[10] *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh i resheniiakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Ts K* (The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee), Part II, 7th edition; Moscow, Political Literature Publishing House, 1954, p. 123.

[11] *SSSR* v *tsifrakh v 1967 godu*, p. 7.

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housing built in recent years is quite imposing: according to Soviet sources, one-third of the Soviet population received either new apartments or improved accommodations during the period 1959-1965.[12] Anyone who has visited the Soviet Union in recent years will testify to the fact that a great amount of residential and other construction appears to be taking place; "on the horizon there is a forest of construction cranes," in the purple prose of a Soviet propagandist. Yet the manifest effort to ease the housing shortage nevertheless amounts to too little too late; as party chief Leonid Brezhnev acknowledged in a speech to the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966, "We are building a great deal, but the housing problem still remains extremely acute." [13]

The authorities are of course paying the piper for decades of neglect of housing and other consumer needs under the Soviet system of economic priorities. Even in the years when the planned targets for housing construction were extremely low, they were almost never achieved. In fact, the goals for new housing have been met during only two plan periods in the fifty years of Soviet history —1951-55, and 1956-60. The seven-year plan ending in 1965 represented the first real effort to do something about the housing crisis, with the results just noted; yet it, too, fell short of the target, achieving only 85 percent of planned construction.[14]

The latest five-year plan, as originally adopted, called for a dramatic increase in the rate of urban housing construction, setting a total target of 480 million square meters of new floor space, or an average of 96 million square meters per year (only once in the past had more than 82 million square meters been built in a single year).[15] The results for 1966 were discouraging: only 80 million square meters (or 88.8 percent) of the first-year goal of 90 million square meters was achieved.[16] Consequently, before 1967 was over, the five-year plan goal was quietly lowered from 480 to 466 million square meters.[17] When the time came to disclose the achievements of the 1967 plan, the official announcement failed—for the first time in recent years—to reveal the precise amount of urban housing that had gone up; instead it stated that a total of 103.1 million square meters of urban *and* rural housing had been constructed during the year (in the past separate figures had been provided for urban housing construction, expressed in square meters, and rural construction, expressed in dwelling units, which was also the procedure used in stating plan goals).[18] While the announcement acknowledged that construction goals had not been met, this switch of indices suggested an attempt to withhold the actual record of performance from the popular press. Later in 1968, the statistical volume *SSSR v tsifrakh* published data setting urban housing construction in 1967 at 83.2 million square meters[19] (87.6 percent of the plan target). The same procedure of combining urban and rural construction was followed in the announcement of 1968 results early this year, and no further breakdown has as yet been provided. But since the combined 1968 total of "more than 102 million square meters" was less than the 1967 total, it seems clear that the urban housing target was again substantially underfulfilled.[20] Unless the level of construction improves drastically, even the revised five-year goal of 466 million square meters (which averages out to 93.2 million square meters of new urban housing per year) will be way out of reach.

The underfulfillment of housing goals is compounded by the fact that in many urban areas errors in planning have led to the destruction of great amounts of older housing in anticipation of more new construction that could be achieved—or at least completed—within a particular plan period, with the result that net increases in housing have been minimized. But while the Soviet system of planning is noted for its blunders, error alone cannot account for the fact that the Soviet leaders and planners continue to set higher goals than they are able to meet. No doubt the aim is to stimulate the construction industry to greater achievements than it would otherwise make, and while the results may be disappointing, the regime

[12] See, *e.g.*, *K Guseinov*, "Lgoty est, nuzhna zabota" (Privileges Exist, Concern is Needed), *Izvestia*, July 6, 1966, p. 3.
[13] *Materially XXIII Sezda KPSS* (Materials of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU), Moscow, Political Literature Publishing House, 1966, p. 58.
[14] See Sosnovy, "Housing Conditions and Urban Development in the USSR," *loc. cit.*, p. 54.
[15] Kosygin's speech in *Izvestia*, April 6, 1966, p. 5.
[16] *Izvestia*, Jan. 29, 1967, p. 2.
[17] *Izvestia* (Moscow), Oct. 10, 1967, p. 3.
[18] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 28, 1968, p. 2. The housing construction plan for 1967 had called for 93.4 million square meters of new urban housing and 425 thousand new homes on collective farms (*Izvestia*, Dec. 16, 1966, p. 3).
[19] *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1967 godu*, p. 136.
[20] Results for 1968 were announced in *Izvestia*, Jan. 26, 1969, p. 2; the 1968 urban housing goal had been 95 million square meters (*Izvestia*, Oct. 10, 1967, p. 3). For the first time the 1969 housing plan also used the combined urban-rural index in setting construction goals; for 1969 "more than 121 million square meters" of housing are to be built (*Izvestia*, Dec. 11, 1968, p. 3).

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betrays no particular embarrassment over the consistent failure to achieve plan figures. It is worth noting that the annual announcement of achievements for the previous year never indicates the percentage of plan fulfillment—possibly on the assumption that most Soviet citizens will neither remember the plan goal nor bother to look it up.

Problems of Quality

If the quantity of housing is a sore point with Soviet citizens, the quality of housing is no less so. Among the important measures of quality is the availability of utilities. While reliable statistics are hard to come by, several general statements can be made on the basis of information in numerous Soviet sources. Electric lighting now seems to be almost universal in state-owned urban housing but is found much less frequently in "privately" owned urban housing (on which more shortly) and rural dwellings. Running water, sewers and central heating are far less common than electricity, although again they are more prevalent in state housing than in private housing. In as "modern" a city as Leningrad, only about 70 percent of the apartments had central heating by 1963.[21] In 1965 less than a quarter of Soviet homes had gas service, and most of these were in the cities. One of the goals of the latest five-year plan is to increase gas service to cover 50 to 55 percent of urban residential property and to "start work on providing gas for rural homes," achieving 20 to 25 percent servicing in rural areas by the end of the plan period.[22] The scarcity of running water in Soviet housing is indirectly indicated by Kosygin's statement that during the 1966-70 plan period "a great number of cities and settlements will receive central water-supply systems."[23] Even in newly-built state housing, tenants often have to wait for utilities for a considerable period of time, since higher priority is given to the construction of new dwelling space than to the provision of "amenities."

New housing in the Soviet Union is rated as to quality by local governmental commissions, which are charged with inspecting each building upon its completion and giving it a grade of "satisfactory,"

THE RATING GAME

Sign hung by construction workers on a new building: "We greet the inspection commission." Commission chairman: "Well, this house doesn't have to be checked."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 3, January 1968.

"good," or "excellent." Soviet spokesmen have boasted that the percentage of "good" ratings in recent years has consistently climbed, while the percentage of "satisfactory" ratings has fallen. But at least one skeptic has questioned the value of the rating system by pointing to an apartment house in Tomsk which had received a rating of "good," despite the fact that its central heating, sanitary facilities and electrical system didn't work, and that neither the pedestrian nor the vehicular approaches to the building had been constructed.[24]

The run-down condition of even newer residential buildings has been a constant subject of complaint in the press. The difficulty of getting home repairs done—at least through legal channels—is notorious. One of the features of the city scene that has

[21] V. Isaev, "Pravo na order" (Right to Order), *Izvestia*, June 12, 1963, p. 3.
[22] *SSSR* v *novoi piatiletke* (The USSR in the New Five-Year Plan), Moscow, Political Literature Publishing House, 1966, p. 147.
[23] *Materialy XXIII Sezda KPSS*, p. 161.
[24] N. Kuleshov, "Troika, chetverka i brak" (Three, Four and Defective Workmanship), *Izvestia*, March 17, 1964, p. 4. On this problem, also see *Nedelia* (Moscow), Feb. 25, 1968, p. 20.

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

CONSTRUCTION RIDDLE

Photograph of an apartment house furnished with balconies that cannot be reached (see text right).

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 29, October 1965.

long struck foreigners visiting the Soviet Union is the prevalence of heavy steel mesh awnings extended over the sidewalks from even the newest buildings to protect pedestrians from falling pieces of the facade.

Since nearly every Soviet citizen has some gripe about his housing situation, there is an abundance of good newspaper copy for the critics of the much berated builders and housing administrators. Undoubtedly the leading critic is the satirical magazine *Krokodil*, which has long been noted for its exposures of bureaucratic waste and inefficiency. In almost every issue of the magazine there are one or more articles or cartoons railing against the lack of building materials or ridiculing some construction blunder. One of the best examples of this genre is a photograph of a recently built five-story residential building in Moscow equipped with a series of balconies which are attached to a solid concrete wall and which have absolutely no means of access. In an accompanying article, the editors venture solutions to the "riddle," including the possibility that "the builders had fulfilled their plan for doors but not for balconies." [25]

Along with the builders and administrators, Soviet architects have been the target of criticism for the poor quality of construction. In his speech to the 23rd Congress, Premier Kosygin demanded that architects "improve the planning of apartments and the exterior appearance of residential and public buildings," adding (no doubt with examples like the inaccessible balconies in mind), that they should manage this task "without committing excesses." [26] Probably as a result of this statement, a sentence was added to the directives on the five-year plan adopted by the Congress calling for improvements in the external appearance of buildings.

State Housing

The impact of the housing problem on the individual Soviet citizen can perhaps be best conveyed by examining what he can do when he is in need of improved accommodations for himself and his family. There are three basic options open to him, respectively, in the sectors of private, cooperative, and state-owned housing. Since the last is by far

[25] *Krokodil* (Moscow), No. 29, Oct. 20, 1965, p. 2.
[26] *Materialy XXIII Sezda KPSS*, p. 153.

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the largest sector of housing, the majority of citizens are faced with conforming to its procedures and regulations.

Most state-owned housing is administered either by the local government or by large industrial enterprises and other institutions which maintain housing for their employees. In some cities—for example, Leningrad—the allocation of all living space is handled through the city government. In others the system of allocation is decentralized, and enterprises can assign their own housing subject to various city regulations. In either case, long waiting lists are inevitable. Securing a place on a waiting list does not necessarily ensure that the citizen will eventually receive an apartment. Even great need is not a guarantee, although it helps. Important enterprises frequently resort to pressure to improve an employee's standing on a city-administered list. This practice has been criticized by a Leningrad official on the ground that "if a person who has been waiting in line for a long time suddenly finds out that someone has gotten ahead of him, this will undermine his faith in justice." But the same official somewhat contradictorily approves of allocating housing as a reward for socially useful work: "We consider it just to provide housing in the first instance to those who do excellent work."[27] This principle appears to be general policy in much of the Soviet Union. The city government of Yerevan has explicitly endorsed it in a 1963 housing ordinance, which also provides that housing will be allocated only to persons who have a continuous work record of at least three years, and that anyone who is not engaged in socially useful work will be denied registration or removed from the waiting list.[28]

However long he may have to wait, once a person obtains an apartment through the registration procedure, his position becomes fairly secure. He signs a lease for a term of five years, but the lease is renewable for as long as the tenant wishes. He is free to break the lease and leave at any time, but he may be evicted only under certain narrowly-defined conditions. For instance, if he or his family "systematically damage or spoil" the premises or continually cause disturbances, they may be evicted without being provided other accommodations. In most other circumstances, eviction must be accompanied by the furnishing of suitable substitute quarters to the tenant. This arrangement creates difficulties for the industrial enterprises which administer employee housing, a complaint that is frequently aired in the Soviet press. Some of the more important enterprises are allowed to evict workers without providing other accommodations, but only if a worker quits his job on his own initiative, commits a crime, or is found to have breached "labor discipline." This last condition is vague enough to invite abuse, but the extent to which employers resort to it is not clear.[29]

In addition to secure tenancy, state housing offers the advantage of low cost. Rents depend upon a number of variables, including the size of the city, the condition of the apartment, and the income of the tenant. But by any standards, the rental charge is extremely low for most citizens, averaging about 5 percent of a family's income (the average monthly wage of office and factory workers was 112.5 rubles, or about $125, in 1968).[30] Not all citizens are treated so reasonably, however. The use of rents as a discriminatory weapon is reflected in a report that priests in the city of Moscow have to pay five times the average charge for their accommodations.[31]

If living in state housing has its advantages, it also has its drawbacks. Only a lucky few are able to move into new apartment buildings, and these —as indicated earlier—may be of poor quality or wanting in utilities and other services. Moreover, even the newer apartments present space problems, since officials insist upon crowding in more people than the sanitary norm allows. The Yerevan housing ordinance, for instance, allows for up to three persons in a one-room apartment, four or five persons in a two-room apartment, and families of six to nine in three rooms. Thus, cramped quarters are inevitable for most citizens. A minority fare somewhat better, for housing is used as an instrument of privilege as well as of discrimination. Creative artists, senior scientists and scholars,

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[27] Isaev, *op. cit.*

[28] "On the Procedure for Registering, Allocating and Occupying Dwelling Space in the City of Yerevan," ordinance adopted Dec. 25, 1963, at the 3rd session of the Yerevan City Soviet. Published in *Kommunist* (of Armenia), Feb. 25, 1964; translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), May 6, 1964, p. 18.

[29] On these provisions of Soviet housing law, see Tolstoi, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-220.

[30] On rental charges, see T. D. Alekseev, *Spravochnik dlia profaktiva po zhilishchnomu zakonodatelstvu* (Handbook for the Trade Union Activist on Housing Legislation), Moscow, "Profizdat" Publishing House, 1966, p. 192. Wage data from *Izvestia*, Jan. 26, 1969, p. 2.

[31] Bernard Rudden, "Soviet Housing and the New Civil Code," *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* (London), January 1966, p. 239.

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inventors, higher-ranking party and governmental workers, military personnel with the rank of colonel and above, and also persons with certain types of illnesses are entitled to "additional space" (*dopolnitelnaia plóshchad*), but the privilege is not overwhelming: creative artists may claim 20 square meters of extra space; for the rest the award is one extra room—or if that is not available, a 10-square-meter portion of a room shared with someone else.[32]

One possibility open to the Soviet citizen who finds his apartment unsatisfactory is to exchange it for another. Such transactions are arranged directly between tenants, although the state has supervisory jurisdiction and permission is required from the administrators of the apartment houses involved. Exchanges are prompted by such motivations as the desire to have a larger or smaller (and cheaper) apartment, the wish to live closer to one's job or relatives, the need to find ground-floor accommodations for reasons of health, etc. Soviet sources give no indication of the volume of apartment-swapping, but it must be quite large, particularly in some parts of the country. Enough goes on in Moscow, for instance, to warrant a weekly 48-page bulletin containing several hundred advertisements by persons wishing to make an exchange. A typical ad reads as follows:

One room, 21 square meters, with all conveniences; hot water, 7th floor of an 8-floor building, elevator, balcony, incinerator. Kiev District, Kutozovskii Prospekt No. 37, Apartment 233. Telephone: 69-34-03, Mr. Demidov. [In exchange] for: Two rooms together with all conveniences and larger floor space.[33]

If the citizen has no luck exchanging apartments and considers the wait for state housing hopeless, he may consider the two alternatives that remain to him.

"Private" Housing

The older and more conventional of these alternatives is to build or buy his own home. The private sector of housing constitutes about one-third of all urban housing space in the Soviet Union, though the current trend of this ratio is downward. In recent years new privately-owned housing has averaged about one-quarter of all urban housing construction, and somewhat less than this proportion is planned for 1966-70.[34]

While Khrushchev was still in power, the "march toward communism" inspired policies aimed at discouraging Soviet citizens from the acquisition of major items of so-called "personal property" like homes and automobiles (the word "personal" rather than "private" is used with reference to all property belonging to Soviet citizens). Since 1962 the building of private homes in the capital cities of the union republics has been forbidden, and both building plots and credit from the state banks are difficult to obtain in other urban areas. Thus, much of the private building that goes on is in rural areas. However, the post-Khrushchev leadership has displayed a somewhat softer attitude than its predecessor,[35] and if the critical housing shortage continues—as it seems bound to—there may well be some easement of the restrictions on urban building that have depressed private construction.

A Soviet citizen who wants to build a house does not first buy a piece of land, as he would in a non-Communist country. A fundamental claim of Soviet ideology is that the land belongs to all the people; in practice, this means that all the land belongs to the state. The prospective home owner may only secure the right to build on a plot assigned to him by the local governmental body. Squatting or unauthorized use of land for building, although punishable by fine or imprisonment, appears to be fairly widespread. But if the citizen wants to be safe, he will acquire his plot legally.

His next step is to sign an agreement with the local government setting forth various specifications for his home-building project, including plans for the actual house. Credit for the ordinary citizen —if he can get it—may legally cover half of the building cost, with a top limit of 700 rubles (about $770). Repayment of this loan may be spread over

[32] Tolstoi, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-80.

[33] *Biulleten po obmenu zhiloi ploshchadi* (Bulletin for the Exchange of Housing Space); published by the housing administration of the Moscow City Soviet of Workers' Deputies. No. 22, May 6, 1962, p. 4.

[34] At the end of 1967 private housing amounted to 32.9 percent of the total of urban housing (*SSSR v tsifrakh v 1967 godu*, p. 138). From 1959 to 1965 new private housing constituted 26.8 percent of total urban housing construction (Sosnovy, "Housing Conditions . . .," p. 541). The latest five-year plan, as originally adopted, projected the proportion of private housing at about 17 percent (80 of 480 million square meters: *SSSR v novoi piatiletke*, p. 145); the actual proportion amounted to 19.4 percent in 1966 and 18.6 percent in 1967 (*SSSR v tsifrakh v 1967 godu*, p. 136).

[35] For instance, Premier Kosygin spoke at the 23rd Party Congress of the need to provide "large amounts of aid to workers, employees, and members of collective farms in the construction of individual houses, built with their own funds and with the aid of credit." *Izvestia*, April 6, 1966, p. 5.

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seven years at 2 percent interest.[36] Given this financial limitation, the quality of Soviet private housing is rarely better and often lower than that of state-owned housing.

A further legal restriction concerns the size of the house. Until 1958 the law allowed an individual to build or buy a one or two-story house of up to five rooms without specifying a limitation on total space. Structures built under this law were said to average about 75 square meters of living space. In 1958 the law was changed to limit the size of private homes to 60 square meters, the equivalent of five small to medium-sized rooms. With the adoption of the RSFSR Civil Code in 1964, it became clear that this limit did not apply, however, to the categories of favored citizens cited above (in the section on state housing) who are entitled to additional space. The Code also provided—with an eye, perhaps, to preserving the image of a classless society— that workers with large families could apply for additional space above the maximum.[37]

Soviet law further provides that each family may own only one home; if a second house is acquired by inheritance or in any other way, one of the structures must be sold or otherwise disposed of within one year. Aside from its ideological aim of limiting property, this law is one of a number of regulations designed to prevent speculation and other illegal economic activity in the housing field. For example, if an owner uses his dwelling or other structure to gain so-called "unearned income"—by renting at exorbitant prices or using the building to carry on an illegal business—it may be confiscated without compensation. Another and probably more common illegal practice is to *acquire* a house with unearned income. This may mean building a house with the profits of an outlawed business, but more often it involves the home-builder's stealing of construction supplies belonging to the state in order to get his house up—a practice encouraged by the notorious lack of building materials for sale through legal channels. The penalty for this crime is also confiscation without compensation.[38]

Given the built-in bias against private property which pervades the ranks of Soviet officialdom (though the depth of conviction seems problematical in the case of the many officials who own

[36] P. Zhuk, *Kooperativnoe i individualnoe zhilishchnoe stroitelstvo* (Cooperative and Individual Housing Construction), Moscow, "*Profizdat*" Publishing House, 1967, pp. 56-67. Certain favored categories of citizens can get credit up to 2,000 rubles, repayable over ten years.

[37] See the discussion of Article 106 of the RSFSR Code of 1964 in E. A. Fleishits, ed., *Nauchno-prakticheskii kommentarii k GK RSFSR* (Scientific-Practical Commentary on the RSFSR Civil Code), Moscow, "Legal Literature" Publishing House, 1966, pp. 122-24.

[38] Cf. *Zhilishchnoe i zhilischno-stroitelnoe zakonodatelstvo* (Housing and Housing-Construction Legislation), Kiev, Budivelnik Publishing House, 1967, Chap. IV, pp. 91-120.

Onward to Communism

Caption: "The Unveiling of a Memorial Stone." Three generations of a family celebrate the erection of a pedestal inscribed: "In ten years a telephone will be installed here."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 32, November 1966.

Открытие памятного камня. Рисунок Е. Щеглова

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homes), the Soviet citizen must be particularly circumspect in acquiring a private house for his family. The Soviet press contains frequent references to local authorities moving zealously against the private builder for real or alleged breaches of the law. Occasionally, these attacks are ventured against persons of some power or influence, as when a number of high judicial officials of the Tadzhik Republic were convicted for building themselves private estates out of public funds. More often, however, it is the property of the less exalted citizen that is tagged for confiscation by the authorities.

Cooperative Housing

Thus, the safer course for the citizen who seeks his own home is to join a housing construction cooperative. Cooperative housing was the subject of some experimentation early in Soviet history but was then abandoned for several decades. Not until 1962 was the idea revived and officially sanctioned, under a scheme which allows groups of citizens to combine forces and become shareholders in a venture to build a multi-apartment complex for their own occupancy. Since its revival, this form of housing has been encouraged by the regime and increasingly emphasized in economic plans. Between 1966 and 1970 cooperative housing is expected to contribute about 10 percent of all urban residential construction; in Moscow it already accounts for 15 percent of the new housing going up, and the proportion is expected to rise steeply in all of the major urban areas over the next several years.[39]

Cooperative housing has several important advantages over other forms. For one thing, it seems ideologically more orthodox than private housing, since it expresses the idea of collective action rather than individual initiative. Soviet publicists have been at pains to emphasize this point, since in earlier years even cooperative housing was adjudged unsuitable for a socialist society intent on building communism. In the present law on cooperatives, the authorities have carefully avoided using the word "ownership." The shareholder is "granted" an apartment for his "permanent use," although most of the rights of ownership accrue to him.[40] Among other advantages, multi-apartment cooperatives are much more suited to densely settled urban areas than are individual houses, and they also afford a means to channel significant amounts of money directly from the populace into housing, thereby somewhat relieving the burden of the state.

Given these considerations, it is hardly surprising that the Soviet authorities have shown enthusiasm for the cooperative housing scheme. Reams of literature have been produced encouraging groups of citizens to form cooperatives; political leaders have extolled their virtues; and the government has obliged by providing relatively generous legal and credit arrangements.

Cooperatives may be formed by any group of citizens, such as fellow workers in a plant or neighbors who want newer housing, so long as they meet the minimum membership requirement (set at 60 prospective shareholders in Moscow and Leningrad, fewer in smaller cities and rural areas). The cooperative then elects an executive committee from its membership and gets itself legally registered. Each member pays an entry fee and buys a share, the cost depending upon the size of the apartment he requires. The members must make a down payment of 40 percent of the cost of construction (30 percent in parts of the far north and Siberia). The remainder may be paid over a period of 10 to 15 years at an interest charge of ½ of 1 percent. The local government is supposed to supply a suitable plot of land. The shareholders collectively agree on the kinds of apartments they want and on other architectural details, and then arrange a contract with state construction enterprises to build the structure.[41]

An article published in a Soviet economic journal in 1965 supplies some cost figures on cooperative apartments. An apartment of two medium-sized rooms costs 3,500 to 4,500 rubles ($3,850-4,950), while a large one-room apartment costs 3,000 to 3,300 rubles ($3,300-3,630). For the two-room apartment, this amounts to a down payment of 1,400 to 1,800 rubles, with subsequent monthly

[39] A Beniamin-Zode, "Rezervy zhilishchno-stroitelnoe kooperatsii" (Reserves of Housing-Construction Cooperation) *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 10, 1965, p. 29.

[40] Article 16, "Primernyi ustav zhilishchno-stroitelnovo kooperativa" (Model Rules of a Housing-Building Cooperative), adopted by a decree (No. 1143) of the RSFSR Council of Ministers on Oct. 2, 1965. Published in S. Rozantsev, *Spravochnik po zhilishchnym voprosam* (Handbook on Housing Questions), Moscow, Moscow Workers' Publishing House, 1967, p. 252.

[41] Source of information in this paragraph is Sh. D. Chikvashvili, *Zhilishchno-stroitelnaia kooperatsiia v SSSR* (Housing-Construction Cooperation in the USSR), Moscow, "Legal Literature" Publishing House, 1965, pp. 3-91.

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payments of 12 to 23 rubles; for the one-room apartment the figures are 1,200 to 1,320 rubles down, and monthly payments of 10 to 16.5 rubles.[42] By Western standards this cost may seem extremely modest. But in the Soviet Union the lowest of the monthly payments cited is more than the rent in most state-owned apartments, and the latter of course require no down payment. Moreover, since one of the prime reasons for joining a cooperative is to get more space, it is probable that many families will need more than two rooms, at a proportionately higher cost. Nonetheless, great numbers of Soviet citizens seem willing and able to meet the costs involved, and thousands of cooperatives have sprung up, especially in the larger cities. While the moderately-price units described above are said to be typical, increasing numbers of cooperatives are being formed by members of the various Soviet elites to build larger and more expensive apartments.

If the prospects for cooperative housing seem bright, there is nevertheless a gloomier side to the picture. It may be that the magnitude of the demand for cooperative units was underestimated by the Soviet authorities, accounting for the problems that have been encountered to date. In any case, this new form of housing has not turned out to be the unblemished success the Soviet leaders hoped it would be, and in many parts of the country the results of cooperative efforts have been woefully discouraging.

As in other sectors of the housing industry, the plans for cooperative construction are regularly underfulfilled. Although there are cities with large amounts of new cooperative housing, there are also cities where not one such apartment has yet been built despite impressive plans. Party and state regulations stipulate that within one month of the receipt of applications from cooperatives, local governments must provide plots supplied with roads, water mains, sewers and power lines. Yet, as articles in the Soviet press repeatedly attest, the local authorities are slow to assign building sites. When the plots are finally designated, they often lack the features and improvements required by law and are located far from public transportation facilities or from the residents' places of work. In the city of Kazan cooperative sites have been assigned in swampy marshlands. Under the law, charges for locating food stores, catering and other services on the ground floors of cooperative buildings are not to be assessed to the cooperative, but this rule is often violated.

The lag in the cooperative building program is attributed by at least one Soviet critic to the "scornful attitude" of many local officials toward this type of housing. "Local government leaders underestimate their role in solving the housing problem," he writes, and construction organizations look upon them as "third-rate customers." If housing cooperatives "are not put on a solid industrial basis," he concludes, "they will not be successful."[43] In addition to other obstacles, the massive amount of red tape that pervades so much of Soviet life plagues the housing cooperatives. The statement of a Soviet bank official makes this point well: "A person entering a cooperative must present the executive committee [of the local government] with so many documents that merely to list them would take half a page."[44]

* * *

Summing up, whatever course the Soviet citizen may choose in his search for better housing for himself and his family, he is likely to encounter delays, obstacles and frustrations to a degree that seems astonishing in a major industrial state. In terms of construction statistics, he may be far better off than he was a decade ago. But from a practical point of view, he will be lucky to find a satisfactory home even if he happens to enjoy privileged status and income; if he is an ordinary citizen, his quest for decent housing—as minimally defined in other industrialized countries—remains a goal that is as yet beyond reach.

[42] A. Beniamin-Zode, *op. cit.*

[43] K. Guseinov, *op. cit.*

[44] D. Dudikov, "Nash zhilishchno-stroitelnyi kooperativ" (Our Housing-Construction Cooperative), *Izvestia*, Dec. 24, 1963, p. 3.

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The Countryside

By Karl-Eugen Wädekin

In the fall of 1968 the Central Committee and Council of Ministers of the USSR held deliberations of considerable import for the future development of the Soviet countryside. Among other things, these talks produced a directive entitled "On Bringing Order Into Construction in Rural Areas," [1] a document which sheds some authoritative light on a subject that has been under intense public discussion since the fall of 1967: rural reconstruction.

The directive designates as one of the country's "foremost tasks" the "gradual transformation" of agrarian communities

. . . into well-appointed settlements with good housing, cultural, and living conditions that satisfy the demands of the rural population, as well as appropriate production units that will make it possible to create all the necessary conditions for high labor productivity . . . and an intensive development of agriculture . . . .

What is remarkable about this directive is its emphasis on gradualism and its avoidance of a concept that had played a considerable role in all previous discussions of this subject and which in fact was enshrined in the 1961 Party Program: namely, the notion of constructing *urban-type* "settlements" or "settlement centers" for habitation by agricultural workers. This concept was and remains closely related to that of the "agrotown" (*agrogorod*), which has been cropping up for nearly twenty years and is most often associated with the name of Khrushchev.

Plans for the transformation of the Soviet village into a type of settlement which would fulfill the Communist ideal of applying an industrial style of working and living to agriculture—a transformation, that is, of the peasant, including the collectivized peasant, into an agricultural proletarian—have existed ever since collectivization was first introduced.[2] One such "agroproletarian" settlement

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 2, 1968.

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[2] The author wishes to thank M. Basile Kerblay, Paris, for informing him that the concept of "agrotowns" was alluded to in the remarks of a high-ranking Soviet planning official as early as 1930. See *L'URSS dans dix ans*, Paris, 1930, p. 120, and *La correspondance internationale* (Paris), March 5, 1930, p. 226.

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containing large apartment houses was the "Gigant" sovkhoz at Zernograd on the lower Don, which was built in the 1930's.[3] More recent initiatives toward proletarianizing the countryside have been in evidence since 1948.[4] Indeed, they attracted considerable attention both at home and abroad when, in 1951, Khrushchev gave them a forthright endorsement—only to be repudiated by Stalin. Several years ago, the American economist Luba O. Richter compiled a comprehensive report on these earlier developments and briefly described similar tendencies since the mid-1950's.[5] The present author has also dealt elsewhere with developments in this area during the Khrushchev era,[6] hence, it suffices here to outline in brief the background of recent discussions bearing on the transformation of the Soviet countryside.

Khrushchev and the Agrotown

The term "agrotown" has proven to be very infectious and has been widely employed in reference to various plans for radical rural reconstruction. Yet even Khrushchev used it only on rare occasions. In fact, even when he first mentioned the expression in his speech of January 18, 1951 (printed in *Pravda*, March 4), he went so far as to caution against its use. (It was well that he added this *caveat*, because in its next issue *Pravda* carried an editorial note indicating that his pronouncements were not to be taken as authoritative.) What Khrushchev specifically had in mind was the construction in rural areas of "well-appointed urban-type dwellings with all modern facilities," the creation of "new settlements and economic centers," and the resettlement of persons from "small, ill-appointed villages into well-appointed [communities]."[7] Even after becoming party First Secretary, he continued to avoid using the term "agrotown" in connection with these ideas, perhaps because it implied restrictions on private agriculture that were alarming to the peasantry. He preferred to speak of "urban-type settlement centers."

But whatever the terminology used by Khrushchev, the first "kolkhoz agrotown" was indeed completed in the Ukraine in 1958.[8] Soon afterward, the term "agrotown" made its reappearance in the press, indicating that official thinking on the subject of rural reconstruction—at least among Khrushchev's closest supporters—had its roots in his radical proposals of 1951.[9] The First Secretary himself was again speaking of bringing scattered segments of the rural population together into settlements with multi-storied buildings; on December 25, 1959, he mentioned two huge apartment houses (with several thousand occupants) on the outskirts of Moscow as good examples of what he had in mind. Clearly, he was not simply thinking of rural settlements, but of genuine urban-type communities, *i.e.*, "agrotowns"; but still he continued to shun the term, presumably because of actual or potential resistance within the party leadership.[10] After 1961, Khrushchev's efforts to establish real "agrotowns" shifted mainly to the sovkhozes, and during the last years of his regime, relatively little was said about urbanizing the countryside. In fact, it became clear that the construction of ordinary farm buildings had taken investment priority over housing projects and other more radical forms of rural reconstruction.

Since Khrushchev's fall, discussion on the general subject of rural reconstruction has not subsided completely inasmuch as his successors have also been aware of the need to modernize sparsely-populated and/or ill-equipped agrarian communities. The issues at stake in the discussions of recent years have centered around the form of reconstruction and the pace at which it is to be carried out. But before examining these discussions, it would be well to take a brief look at the areas being considered for reconstruction.

Rural Life Today

In Russian villages (as in the villages of the major non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union), peasants have traditionally lived in dwellings with

[3] O. Shiller, *Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie* (Frankfurt-am-Main), April 1963, p. 95.

[4] A regulation of October 5, 1948, required that new village buildings had to be erected in accordance with countrywide construction plans that were to be worked out over the next two to three years; but at that time sufficient funds for such an ambitious undertaking were hardly available.

[5] Luba O. Richter, "Plans to Urbanize the Countryside 1950-61," in Jane Degras and Alec Nove (eds.), *Soviet Planning: Essays in Honor of Naum Jasny*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1964, pp. 32-45.

[6] K.-E. Wädekin, *Sowjetstudien* (Munich), No. 22, 1967, pp. 57-63.

[7] L. O. Richter, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 37.

[8] I. Vinnichenko, *Duma o kommunizme*, Moscow, Molodaia gvardiia, 1959, p. 3.

[9] See L. O. Richter, *loc. cit.*

[10] For further details, see K.-E. Wädekin, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

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attached plots of land, ranging from one-half to a whole acre, on which garden vegetables, fruit, potatoes and other crops are raised for family consumption, while the fields belonging to the kolkhoz or sovkhoz as such are situated outside the villages. This arrangement has produced widely spread-out settlements, usually consisting of rows of houses along a road, with long, narrow plots behind the houses.

The technical amenities of modern civilization are scarce: many villages are still without electricity, and running water, sewage systems, and piped gas are rarely to be found. Even in certain districts of Russian cities, it is still customary to find garden plots of up to one-third of an acre adjoining the dwellings, and sometimes even livestock. Such "urban" districts, with their primitive one and two-story houses, cover larger areas than is commonly thought (especially in small and medium-sized towns and where erstwhile villages have been incorporated into expanding metropolises). But facilities in these areas are quite rustic by Western standards: water must often be fetched by hand from wells or hydrants placed at intervals in the street, and sewage systems are usually non-existent. Up to now, electric light is the one utility that can be found in nearly all such districts, and gas lines are also being introduced on an increasing scale.

What does the proposed transformation of rural communities into "urban-type settlements" entail? Is it to involve the resettlement of thousands of peasants into vast apartment complexes equipped with all the communal services and amenities usually found in a modern city? If so, today's private plots, which make such an important contribution to overall agricultural production, will most likely give way to ornamental flower beds surrounding apartment houses. Or will the regime opt instead to encourage the construction of traditional one and two-family houses, with the proviso that they be built more closely together than has thus far been the case in many villages and suburbs? This would reduce but not eliminate the private plots, and it would also obviate the necessity for massive resettlement programs. Communal services (such as gas, running water, and sewage disposal) could be gradually introduced into existing agrarian communities—in other words, these communities would be modernized, rather than "urbanized."

The Debate Since Khrushchev

Thus, in following the debate[11] in the Soviet press regarding rural reconstruction, it is helpful to look at certain key indicators as a means of distinguishing between extreme and moderate approaches. These indicators include the type of dwellings, the size of private plots, and the number

[11] A detailed account of recent discussions, with numerous sources which need not be repeated here, was given by this author in *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), No. 8/9, 1968, pp. 602-627, and in *Sowjetstudien*, No. 24, 1968, pp. 3-33.

— Товарищ директор, к нам в общежитие медведь забрался!
— Хорошо, хорошо, как-нибудь и я загляну...

Рисунок Ю. УЗБЯКОВА

JOYS OF THE COUNTRY

—"Comrade Director, a bear tore into our dormitory!"
—"Alright, alright, I'll look into it somehow."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 3, January 1968.

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of inhabitants proposed for future agrarian communities.

In the period immediately following Khrushchev's overthrow, some critics objected to the construction of large apartment houses of up to four or five stories as a means of concentrating a dispersed rural population.[12] It soon became clear, moreover, that the plans for establishing such large settlements had undergone substantial modification since their initiation in 1959-60. The objective now was a less radical reduction in the number of existing villages by means of consolidation (*sselenie*). In Moscow oblast, the number of villages earmarked to be expanded into such prospective settlements was now almost three times as large as in the older plans, with the result that fewer existing villages would be condemned to extinction.[13] In the Ukraine, there was talk of permitting the population of villages to range from 500 to 3,000, but 79 percent of the Ukrainian population was in any case already living in villages of over 500 population as of 1959.[14] In Lithuania, where over one-half of all rural settlements had less than 50 inhabitants in 1959, the revised plans called for the preservation and expansion of 4,700 villages, which would only bring the average village population to between 300 to 350.[15]

In 1967, however, the rate of resettlement was stepped up. In Lithuania, for instance, only 276 hamlets and individual farms had been resettled in 1966, but by the end of 1967, their number had risen to 1,829.[16] This acceleration of the tempo of resettlement was symptomatic of a resurgence of pressure in favor of radical rural reconstruction,[17] for which the USSR State Committee for Construction (Gosstroi) and the agricultural journal *Selskaia zhizn* appear to have been chiefly responsible.

Opposing voices counseling moderation also found expression, especially in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, which published a series of articles on the subject of rural reconstruction in the fall and winter of 1967-68.

In one of these articles, the Soviet writer Boris Mozhaev directly opposed the consolidation of small villages unless it was undertaken at the express wish of the rural population itself. He urged instead an expansion of the network of rural roads, which would be less costly and would make a large part of the resettlement program unnecessary.[18]

But the radicals continued to press their case. In 1968, in a volume of essays by diverse authors, the "agrotown" was once again put forward as the goal of the future but was defined in such a way as to leave open the question of just how "urban" it should be ("a complex of beautiful living quarters possessing architectural significance, with abundant green areas and sunlight . . ., the economic and cultural center of an agrarian-industrial community").[19]

By the summer of 1968, it was clear that an authoritative statement was needed from Moscow, but no such statement was forthcoming. To begin with, there was no such thing as a central agency responsible for coordinating rural construction. Nor did any binding statement emerge from a "conference-seminar" on rural reconstruction held in Minsk in early July, at which three ministers presented their views.

The "Conference-Seminar"

S. D. Khitrov, USSR Minister of Rural Construction, did not go into the complex problems of rural reconstruction as a whole, confining himself to pointing out the shortages of manpower and materials in the construction industry,[20] which would naturally be aggravated by a more rapid rate of rural reconstruction. V. V. Matskevich, the Minister of Agriculture, counseled more openly against too precipitous an approach to rural reconstruction, stressing that plans for such reconstruction were

[12] *E.g.*, "Obzor statei i pisem," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 3, 1966; V. Sinitsyn, *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, 1965; P. Ignatovsky, *Pravda*, Aug. 15, 1966, p. 3.

[13] By summer 1968, the Moscow oblast soviet was permitting rural construction cooperatives to build traditional one and two-family houses. See P. Vainshtein, *Selskaia zhizn* (Moscow), June 5, 1968, p. 2.

[14] *Selskaia zhizn*, Dec. 1, 1966, p. 1; I. Loboda, *Ekonomika sovetskoi Ukrainy* (Kiev), No. 8, 1967, p. 79. Distribution of settlements in the Ukraine 1959: *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda*, Moscow, Gosstatizdat, Table 9.

[15] *Itogi vsesoiuznoi . . ., Litovskaia SSR*, Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1962, Table 9.

[16] *Selskaia zhizn*, June 15, 1968, p. 2.

[17] In Belorussia, for example, the authorities drew up strict rules governing private house-building and limiting private plots near one-family houses to two-fifths of an acre; any other privately-used land was to be located outside the village. See N. Divakov, *Selskaia zhizn*, June 9, 1968, p. 2.

[18] *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 8, 1968, p. 10. The same position was also taken by O. G. Tunkareli, Chairman of the Georgian *Gosstroi*, according to N. Chetunova, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 34, 1968, p. 10.

[19] *Problemy izmeneniia sotsialnoi struktury sovetskovo obschchestva*, Moscow, Nauka, 1968, p. 202.

[20] *Stroitelnaia gazeta* (Moscow), July 3, 1968, pp. 2-3.

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contingent upon completing long-range plans for agricultural development, including plans for regional specialization and the economic organization of individual enterprises.[21] This implied that any rural reconstruction undertaken while the long-range plans for agricultural development were still in the drafting stage—and they still are—might result in major misapplications and losses of investment.

I. T. Novikov, Chairman of Gosstroi, took a more radical stand. He proposed an altogether unrealistic deadline of 1970-71 for the completion of long-range agricultural development plans, voicing the conviction that the "successful reconstruction of rural localities was dependent on it." [22] Moreover, he insisted that all rural reconstruction plans must be ready by 1973-75, and that those for completely new villages must be drawn up even earlier. The radical nature of his position was further underscored when he stated:

If rural people prefer . . . to live in multi-storied buildings . . ., no restrictions should be imposed on anyone in such cases. However, everything must be done to restrain and even prohibit any autonomous, spontaneous construction activity . . . Mistakes committed in past years confirm that a mechanical application of urban construction to the countryside is not acceptable. This, however, does not mean that we have to return to the traditional old-style peasant dwelling, with an individual residence and private plot nearby, circumscribing the whole existence of the peasant family. Unfortunately, in several regions, such a tendency exists.[23]

By contrast, in a report on the Minsk discussions, the journalist N. Chetunova claimed that many of the participants had favored "one-story, one family houses with garden plots next to the houses," while others had advocated two-story, two-family houses, likewise with adjoining garden plots.[24] She made no mention whatever of any advocates of multi-storied dwellings, and it would appear that, apart from Novikov, this idea was favored by only a small minority at best. Furthermore, Chetunova strongly emphasized the disparity between the requirements of agricultural planning and the short construction deadlines demanded by Novikov, remarking:

One would assume that such hasty work could hardly ensure a thoroughgoing analysis of all the factors of economics, climate, nationality, improved living conditions, demography, etc., bearing on the development of the respective districts.[25]

A Moderate Solution

The issue remained unresolved until October 1968, when the joint Central Committee and Council of Ministers directive referred to at the outset finally supplied authoritative guidelines for the future development of the countryside. Following upon the earlier controversies and the extreme demands of Gosstroi chief Novikov, this directive must be viewed as a clearcut victory for the advocates of moderate rural reconstruction: it contained no rigid prescriptions, left room for continued experimentation, avoided the term "urban-type settlements," and set longer time limits than those urged by Novikov.

The directive stipulated that only central villages of kolkhozes and sovkhozes whose production specialization has already been determined will be required to complete their construction plans within the next five years. This not only substantially reduces the number of individual construction plans to be completed by 1973, but also takes account of the Agriculture Minister's contention that the long-range plans for agriculture—which cannot be drawn up from one year to the next—should take precedence over construction plans. Another modest requirement was that one or two modern demonstration villages should be built in every oblast or autonomous republic during 1969-75 so as to provide the experimental basis on which the reconstruction of other villages might proceed. This, obviously, is a far cry from Novikov's 1973-75 deadline for the completion of all construction plans.

The directive also specified that due consideration should be given to the "varying local conditions of agricultural production" and "the national peculiarities of the population," as well as to "local natural and climatic conditions and the specific characteristics of the work and life of the rural population." It further stressed the participation of local organizations in the preparation of construction plans. These reservations were by no means new, but they had often been ignored in the past in favor of mechanical prescription by Moscow. The directive recommended further that kolkhozes con-

[21] *Selskaia zhizn*, July 6, 1968, p. 2.
[22] *Ibid.*, July 2, 1968, p. 2.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 34, 1968, p. 10.
[25] *Ibid.*

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tribute their own cash or credit resources toward financing construction, and that they try to attract private funds by granting special concessions for individual and cooperative housing construction. This sort of financing is also hardly novel,[26] but it had never before been generally and officially recommended for the countryside.

Although the directive did not specify what size or type of rural housing should be built, and whether or not private plots should be attached, the reference to enlisting private funds would suggest that construction of a large number of one-family homes will be permitted, because this is the type of house for which private savings can most readily be mobilized. Nor could it have been mere coincidence that on October 3, the day after the directive was published, *Selskaia zhizn* carried a report about a village in the Transcarpathian oblast stressing the advantages, in rural areas, of modern one-family houses adapted to the traditional mode of living. What the journal had in mind seemed to resemble for the most part the type of dwellings—not overly modern, but with adjoining garages—found in many parts of Central and Western Europe. The Transcarpathian village was lauded in these terms:

The construction of the village of Sredne-Vodianoe shows how the manifold demands of modern life can be successfully harmonized with good local traditions and the rich heritage of national architecture. That is exactly what the directive of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers concerning the regulation of rural construction seeks to encourage.

On October 5, the same newspaper told of a village which had built one-half of its new houses as one-family homes and the other half as two-story row houses, all having directly adjoining private plots. On October 9, again in *Selskaia zhizn*, the president of the architects' association of Uzbekistan gave an account of the fiasco that had resulted from earlier planning efforts in the new sovkhoz villiages of the recently irrigated Central Asiatic wasteland. There, big apartment houses had been unimaginatively constructed on the pattern of urban dwellings, providing only small garden plots of 200 square meters each, and the buildings were situated in open areas without any shade. "Everything seemingly had been planned with a view to making the central villages of sovkhozes the model for the transformation of rural life," said the article. "And yet they never became such a model." The plans had been later modified, and one-family and two-family houses were built with garden plots of 800 square meters each.

However, the press reports that came out in the wake of the directive did not present an entirely uniform picture. For instance, there was a report of a Ukrainian village which spoke only of the construction of two-story buildings containing 12-18 dwelling units each.[27] There have also been reports of a somewhat more radical kind of planning for a typical Central Russian district, envisaging the consolidation of over 300 existing villages, most of them having a population of not more than 20 to 30, into only 48 villages with a population of 500 each by 1980. However, these settlements would still be relatively small and are to retain one-family dwellings, thus preserving their rural character.[28]

It would no doubt be erroneous to interpret the regime's unmistakable shift toward a more moderate line on rural reconstruction as a modification of ideology *per se*. Still, there has definitely been a modification in the long-term concept of rural living, for whatever is built now and over the next few years along the lines of the directive cannot be undone at a moment's notice. At a plenary session of the USSR Association of Architects in mid-October 1968, its secretary, G. M. Orlov, declared:

Our current practical activity is shaping the design and appearance of the Communist village of the future. The lifespan of modern buildings is a hundred years or more. This means that today's mistakes may cause great damage and in some instances may be practically beyond repair.[29]

That even the latest, more moderate forms of rural reconstruction will bring country life closer to urban patterns cannot be ruled out, just as villages in the highly industrialized countries of Centrol and Western Europe have acquired a form which is fully urban by Soviet standards. But it is on the already existing suburban zones of one-family and two-family houses that new Soviet villages are now being patterned, and not on the rural prole-

[26] See, *e.g.*, *Ekonomicheskie zakonomernosti pererastaniia sotsializma v kommunizm*, Moscow, Nauka, 1967, p. 212.

[27] *Selskaia zhizn*, Oct. 17, 1968, p. 2.

[28] See the full page description of this district planning in *Selskaia zhizn*, Nov. 16, 1968, p. 3.

[29] See the report by P. Vainshtein, *Selskaia zhizn*, Oct. 24, 1968, p. 2.

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tarian concepts that Marx and Lenin had in mind. To be sure, small, two story buildings containing a dozen or so dwelling units will also play an important role in the new variant of "urbanization."

Practical Considerations

We can be certain that the decisions of the Soviet leadership were dictated by practical considerations. These can be divided into four categories, as follows:

1) The existence of shortages of money, construction materials, and construction workers is one critical factor which is so well documented that there is no need to go into detailed discussion of it here.[30] It may be useful, however, to form some idea of the dimensions of the financial requirements which rapid and radical rural reconstruction would have entailed. This writer has already presented elsewhere an estimate of the amounts which would have been involved, calculated on the basis of the minimum cost per square meter of living space.[31]

Another method of computation yields much bigger sums. In the case of two Ukrainian villages, the overall costs of reconstruction were recently given as 12 million rubles for one and 20 million for the other.[32] However, villages in the Ukraine are generally larger than the overall average for the Soviet Union and not all of them are to be completely rebuilt. If, making due allowance for these factors, we take just 5 million rubles as the average cost per village and figure on the reconstruction of only the approximately 50,000 central villages of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, we arrive at an aggregate cost of 250 billion rubles! (Actually, the number of the villages to be reconstructed is larger: I. T. Novikov estimated it at 110,000,[33] including secondary villages of smaller size.) If, instead, we base our computation on the estimated cost of reconstructing the Furmanovsky oblast of Ivanovo, we arrive at a smaller but still huge sum in state allocations alone.[34] In either case, even if the kolkhozes and their individual members were to supply one-half of the required total funds—a very optimistic assumption—the extra burden on the national budget would still exceed the total budget for 1967.

2) Both the organization of individual agricultural units (kolkhozes and sovkhozes) and production planning would have been seriously disrupted by a radical and rapid program of rural reconstruction. The number of villages in 1959, exclusive of non-agricultural settlements and settlements with less than eleven inhabitants, was about 350,000.[35] If these were to be consolidated into only 110,000 expanded villages, each kolkhoz or sovkhoz would, on average, contain only two villages instead of seven as at present. (The kolkhozes comprise an average productive area of about 7,410 acres, and the sovkhozes, about 19,760 acres. If one includes woodlands and other areas, they are, of course, much larger.) Such consolidation would therefore greatly extend the distance between home and place of work and would thus require the rapid construction of a comprehensive network of roads within the operating areas. But since this work has hardly begun in the Soviet Union, the cost of precipitous resettlement would be a reduction in operational efficiency, since the time lost in transporting workers to and from the fields would only aggravate the shortage of agricultural manpower in large parts of the country. By the same token, rural transport equipment and facilities, which are inadequate even for present purposes, would have to be multiplied several times over. There is also reason to fear that the elimination of some 240,000 small and medium-sized villages would result in some reduction in the area of land under cultivation.

Obviously, so drastic a change in the structure of rural settlements would have to be brought into line with plans for long-range agricultural development. But even assuming that detailed plans for such development could be successfully completed within the next few years, they would surely have to be adjusted to meet new and changing realities, and such modifications could in turn upset some of the plans for rural reconstruction and render the investments connected with them useless. The more rapid and drastic the rural reconstruction, the greater the chances that this might occur.

3) Internal migration and rural population shifts are another important factor which is vir-

[30] Compare the aforementioned speech by S. D. Khitrov; N. Verkhovsky, *Novyi mir* (Moscow), No. 7, 1968, pp. 251 f; and G. Radov, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 41, 1968, p. 1.

[31] *Sowjetstudien*, No. 24, 1968, p. 29.

[32] *Selskaia zhizn*, Sept. 7, 1968, p. 4, and Oct. 17, 1968, p. 2.

[33] *Ibid.*, July 2, 1968, p. 2.

[34] 50 million rubles in the socialized sector, *Selskaia zhizn*, Nov. 16, 1968, p. 3. Multiplied by the total number of about 3,000 districts in the USSR, this would amount to 150 billion rubles.

[35] *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi . . .*, Table 9.

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tually unpredictable. Serious Soviet research in this area has been in progress for less than ten years, and those involved are as yet unable to make accurate prognoses about these processes. If the retreat from the countryside in the areas north of the black-earth zone or in the Virgin Lands, for example, continues despite all official countermeasures, a large number of reconstruction plans will be invalidated. Instead of the projected large and urbanized central villages, there could eventually be "tiny and very sparsely scattered, though well-equipped settlements." [36] On the other hand, the rapid growth of the rural population in the south of Russia and the Asian republics could also invalidate reconstruction plans.

4) Drastic rural reconstruction would almost certainly have met with a negative response on the part of the population affected and would thereby have hurt production. Even the more moderate plans for rural reconstruction and resettlement show a distinct tendency to restrict private agricultural operations, or at least to render such operations more difficult by reason of the fact that private plots will no longer be directly adjacent to peasant dwellings but will be situated outside the villages. That the great majority of the rural population is opposed to such restrictions and encumbrances on private cultivation goes almost without saying. Furthermore, the probable drop in private agricultural production that would result would have undesirable consequences not only for the diet of the rural population but also for the supply of the "free" urban kolkhoz markets, which are still indispensable sources of food for the general public. On this score, the lesson of the Khrushchev era, during which severe restrictions were imposed on kolkhoz markets, is still fresh in Soviet memories.[37]

Because of these and other disadvantages in living and working conditions which would be caused by radical rural resettlement, it is also quite possible that the end result might be an acceleration of the exodus from the countryside which has been gathering momentum since 1959. Family men and women, in particular, will dislike the idea of spending long periods of the summer in remote fields, where they would have to live in "field camps in the form of well-equipped hostels" [38] because it would take too long to transport them to and from their central villages. And even where field workers could be transported on a daily basis, they would be penalized by reason of the fact that the Soviet wage system does not take travel time into account. This was pointed out prior to the 1966-67 wave of propaganda in favor of resettlement by two Soviet authors, who observed:

. . . the population of these hamlets sometimes resists resettlement in large villages at all costs, because this automatically involves a big increase in working time by

Пока не завезли кирпич...

Рисунок С. КУЗЬМИНА

BUILDING UP THE COUNTRYSIDE

Peasant construction workers stand idle, while building directors watch the "Production Schedule" blow away. Caption: "Bricks not yet delivered."

—*From* **Krokodil** *(Moscow), No. 7, March 1966.*

[36] N. Verkhovsky, *Novyi mir*, No. 7, 1968, p. 209.
[37] See *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1968, pp. 22-30.
[38] *Ekonomika selskovo khoziaistva* (Moscow), No. 11, 1967, p. 14.

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lengthening the distance between home and place of work.[39]

Clearly, at a time when the goals of the current agricultural five-year plan can be achieved only with great effort, if at all, the Soviet leadership can scarcely afford to provoke a sharply negative reaction on the part of the agricultural labor force.

Future Prospects

All these factors which influenced the October 1968 directive indicate that rural resettlement will be carried out only on a limited scale, at least for the present. There is no doubt that resettlement makes sense under certain conditions; for example, in depopulated or arid areas. In general, however, the development of an extensive year-round road system would do more to raise living standards in the villages. It would have the advantage not only of increasing the welfare of the rural population but also of providing an impetus to agriculture itself.

Unless there is a sudden new shift in the political line in the near future, it would appear that the sheer weight of social and economic circumstances will continue to prevent the introduction of the *agrogorod* in the old Khrushchevian sense. Rather, rural reconstruction will probably be pushed on a selective and localized basis, with regional variations of intensity. Accordingly, any large apartment developments in rural centers are likely to be predominantly inhabited by so-called specialists—managers, office workers, teachers, medical personnel, drivers, and so on. Actually, some of these people no longer care to have private agricultural plots and livestock holdings, wanting at most perhaps small fruit and flower gardens. In many cases, young people who have completed their regular education, and perhaps even had specialized training, will probably move away of their own accord from the gradually dying peripheral villages and gravitate to the central villages—a movement that can already be observed in many areas. Another element to be considered is that non-agricultural operations and occupations are gaining importance in the villages, just as the non-agricultural population constitutes a relatively increasing segment of the decreasing rural population.[40]

The Soviet state and party will encourage and hasten such processes, partly by mild pressure but probably without trying to impose forcible and precipitous changes. The previously mentioned plenary session of the Soviet Architects' Association reached the following unanimous conclusion as to the future of rural construction: "Public services and the cultural and general conditions of living should be of the urban type. But they should be complemented by the advantages of village life!" [41]

It must be borne in mind here that for the great bulk of the Soviet rural population, private agricultural production is one of the "advantages of village life." Their attitude might be defined as follows: "Modernization, yes—proletarianization, no." Apparently the Soviet state and party are prepared to take account of this attitude, perhaps because they do not want to create an added source of popular unrest at a time when they are already confronted by various urgent problems, both domestic and international.

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[39] M. Tikhomirov and I. Chernov, *Ekonomika selskovo khoziaistva*, No. 1, 1966. p. 105.

[40] See N. Verkhovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 209, 212, and K.-E. Wädekin, *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft* (Stuttgart), No. 1, 1968, pp. 1-25.

[41] P. Vainshtein, *Selskaia zhizn*, Oct. 24, 1968, p. 2.

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Mao, Marx, and the Future Society

By Lloyd Eastman

Marxists have never been lavish in describing the features of the ultimate Communist society. For one thing, they have felt that to do so in great detail would not be in keeping with the "scientific" character of their ideology. For another, they have always been relatively preoccupied with more immediate and pressing considerations—philosophical problems (such as a "correct" analysis of the enemy, be it "capitalism" or "imperialism") as well as strategic concerns (such as the seizure or maintenance of power). But since the attainment of a perfect society is central to the Marxist *Weltanschauung*, they have never been able to refrain entirely from speculating about its nature.

The compulsion to describe the realm of the future, however sketchily, has been as strong in Marx's leading disciples as it was in the master himself. And if, for example, Lenin and Trotsky disagreed with each other—and differed even from Marx—on many questions, the visions of Communist society held by all three men were essentially alike, for their ideas derived from similar cultural backgrounds and similar revolutionary goals. Not so, the ideas of Mao Tse-tung. A comparison of Mao's vision of the future society with that of Marx clearly reveals significant differences. Whereas Marx, for instance, believed in the ultimate perfectibility of human nature, Mao does not. And whereas Marx envisioned the disappearance of political authority in Communist society, Mao believes that the need for a dominant political leadership is inexorable in human society, whatever the degree of its advancement. The purpose of this paper is to describe the views of Marx and Mao regarding human nature and authority in a Communist society, and to demonstrate that their disparate nature derives precisely from the differences between the backgrounds of the two men and the goals they set out to attain.

Karl Marx's initial and abiding preoccupation was the improvement of the human condition. He decried the degradation and dehumanization of mankind—he called it the "alienation" of man—that had been wrought by human greed and by man's exploitation of man in capitalist society. Man seemed to have become something less than human; he was a mere commodity as a result

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of being forced to sell himself and his labor simply to keep alive.

But Marx possessed an apocalyptic vision of the future. He believed that capitalism was destroying itself, and that out of its ashes there would emerge a society in which man would realize the truly human qualities of his being. "*Communism*," he wrote, is the *positive* abolition of *private property*, of *human self-alienation*, and thus the real *appropriation* of human nature through and for man. It is, therefore, the return of man himself as a *social, i.e.*, really human, being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous development. . . . It is the *definitive* resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species." [1] In short, man in Communist society would be a perfect human being, wholly rational and free, whose individual conduct would harmonize completely with the needs of society at large.

An important corollary of Marx's belief that human nature was perfectible was his view that political leadership, in the sense of coercive external control over man's conduct, would be unnecessary in the future Communist society. This is not to say that Marx was an anarchist. On the contrary, he anticipated that some form of authority and leadership would be necessary, but it would be a completely different kind of authority and leadership from that known in pre-Communist society. Friedrich Engels, in a work written in close association with Marx, stated that "in time to come there will no longer be any professional porters or architects, and . . . the man who for half an hour gives instructions as an architect will push a barrow for a period, until his activity as an architect is once again required." [2]

And even when one would act in a subordinate role, submission to authority would be absolutely voluntary. The worker in a factory would be like a member of an amateur orchestral group who, in the joy of performing, voluntarily responds to the commands of the director. Thus, leadership and authority in Communist society would be of an entirely new kind. For, as Robert Tucker has observed, 'this society without social structure is not a social order in any meaningful sense of that term. Speaking in the younger Marx's vein, it is an unsociety." [3] In like manner, authority in Marx's version of Communist society might be termed "unauthority."

The chiliastic features of this vision of Communist society reflect both Marx's background in Western philosophy and his concern for the plight of man during the industrial transformation of European society. He insisted that his conclusions were derived from an empirical analysis of history,[4] but in his vision of man's salvation from the evils of capitalism, one sees the leap of faith of a religious prophet rather than the objective conclusions of a social scientist. Indeed, the similarity of this vision to the Judeo-Christian concept of paradise has caused Robert Tucker to describe Marx's solution of the problem of human alienation as "a metamorphosis of the theological notion of salvation of the soul." [5]

The progressive "deradicalization" of the Communist movement in Soviet Russia has not been accompanied by a concomitant dilution of Marx's vision of the ultimate society.[6] This point must be emphasized, because the contention of this article is that the Maoist image of Communist society is more a product of uniquely Chinese influences than of evolutionary developments within the Soviet ideology.

Hardheaded and practical, Lenin generally shunned speculation regarding the nature of the Communist utopia even more than had Marx. Explicitly protesting that he was not a utopian, he declared that there would indeed be idlers and swindlers, at least for a time, after the overthrow of capitalism. Yet his utopianism was nonetheless real. Ultimately, he declared, there would emerge a new kind of man—"*not the present* ordinary run

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[1] T. B. Bottomore, ed. & trans., *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, London, C. A. Watts & Co. Ltd., 1963, p. 155 (Marx's italics). On Marx's concern about human alienation, see Robert C. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1961, *passim;* Erich Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961, pp. 43-58; and Eduard Heimann, *Reason and Faith in Modern Society: Liberalism, Marxism, and Democracy*, Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1961, pp. 125-29.

[2] *Anti-Dühring*, quoted in Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

[3] Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 201. On Marx's view of authority, see also Theodore Denno, *The Communist Millennium: The Soviet View*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, pp. 27-28.

[4] Bottomore, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[5] Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 151. The messianic quality of Marx's thought has also been noted in Heimann, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-58; Fromm, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-68; and Karl Lowith, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949, pp. 41-45.

[6] Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (June 1967), p. 355.

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of people"—for whom "the *necessity* of observing the simple, fundamental rules of human intercourse will very soon become a *habit*." Political controls and social stratification would then disappear, and all members of this perfected humanity would participate equally in the administration of their society.[7]

Even as recently as 1961, in the "New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," the chiliastic features of the future society were spelled out in perhaps unprecedentedly graphic detail. The New Program speaks of "a new man who will harmoniously combine spiritual wealth, moral purity and a perfect physique." The rule of man by man is also expected to disappear. As the New Program predicts, "the bodies in charge of planning, accounting, economic management and cultural advancement — now government bodies — will lose their political character and will become organs of public self-government. Communist society will be a highly organized community of workingmen. Universally recognized rules of Communist conduct will be established whose observance will become an organic need and habit with everyone." [8]

Mao Tse-tung's conception of the future Communist society shares many of the features of the Marxist vision. If Mao has his way, China will become a socialist society in which all instruments of class struggle will be abolished. "Classes, state power and political parties," he has declared, "will die out very naturally, and mankind will enter the realm of Great Harmony." [9] The Communist society will also be one of great material abundance, private possessions will disappear, and distribution of goods will be according to the classic formula, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." [10]

It is, however, the differences that concern us here. Mao does not foresee (as did Marx) "the *definitive* resolution of antagonisms between man and man," or (as does the current Soviet leadership) that "universally recognized rules of Communist conduct will be established whose observance will become an organic need and habit with everyone." Rather, he anticipates that there will still be anti-social behavior and contradictions—*i.e.*, conflicts and differences of opinion—among the people even in Communist society. One of the most explicit statements of this view was set forth editorially in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) as follows:

> **It is obviously incorrect to maintain, as some people do, that the contradiction between idealism and materialism can be eliminated in a socialist or Communist society. . . . Since man lives in society, he reflects, in different circumstances and to varying degrees, the contradictions existing in each form of society. Therefore, not everybody will be perfect, even when a Communist society is established. By then there will still be contradictions among people, and there will still be good people and bad, people whose thinking is relatively correct and others whose thinking is relatively incorrect. Hence there will still be struggle between people, though its nature and form will be different from those in class societies.**[11]

In 1959, the CCP Central Committee echoed the above view and further implied its rejection of the notion that mankind is capable of complete rationality. Under communism, the Central Committee's resolution read, there will be "contradictions (without class imprints) among the people (including contradictions between the advanced and backward, between truth and error, between subjectivity and objectivity)." [12] As recently as May 1967, after the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Maoist rejection of the paradisiacal vision of Communist society was reiterated in a diatribe against China's discredited head of state, Liu Shao-ch'i. Liu was quoted as having written that in Communist society "there will be no darkness, ignorance and backwardness, and so on. In such a society all humanity will consist of unselfish, intelligent, highly cultured and skilled Communists; mutual assistance and affection will prevail among

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[7] V. I. Lenin, "State and Revolution," in *Selected Works*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 300-06. (All italics are Lenin's.)

[8] For the New Program of the CPSU, see Arthur P.Mendel, ed., *Essential Works of Marxism*, New York, Bantam Books, 1961, pp. 468, 458.

[9] "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV, Peking, Foreign Languages Press 1961, p. 412.

[10] Wu Jiang, "Un partisan de la théorie de la révolution permanente doit nécessairement être un matérialiste dialectique conséquent," in Stuart R. Schram, *Documents sur la théorie de la "révolution permanente" en Chine: idéologie dialectique et dialectique du réal*, Paris, Mouton & Cie, 1963, pp. 25-26.

[11] *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial, "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," reproduced in *Communist China, 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962, p. 148. Stuart R. Schram sees no reason to doubt that this editorial "reflects Mao's viewpoint" (see his *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, New York and London, F. A. Praeger, 1963, p. 233).

[12] "Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on the Establishment of People's Communes in Rural Areas," in *Extracts from China Mainland Magazines* (Hong Kong, U.S. Consulate General), No. 169, p. 24.

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men, and there will be no such irrationalities as mutual suspicion and deception. . . . It will of course be the best, most beautiful, and most advanced society in human history."

The Maoists contemptuously dismissed this description of communism. "In the opinion of [Liu Shao-ch'i]," asserted the editors of *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag) and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, "Communist society is a bed of roses, without darkness or contradiction; all is well, without the existence of opposites. . . . What [Liu Shao-ch'i] is doing here is preaching metaphysics. . . ." [13] Indeed, the Maoists, in contradistinction to Liu, anticipate that communism will be fraught with "conflicts which could not possibly be foreseen." [14]

None of the above quotations, so far as we know, were authored by Mao himself, but there can be little doubt that they reflect his personal views. In "On Contradiction," his most important philosphical statement, he asserted repeatedly that contradictions are inevitable in all processes, including relations between man and man. For example:

The question is one of different kinds of contradiction, not of the presence or absence of contradiction. Contradiction is universal and absolute, it is present in the process of development of all things and permeates every process from beginning to end. . . . Every form of society, every form of ideology, has its own particular contradiction and particular essence.[15]

Soviet ideologues view these Chinese assertions that contradictions will continue to exist in a socialist—and even a Communist—society as a reprehensible distortion of Marxist dogma. It is true that Lenin, and Stalin after him, modified Marx by declaring that contradictions between productive forces and relations of production would persist in a socialist society.[16] But the Soviet leaders have been profoundly embarrassed by the Chinese insistence that these contradictions are reflected in human relations. They have barred some of the most important Chinese pronouncements on contradictions from the Soviet press.[17] And when Khrushchev was asked about Mao's statement that "the existence of contradictions between the individual and the collective in a socialist society is nothing strange," he replied: "We believe that we have no contradictions of that nature." [18]

The Maoist conviction that human nature will not become perfect in Communist society, and that there will still be anti-social behavior, has also caused the Chinese Communists to reject Marx's concept of authority in the future society. Whereas Marx and his Russian followers anticipated that social organization would be maintained through the self-governance of free and totally rational men, the Chinese intimate that a politically dominant group will continue to provide guidance and control over the masses. In 1959, for example, the authoritative CCP theoretical organ, *Hung Ch'i*, stated that leadership "is a universal law of social life within the easy comprehension of all." [19] Mao himself affirmed that "within the ranks of the people, we cannot do without freedom, nor can we do without discipline; we cannot do without democracy, nor can we do without centralism." [20] Lu Ting-yi, long one of Mao's leading ideological spokesmen (though now purged), echoed Mao in asserting that "without centralism, just as without democracy, it is unthinkable for human society to exist." [21]

It is clear from such statements about the permanent necessity for "centralism"—for which one may read "leadership"—that the Chinese concept of authority in future Communist society does not

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[13] See English translation of this joint editorial in *Peking Review*, May 12, 1967, p. 9.

[14] This is a paraphrase of a statement made in November 1966 by Ch'en Po-ta, an intimate of Mao and head of the Cultural Revolution Group under the CCP Central Committee (see S. J. Noumoff, "Yang Hsien-chen and the Unity of Opposites: A Doctrinal Dilemma," paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies meeting in Chicago, 1967, p. 10). I am deeply grateful to Prof. Noumoff for permitting me to use his stimulating paper, which provides further documentation on this point. See also Wu Jiang, in Schram, *Documents . . .*, p. 22.

[15] *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. I, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1965, pp. 318, 320. Mao once indicated a contrary view when he stated that the contradiction between materialism and idealism—probably a principal contradiction in his view—would cease after the consolidation of Communist society ("Dialectial Materialism," in Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 121, 122). As seen in the quotations above, however, Maoists do not now anticipate the disappearance of this contradiction. It is significant that the article containing the contrary statement cited by Schram has not been included in Mao's *Selected Works* and is no longer even referred to by Chinese ideologues (see Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Mao Tse-tung's Materialistic Dialectics," *The China Quarterly* [London] July-September, 1964. p. 10).

[16] Arthur A. Cohen, *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. 140-41.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 149, 151; *Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, p. 45 n.

[18] Khrushchev's comment is from his interview on the Columbia Broadcasting System's television and radio program, "Face the Nation", June 2, 1957, quoted in Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1960, p. 306. The text of Mao's statement may be found in *Communist China, 1955-1959*, p. 148.

[19] Quoted in John Wilson Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1963, p. 264.

[20] "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," in *Communist China, 1955-1959*, p. 278.

[21] Quoted in Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

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at all correspond to the kind of "un-authority" implied by Marx. John W. Lewis, a careful student of Chinese government, also has noted the persistence of real authority in the Maoist version of Communist society. "From current Communist revelations on utopia," Lewis wrote, "it is difficult to differentiate the Communist society from what exists currently. . . . Not only will people struggle and work hard under communism, but they will also have leaders despite the scheduled disappearance of the party organization." [22]

We enter upon very uncertain terrain when we attempt to explain why Mao's vision of Communist society differs from that of Marx and the Russian Marxists. Stuart Schram, in his excellent study on the doctrine of "permanent revolution" in China, has suggested that the Maoist stress upon the persistence of contradictions in socialist and Communist society is a response to political and social realities during the transitional stage of socialism. China's present relations with foreign powers remain fraught with tensions; there are still stark contrasts between the modernized industrial sector and the traditional agricultural sector of the economy; and there is a bitter and continuing struggle against the traditional culture and pre-socialist modes of thought.[23]

These profound conflicts in China's domestic and international life, together with the leadership's determination to maintain revolutionary élan among its followers, have doubtless influenced Mao's thinking regarding contradictions. Yet, Schram's analysis does not explain why the Maoist ideologues have rejected Marx's assumptions about the perfectibility of human conduct, or why they envision the continuation of a politically dominant group even after the higher phase of Communist society has been attained. Such alterations in the Communist vision would seem wholly gratuitous if Mao were merely seeking a solution to problems relating to the pre-Communist stage of socialism.

The author's tentative explanation for this is based, in the first place, on the hypothesis that Mao has not concerned himself with the problem of man's realization of his true humanity—as did Marx. China's is a group-oriented culture. In contrast to thinking in the West, where individualism has been a vaunted ideal, Chinese social thought has been overwhelmingly preoccupied with the group and the individual's relationship to the group. As Richard Solomon has stated in a superb study of Chinese social and political orientations, there is "no indication [from individual interviews] that Chinese find personal independence and self-realization to be goals worth striving for; indeed, consistently there is expressed an attitude observed by other students of China as well, that 'the life of a single individual is an incomplete life.' " [24]

As a consequence of the general Chinese acceptance of the individual's subordination to the group, it was quite natural that Marx's writings about the alienation of man should not have struck a sympathetic chord in Mao's thinking. In fact, the Chinese Communists have dismissed those writings as the product of an immature mind still under the influence of "mechanical materialism and utopian socialism." [25] And they assert that those who persist in following the writings of the youthful Marx are actually counterrevolutionaries. "In their view," Chou Yang wrote, "to eliminate the 'alienation of man,' it is necessary to destroy the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system. In advocating the return of man to himself, they are actually advocating absolute individual freedom and asking the people who live under socialism to return to the human nature of bourgeois individualism and to restore the capitalism by which it is fostered." [26]

Mao has not written about the prospect of man's self-fulfillment because his primary and continuing preoccupation has been the Chinese nation. His writings are replete with statements attesting to his objectives of erasing China's national humiliations and establishing China in a position of honor and security among the nations of the world. China, he writes, "will never again be an insulted nation"; "our national defense will be consolidated and no imperialist will be allowed to invade our territory

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 262, 263-64. Lewis' study provides a good discussion (pp. 262-64) of the Chinese vision of Communist society. For a different aspect of this vision, see Benjamin Schwartz, "Modernization and the Maoist Vision—Some Reflections on Chinese Communist Goals," *The China Quarterly*, January-March 1965, pp. 9-14.

[23] Schram, *Documents sur la théorie de la "révolution permanente" en Chine*, pp. xxxvii-xlvii.

[24] Richard H. Solomon, "Mao's Effort to Reintegrate the Chinese Polity: Problems of Authority and Conflict in Chinese Social Processes," p. 11. Professor Solomon has kindly permitted me to quote this mimeographed paper, which he presented to a conference on the Chinese political system, held at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 1967.

[25] Chou Yang, "The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences," *Peking Review*, Jan. 3, 1964, p. 19.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

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again"; "China's situation as a poor country denied its rights in international affairs will also be changed—a poor country will be changed into a rich country, a country denied its rights into a country enjoying its rights—a transformation of things into their opposites." [27] On the other hand, he has said little about what socialism will do for the Chinese people other than to indicate that they will enjoy prosperity and boast a "high culture." The inner transformation that might be effected in the Chinese man by these material changes in society has apparently interested Mao little or not at all.

A second possible explanation for the difference between the Marxist and Maoist visions of Communist society may lie in the fact that Mao's thought bears the imprint of traditional Chinese utopianism, much as Marx's vision was influenced by Judeo-Christian millenarianism. Mao matured and got his education at a time when traditional modes of thought were still pervasive, and even dominant, in Chinese society. And numerous scholars have noted how both the form and substance of Mao's thought, in other respects, reflected his cultural background. In any case, the similarities between Mao's utopian vision and that of the Confucians is striking.

Confucius, for example, rejected the possibility that the mass of common people were capable of enlightenment: "The people can be made to follow a path of action, but they may not be made to understand it." [28] Hsun-tzu was even more explicit in rejecting the notion of the universal perfectibility of men:

> **Everyone is capable of [becoming a sage], but not everyone can be made to do so. . . . Hence, it is correct to say that the man in the street is *capable* of becoming a Yü [a sage emperor], but it is not necessarily correct to say that he will in fact find it possible to do so.** [29]

In other words, sagehood might be attained by mortal man, but only by a very few—a Duke of Chou or a Confucius (or perhaps a Mao Tse-tung?).

As a consequence of this denial of universal human perfectibility in the traditional culture, the Chinese ideal of the good society has been, as Derk Bodde has aptly put it, an "ordered inequality." [30] Most Chinese have tended to accept as natural and good that in the ideal society a political-moral elite would provide guidance and good example to the ethically imperfect commoners.[31] If Mao was indeed influenced by this traditional utopianism, it is probable that he found the Marxian vision of a virtually authority-less society either incomprehensible or implausible.

But Mao is not simply a latter-day Confucian. His belief in progress is non-Confucian, and his extraordinary stress upon contradictions and unending struggle violates traditional ideals of social harmony.[32] The Maoists also utterly reject the Confucian view that intellectuals are properly and inevitably distinct from manual laborers. "Our ultimate goal," they assert, "is to eliminate the differences between mental and physical labor." [33] In pursuance of this non-Confucian goal, the Chinese Communist regime has implemented the so-called *hsia-fang* policy, whereby cadres and intellectuals are required to work periodically in the fields and factories so that they will become "working-class intellectuals."

This Maoist determination to proletarianize those who work primarily with their minds might appear to confute our contention that Mao rejects notions of absolute egalitarianism. In fact, however, the *hsia-fang* policy stems primarily from the conviction that leadership is effective only when the leaders "maintain constant and close ties with the masses." [34] It does not imply the obliteration of a dominant political elite, but merely indicates that the principles of leadership guiding that elite in a Communist society will be fundamentally different from those in traditional China.

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[27] Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, p. 110; "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," in *Communist China: 1955-1959*, p. 293.

[28] *Analects*, Vol. VIII, p. 9; translation in James Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1960, Vol. I, p. 211.

[29] *Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings*, trans. by Burton Watson, New York and London, Columbia Univ. Press, 1963, p. 167.

[30] Derk Bodde, "Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy" in Arthur F. Wright, Ed., *Studies in Chinese Thought*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 48.

[31] Even the classic expression of Chinese utopianism, the Li-yun chapter in the *Li-chi*, assumed that sages would rule in the ideal society. At least that is the interpretation of one recent commentator, who stated that "the sages and capable ones" in the ideal society were to be elected by all members of society (Jen Chuan, "K'ung-tzu Li-yün 'ta-t' ung' ssu-hsiang" [Confucius' utopian thought in the Li-yun], *Kuang-ming jih-pao*, May 12, 1961, p. 4).

[32] Mao seems to have derived his concept of dialectics and struggle largely from the heterodox strands of Chinese thought, especially from works of popular literature. See Holubnychy, *loc. cit.*, pp. 14-17; Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, p. 12.

[33] "To Become One with the Workers and Peasants," in *Peking Review*, May 15, 1964, p. 25. Compare this with Mencius' classic expression of Confucian elitism: translated in Legge, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 249-50.

[34] "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *China after Mao*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 188.

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Russia's Literary Past

P. V. ANNENKOV: *The Extraordinary Decade.*
Edited by Arthur P. Mendel. Translated by Irwin R. Titunik.
Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1968.
RONALD HINGLEY: *Russian Writers and Society, 1825-1904.*
New York, World University Library, 1968.
ROBERT A. MAGUIRE: *Red Virgin Soil: Soviet Literature in the Twenties.*
Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1968.

Reviewed by Edward J. Brown

THE LITERARY SCHOLAR'S besetting hazard—the *pons asinorum* of his trade—is the problem of the relationship of literature to "society." When Lenin offered his followers the dictum that "man cannot live in a society and be free of it," he placed in their hands a dangerous truism which—if taken seriously—obscures real issues and certainly impedes the study of literature. It is true that novels, poems, and stories are social products; it is also true that the poems of a Maiakovsky or the paintings of a Malevich are important facts of cultural history which cannot be fully understood except in the light of the milieu and the historical moment of their creation. But in the search for this kind of historical evidence, the critic has too often been deflected from the proper object of inquiry—the literary or artistic work itself.

The Russian Formalists, such as Viktor Shklovsky, Boris Eikhenbaum and Roman Yakobson, were aware of this danger; they rejected historical, sociological, and biographical approaches to criticism and devised methods of analyzing literature in terms of language and literary techniques. Yet in this effort they, too, were often led astray from the objective, tending to substitute the study of linguistics for the study of literature. The modern relatives of the Formalists—the "new" critics of whatever persuasion—have also attempted to concentrate exclusive attention on the literary artifact; but in their case the tendency has been to substitute not, of course, biography, or history, or politics, or linguistics, but something infinitely narrower—themselves. The structure of meanings, the complex of symbols, the pattern of resonance, the nexus of literary or mythic associations which the critic finds in a work all too often represent a purely subjective system which he has imposed upon it. When he thinks he has found a symbol, our pure critic of literature, in Nabokov's admirable phrase, is frequently describing his own thumbprint.

THE THREE WORKS under discussion share in common an implicit concern with this problem of literature's relationship to its environment, although they differ drastically in style, approach, and subject matter. The first is a new edition of Pavel Annenkov's classic work, *An Extraordinary Decade* (1880), which has served for some ninety years as a primary source on the intellectual life of the exhilarating 1840's and as background reading for the study of 19th-century Russian literature. Annenkov—himself a literary critic—was an intimate of the famed critic Belinsky and a correspondent and friend of other literary notables of the 1840's. His extraordinary volume is a vivid account

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of the personalities and issues that were then at the center of intellectual life. Along with Hertzen's *My Life and Thoughts,* Annenkov's reminiscences are the principal source of historical images that we still retain: the intense and zealous personality of Belinsky; the civilized, immensely informed Granovsky; that glittering host to the intellectual elite of his day, Hertzen; the *personalite violente,* Bakunin; and many others

Among Annenkov's closest companions were men who had belonged to the Stankevich Circle in the 1930's, a group at Moscow University whose main interest had been German idealistic philosophy and romantic literature. Both the volume under review and another of Annenkov's works, *The Biography and Correspondence of Stankevich* (1858), are rich in material on this earlier period, and it is as a memoirist of both decades that Annenkov has made his great contribution.

Annenkov seems to have been formed by nature as a reporter of the intellectual concerns of other men. He could brilliantly sum up the essence of an argument, and he reacted with the enthusiasm of a connoisseur to the philosophies of his day. Having no strong intellectual bias of his own, he was able to turn from one to another of his contemporaries with unstinted and at times indiscriminate admiration. He was possessed of a consummate skill in the artist's task of constructing dramatic scenes in which the real personages of history play out significant moments with eloquent speech and gesture. He was, perhaps, at his best in

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THOMAS W. WOLFE—Senior Staff Member at the RAND Corporation (Washington, DC) specializing in Soviet military doctrine and history. Author of *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964).

ANDREW GYORGY—Professor of International Affairs at the Sino-Soviet Institute at the George Washington University and co-author (with G. D. Blackwood) of *Ideologies in World Affairs* (Waltham, Mass., Blaisdell, 1967). Mr. Gyorgy's *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* will be published in the near future by the Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore.

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brilliant accounts of important moments in the life of Belinsky: his quarrel with Hertzen, his early fascination and final disgust with Gogol, the three mornings in Salzbrunn when he composed his famous "letter" to Gogol. The critic at work is nicely framed in his littered quarters moving from his high desk to his sofa and back again.

Contributing almost nothing of his own to the intellectual ferment of the 1840's, Annenkov viewed it all with the eye of an artist and fashioned a work in which *Dichtung* and *Wahrheit* are intimately mingled. When one applies to his creation the test of evidence, however, it often turns out that the fabric is full of flaws. An example in point is his account of the dispute among the Westernizers over the question of the value of folk culture. With remarkable lucidity—considering that he wrote a number of years after the event—he recounted the details of a peripatetic debate which was carried on in the summer of 1845 in the fields of Sokolovo, where the participants discussed at length and in depth the importance of the "people" as a cultural force. Yet in describing this debate as a kind of turning point, a "first major manifestation of an idea . . . concerning the necessity of a more reasonable attitude toward the simple people than was current in literature and in certain strata of the class of thinking people," Annenkov overlooked or else grossly underestimated the importance of much earlier statements on the subject by both Belinsky and Stankevich. A careful historical criticism of Annenkov's work is surely needed, and until it is undertaken there will always be some doubt on many points in the history of that "extraordinary decade."

Yet Annenkov's work will probably never lose its charm as a sympathetic account of a number of brilliant men who lived in joyful contention over ideas. More important, the real value and principal function of his reminiscences—for example, his pages on Gogol, Turgenev, and Pisemsky—is to illuminate the intellectual content of 19th-century literature. We can learn from his book the motivating concerns of the men who produced some of that literature; and we can become acquainted with its principal critic, who used literary criticism as a vehicle for philosophical ideas and social commentary. Whatever else Belinsky thought about Gogol, he viewed *Dead Souls* as a significant literary work chiefly because it dealt with the great problem of 19th-century Russian life—serfdom. In our post-diluvian world that problem has disappeared, and, unless we are historians, we have difficulty imagining the excitement it engendered. Similarly, the questions of Russia's place in history, of her relationship to Byzantium and to the West, of the role of native Russian culture, were issues that deeply absorbed the thinkers of the day—the guests at Sokolovo, the circle that gathered in Belinsky's rooms, the Russian émigrés in Paris and London. It was issues like these that gave 19th-century literature its spirit and form. Today they seem to have only peripheral interest for the narrowly-specialized literary scholar and critic; indeed, he sometimes seems to prefer—as a matter of jurisdictional purity—to be ignorant of the environmental influences that shape literature. The contemporary critic might find it a healthy corrective to take time to read this new and excellently translated edition of a century-old work.

FOR THOSE WHO, on the contrary, feel a vital need to understand the environment that yielded the Russian classics, Ronald Hingley has performed an immense service in producing his *Russian Writers and Society, 1825-1904*. The aim of the study is to supply the background material and information that is necessary, in Mr. Hingley's view, for a full appreciation of Russian literature—the kind of knowledge that Russian writers of the last century took for granted on the part of their readers. The volume presents authoritatively and in interesting form information on the geographical features, the roads and waterways, the ethnic composition, and the history of the vast Russian territory. It explains what a *zemstvo* was, how a peasant's hut looked, what it meant to be "sent to Siberia." When the "deep Russian winter" is defined in explicit terms of an average of 150 days of below-zero temperature, the modern reader of—say—Bunin may acquire a clearer understanding of the "gray man" in the novel, *The Village*, a man whose winter season was a prolonged subhuman hibernation in a lightless hut—and the critic may be somewhat less inclined to indulge his craving for hidden meanings and symbols. Mr. Hingley quite skillfully draws on Russian literary works for characters and situations that illustrate the connection of Russian literature with a particular kind of human reality.

Two objections might be raised to Mr. Hingley's method and viewpoint—and he is well aware of both. The first is the argument that since Russian literature deals with universal human problems, why should it be necessary to locate that literature so meticulously in its geographical and historical setting? The second would come again from those critics who maintain one or another variant of the

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theory that a literary work is a system of forms which can be apprehended without reference to extraneous facts. Both objections can be answered. It is, of course, possible to appreciate Russian literature for its presentation of the general human predicament, but only the willfully illiterate would deny themselves the satisfaction of knowing the precise terms in which Russian writers stated their problems. And while it is also possible to consider a given literary work in abstraction from everything else in the world, why should we limit ourselves to the abstraction? The real world, out of which both literature and written history emerge, is made up of facts that enter in some degree into the structure of a literary work, and that are interesting to know. Once more we say: The literary scholar can specialize so violently that only the formal structure of a work is in his field of vision. Or at the other extreme, he can discourse in general terms about a variety of historical, social, or philosophical matters without ever looking at the formal structure. In either case the results are apt to be arid and dull. Mr. Hingley recognizes both hazards; in meticulously elucidating background facts, he makes it clear that he is trying to illuminate, not to ignore, the literary value of the classics. His book ought to be required reading for students embarking on the study of Russian literature.

IN *Red Virgin Soil: Soviet Literature in the Twenties*, Robert Maguire has—whether deliberately or not—developed an approach to his subject that felicitously combines the facts of history with the facts of literature. His research focuses upon Alexander Voronsky, who, perhaps more than any other single person, was responsible for the literary revival that took place in Soviet Russia in the middle 1920's. In 1921 Voronsky was relieved of other party duties and given the assignment of founding and editing a Soviet version of the "thick" journal —a type of intellectual publication that had flourished in 19th-century Russia (famous examples were *The Contemporary* and *Notes of the Fatherland*). The Soviet journal was called *Red Virgin Soil*, a title which sounds much less awkward in Russian: *Krasnaia nov.*

Mr. Maguire's first two chapters, "Beginnings" and "Tradition," set the historical stage for his later parade of *dramatis personae*—Voronsky and the authors he drew into his publishing venture. These chapters offer thorough documentation on the early Soviet political situation in its relation to cultural affairs. The author provides hard information and statistics which graphically portray the cultural nudity of the times in science, literature and the arts, as well as the near disappearance by 1920 of the printed book. We read significant excerpts from documents which motivated the efforts of Lenin and his associates to found *Red Virgin Soil*, and Mr. Maguire is able to throw new light on their choice of a format. It appears that the Bolshevik leaders hoped to turn back the clock of literary evolution and to give new life to the realistic novel, a genre which had reached its finest development in the 19th-century "thick" journals. The rich literary life at the turn of the century seemed to the principal artificers of the "new" culture a symptom of decline and fall. Lenin's statements on modern art expressed a visceral aversion to it in all its forms: erotic motifs, mystical searches, innovations in verse form, subtle difficulties in language and structure—all of these things taken together were for him a syndrome of bourgeois decay. Thus political revolutionaries, in their efforts to revive literary culture, seem to have favored a "backward" leap, and their selection of the thick-journal format—according to which literature was treated as a "branch of knowledge" along with philosophy, history, political economy, etc.—signalized above all, as Mr. Maguire demonstrates, their anti-modern bias.

This much of the book is already an impressive contribution to the historical study of 20th-century literature, and the author might well have rested on his laurels, simply adding some information on the general content of *Red Virgin Soil*, on Voronsky's literary theories and literary criticism, and on other matters more or less germane to literature. But Professor Maguire seems to have been troubled by the suspicion that without specific discussion of literature something essential was missing from his study, and so he undertook to analyze from the viewpoint of thematic interest and literary style the principal writers published in *Red Virgin Soil* —and in so doing has produced the best criticism of Soviet literature of the 1920's yet written in any language. His pages of literary criticism are sensitive, beautifully written, and even creative in the sense that he identifies and illuminates the mythical and symbolic content embedded in many writers of the period. His intimacy with the symbolist movement and other trends in prose fiction of the early 20th century enables him to write about Pilniak, for instance, with greater authority than anyone else who has yet attempted the task. The curious relationship of Pilniak to Belyi and Remizov, a concern of Russian literary criticism for many

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years, is discussed here in terms of specific literary attitudes and procedures. Above all, his approach to each writer is fresh, original, and stimulating. Maguire is an enemy of the worn cliché, whether historical, political or literary.

In addition to sound history and sensitive analysis, Professor Maguire has provided an acute and detailed investigation of the problems which Marxist esthetics tried to solve during the 1920's. *Red Virgin Soil* became the focal point of Marxist thought on problems of literature and art; the development of this thought can be traced in the critical and theoretical articles of Voronsky and in the polemic which those articles occasioned. As Maguire says, ". . . until an honest attempt is made in Russia to grapple with the kind of questions Voronsky raised . . . , Marxist criticism can make no substantial progress there." Voronsky seems to have developed his "theory of literature" as a justification after the fact for his own editorial decisions. In its first variant, that theory—derived largely from Plekhanov—emphasized the function of literature as "knowledge" of reality, and the necessity for an "esthetic" as well as a "sociological" evaluation by the critic. The weakness of the theory lay in the fact that Plekhanov had left the term "esthetic" undefined, and Voronsky's principal efforts during the 1920's were directed toward repairing this weakness. Since the founders of Marxism had made no systematic effort to develop a Marxian esthetic, Voronsky was obliged to reach widely into modern psychology and philosophy in search of new ideas. The result was his exploration of the role of unconscious psychological processes in the creation of art. His researches were, as we know, abruptly terminated, and a rigid dogmatism in "Marxist" literary theory eventually ensued.

Professor Maguire's book is a model worthy of imitation. In it we see literary criticism laboring on the problems of a given period, as the yokemate of philosophical and historical research. Such books are and will continue to be rare, for the simple reason that very few scholars possess the wide range of historical knowledge and literary sophistication that Maguire has brought to his subject.

Ideology and Politics

GEORGE LICHTHEIM: *The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays.*
New York, Random House, 1967.
ROBERT CONQUEST, ED.: *The Politics of Ideas in the USSR.*
New York, F. A. Praeger, 1967.

Reviewed by J. Bandyopadhyaya

IN POPULAR CONCEPTION, the term "ideology" has a rather broad connotation and is generally used to embrace almost every kind of philosophic or socio-political conviction or faith, including ontological and ethical idealism, credos of political parties or groups, economic and political systems, philosophies of history, and even religion. In this broad sense, ideology—though perhaps not the concept of it—has probably existed since the dawn of human history. In political science, the term came into use about the time of the French Revolution and since then has been employed in a wide variety of senses. Some political analysts have tried to narrow down the meaning of the term to that of a "particular ideology," defined by Karl Mannheim as "more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation." [1] Professor Hans J. Morgenthau and his "political realism" have flour-

[1] Karl Mannheim: *Ideology And Utopia,* New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936, p. 49.

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ished on this definition; yet not only Morgenthau but most other political theorists have not desisted from playing fast and loose with the concept, often using it in the same broad sense ascribed to it by the layman. At the same time, there is a powerful trend in contemporary philosophical thinking in the Anglo-Saxon world—as evidenced by the writings of empiricists, realists, positivists, and other assorted worshippers of empirical data—towards hearty disapproval of, and even contempt for, the phenomenon of ideology, so much so that even serious study of it is often regarded as symptomatic of softness of the brain.[2] And yet ideology seems to persist, and also to shape the course of history, while changing its content in different historical situations and different geographical regions. It is in this context that the appearance of George Lichtheim's *The Concept of Ideology And Other Essays* is a welcome occurrence, for the book not only establishes a measure of clarity with regard to the different senses in which the term "ideology" has been used historically, but also attempts a serious study of some of its contemporary manifestations.

The externals of the book leave much to be desired. It is a collection of essays, long and short, mostly book-reviews, written over a number of years without any preconceived plan and brought together as an obvious afterthought. In the introduction and various other places in the book, the author discourses on his well-known theme of the "logic of history," and we are assured that "a historical structure is not a mere assemblage of its constituents . . . but rather that which holds them together and imposes their real nature upon them" (p. xvi). Now Lichtheim is obviously under the spell of Hegel, though he is a critic of much in the latter's thought, and his views bear the unmistakable mark of German metaphysics. It is not possible here to go into the question of the "meaning of history," though I hope my initial remarks have made it clear that metaphysics is congenial to me. But if the external arrangement of the book represents an attempt on the author's part to prove his thesis (as seems to be the case), the least one can say is that it is a clumsy attempt. Lichtheim assures us that "there is in fact a theme" in his book, and that "it has been pursued with what the author, at any rate, regards as a fair degree of consistency" (p. xvi). This apologetic remark, however, would hardly be sufficient if one of the book's objectives is to prove the "meaning of history." And even otherwise, an apology was indeed in order, for what appears to be the common theme of the whole work, namely, the different manifestations of ideology in modern history, could have been much better presented through a shorter and more connected account than through a disjointed and not very readable compilation of book reviews.

THE BOOK IS DIVIDED into four parts. It begins with the title essay, which traces the origin and evolution of the concept of ideology. Starting from the early liberalism of the 18th century and proceeding through the French Revolution, Hegel, Marx, and Max Weber, Lichtheim concludes that "an understanding of what is involved in the concept of ideology is thus at the same time an exercise in that historical imagination which enables us to see our predecessors as men engaged in an enterprise whose outcome still concerns us" (p. 46). In the remaining essays of Part One, we are given a sample of the sociology of Karl Marx via various authors, including Stanislaw Ossowski and Karl A. Wittfogel. In Part Two, the author goes on to discuss some of the attempts that have been made to provide the United States—a neo-imperialist power, according to Mr. Lichtheim—with an appropriate ideology. Here we meet such celebrities as Arnold Toynbee (whose version of American imperialism is said to be the result of his complete ignorance of economics) and Morgenthau (whose "conservative realism" is the result of false premises regarding human nature), as well as such lesser personages as Louis J. Halle and Herbert Marcuse. In this part we are also given a sample of German metaphysics—as a transition to Part Three, we are told. In Part Three we are in the post-Russian-Revolution phase and are taken through Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky, and the conflict between communism and fascism. We are told that there is not much practical difference between these two ideologies, except that the former does not preach the extermination of the "inferior races." In the fourth and final part, we are presented with contemporary French sociology, existentialism, and the existentialized Marxism of Sartre (which proves, according to Lichtheim, that "if 'historicism' is pushed to the furthest limit, it becomes a self-consistent position and thus has to be taken seriously" (p. 315). The three best essays in the collection are the title essay, the essay on Morgenthau, and the one on Sartre. The analysis reveals a

[2] Eastern Europe and the European Continent generally, as well as Asia and Africa and probably Latin America, still love ideology.

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typically German type of intellect (only slightly tempered by contemporary positivism), with its usual penetration, obscurity and wildness.

The principal ideology discussed by Lichtheim is Marxism. A sympathetic critic of Marx, he maintains that while the three-class model or even the simplified two-class model of Marx does not reflect the reality of "post-bourgeois" industrial society, "his [Marx's] general mode of approach is more fruitful than the prevailing academic fashion which dispenses with the concept of 'laws of development'" (p. 161). Space limitations do not permit me to comment on this statement in detail, but the least that can be said about it is that it is an intuitive assertion of doubtful logical validity and shows a merely personal bias. Lichtheim further argues that, while Marx added a new dimension to the concept of individual liberty by his prescription for a socialized production that would prevent the alienation of the worker, he was unable to realize —writing as he did at the peak of liberalism—the possibility of the growth of bureaucracy and the consequent diminution of individual freedom in an industrial society and wrongly sought to establish a unique correlation between despotism and the "Asiatic mode of production." Moreover, Marx did not, in Lichtheim's view, take into account the fact that in our age the state has become strong enough to reshape the social order—a fact that Hitler and Stalin alike have proved.

It seems to me, however, that the growth of powerful bureaucracies and the emergence of totalitarian social control by the state in the Communist countries do not represent mere aberrations from Marxism which Marx was unable to foresee, but are rather the inevitable outcome of the Marxian theories of class struggle, proletarian dictatorship, and the socialist transformation of society. Lenin and Stalin did not, as Lichtheim argues, make a substantial "theoretical discovery" of their own, but merely worked out the empirical consequences—on the whole, quite faithfully, it seems to me—of the Marxian theory of class struggle.

A DESCRIPTIVE and analytical study of the nature and extent of totalitarian social control in the Soviet Union in the name of ideology is presented in *The Politics Of Ideas in the USSR*, edited by Robert Conquest. The book begins with an analysis of the theoretical background of the Soviet system of thought control and then takes us through the compulsions generated by the Five-Year Plans, which made it inevitable that totalitarian social control should be introduced in order to ensure the construction of the Stalinist conception of socialism. This is followed by a historical and analytical survey of the institutional machinery for controlling and restricting freedom of thought and expression, including the organization and operational techniques of such institutions as the *Glavlit* (which controls the press), the *Glavrepertkom* (which controls plays and films), the office of the *prokuror* (which has the power to censor mail), the *Sayuzkniga* and other allied institutions (which control the publication, import and distribution of books), the *spetzkhran* ("special store" of libraries and museums where controversial and restricted literature is kept), and the control mechanism for radio and television.

This all-embracing control machinery is paralleled by an elaborate system of indoctrination via the press, literature, broadcasting, and cultural activities, which is also analytically surveyed. The details of the indoctrination system, including propaganda, political self-education, political schools, study circles, universities of Marxism-Leninism, "Houses" and "Cabinets of Political Enlightenment," the training of leaders, agitation, and the special role in all this of the *Agitprop* of the Communist Party, are analyzed in depth. The last chapter deals with the party's role in the thought-control process from 1946 to 1966 and includes a discussion of the Zhdanov, Pasternak and Siniavsky-Daniel affairs, the general position of writers in the Soviet Union since the "thaw," and the apparent oscillations of the current Soviet policy of control.

The analytical survey of social control in the Soviet Union presented in the book is highly informative, thorough and illuminating. It seems to me, however, that two fundamental questions have been dealt with rather unsatisfactorily. First, it is assumed, as also in Lichtheim's analysis discussed above, that Marx regarded ideology as a reflex of social conditions, and that he therefore neither attached any great importance to its role as an instrument of social control nor considered such control desirable, especially in the case of the press. It is further assumed that it was Lenin to some extent, but mainly Stalin, who was responsible for introducing the totalitarian system of social control in the Soviet Union. This line of reasoning seems to me rather superficial and characteristic of an apparently growing school of anti-Marxists who, I suspect, are keen on retaining a measure of popularity with the Marxists.

Marx's inability to foresee, or his unwillingness to prescribe, the use of ideology for totalitarian

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social control was largely due to his confusion between determinism and free will, a confusion that is characteristic of most philosophers of history. He was an interpreter of history in terms of the "law of dialectical materialism"; yet, at the same time, his primary preoccupation—as he wrote in his *Thesis On Feuerbach*—was to *change* the world. He attempted to resolve the dilemma through the theory that the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat represented "cooperation" with the law of historical development, designed to hasten the unfolding of history according to its own inner law. What Lenin and Stalin did was simply to work out the empirical counterpart of this logic of "cooperation" with history: for unless society was controlled and guided along the preordained historical path, how would history fulfill itself? Marx, of course, had left no programmatic blueprint for the future, but his subject-object characterization of history could have only one logical consequence, namely, totalitarianism in one form or another. We shall have to wait for the breathtaking spectacle of a Communist state which permits full freedom of thought and expression before we can start believing that there could be some form of Marxism other than totalitarian. To me this seems to be a contradiction in terms.

A SECOND DRAWBACK of Conquest's work is that he does not relate the recent trend toward liberalization of the system of thought control (punctuated by such retrograde steps as the Siniavsky trial) to the unmistakable decline of Marxism as an ideology in the Soviet Union. I am not referring here to the thesis of W. W. Rostow, Daniel Bell, and others, that there tends to be an erosion of ideology with the approach of a hitherto backward society to levels of mass consumption—a thesis which I consider to be only partially correct. What I wish to emphasize is the more fundamental fact that in the Soviet Union Marxism as an ideology has performed a certain historical role and is now exhausted. It was Montesquieu who rightly said, "*On peut de plus poser pour maxime générale que toute révolution prévue n'arrivera jamais*" (One can further posit as a general rule that any revolution that is foreseen will never happen), and this is certainly true of the Russian Revolution. Yet every revolution does perform a certain historical role, however different that role may be from the original expectation. The Russian Revolution and the ideology which inspired it also have performed a major historical function, namely, the transformation of Russia into an economically and technologically advanced and militarily powerful state where private property has been largely abolished. Marxism, which is primarily an ideology of class struggle and revolution, is no longer relevant to the problems of contemporary Soviet society. The totalitarian system of social control which was induced by Marxism is, therefore, destined to break up sooner or later. For I do not believe that action can be sustained long after the idea behind it has been lost. Whether the rulers of the Soviet Union will devise a substantially new ideology along with a new structure of social control related to it is an altogether different matter.

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Old Wine in New Bottles

ADAM B. ULAM: *Expansion and Coexistence. The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967.* New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.
HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN: *Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy.* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.

Reviewed by Tibor Szamuely

IT SEEMS to have become a general rule for each postwar US administration to pass through a regular cycle in its relations with the USSR—a cycle that begins with a phase of optimism and goodwill, then gradually shifts over to disenchantment, and finally ends up in extreme hostility. At present we seem to be witnessing the beginning of another such cycle. And while we must be sympathetic if not charitable towards efforts to secure the triumph of hope over experience, a knowledge of history enjoins a considerable degree of prudence with regard to such hopes. As somebody once said, however, the only lesson of history is that no one ever learns anything from it. Each generation is seemingly destined to learn only from its own experience—emerging, no doubt, the sadder and wiser for it.

This unwillingness to learn is most regrettable—and can also prove rather costly. It can, moreover, no longer be explained by ignorance of Soviet realities, particularly when every important fact about Soviet foreign policy, together with a perceptive interpretation of its basic rules, is readily available in Professor Ulam's excellent, comprehensive, objective and eminently readable new book, which is undoubtedly destined to become a standard reference work on the subject.

Soviet rulers—the present rather uninspiring lot included—have always possessed a far greater sense of history than the governing classes of other world powers. This is inherent in their Marxist upbringing based on the concept of "historical materialism." (Professor Ulam shows the crucial importance of Lenin's *Imperialism* as the theoretical foundation of Soviet foreign policy throughout all its fifty years.) It is also a reflection of the traditionalist nature of Russian politics. Paradoxically, the country which produced the greatest revolution of our times is in many respects more traditional, and even more conservative, than any other nation in the world.

The force of tradition, whether Tsarist or revolutionary, goes a long way towards explaining the foreign policies of the USSR. Take, for instance, the question that has puzzled generations of Western statesmen and analysts: What are the respective parts played in Russia's foreign policy by Communist ideology and plain, old-fashioned Russian nationalism? The "conflict" certainly exists—but it had existed, in slightly different form, long before the 1917 Revolution. Russian expanionism had always been both nationalist *and* ideological, the latter factor having been supplied in Tsarist times by the extraordinary notion (sometimes elaborated as "the Russian Idea") that Russia, *because* she was an absolute despotism, somehow embodied the ideals of equality and social justice. This weird belief in the superior moral qualities of

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a despotic Russia was strikingly expressed by the 19th-century Slavophile philosopher Leontiev (not quoted by Ulam), who wrote that Russia's "interests have *in some way a moral tendency* towards supporting the weak, the oppressed. And all these weak, all these oppressed are her partisans. . . . I understand that even the Moslems and Hindus of India have prophecies in favor of the 'Urus' and in disfavor of the 'Ingles.' Such is the curious destiny of this *despotic* Russia." Curious is certainly the word for it—and it became even more curious after 1917.

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION triumphed because it was led by the supreme political genius of the century. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, became the architect of its foreign policy. Every basic principle of present-day Soviet diplomacy goes back to the crucial formative years—1917-21—and to the colossal figure then at the helm. When Soviet ideologists pontificate today about the "Leninist principles of Soviet foreign policy," they are speaking no more than the truth, and we in the West would do well to study closely —with Professor Ulam's able assistance—the early policies of the Bolshevik regime.

Only a few months, or even a few weeks, after the October Revolution, amidst the great hopes it generated for an immediate world revolution, Lenin realistically faced the fact that he now had both a nation-state to govern and an international revolutionary movement to foster. But for him—as for all his successors, Brezhnev included—there could never be any question which of the two was more important: above all, Soviet Russia had to be preserved, and so he literally forced the Brest-Litovsk treaty upon his unwilling party. With the Soviet Union militarily helpless, he was ready to accept any demand, make any concession. At one critical point he even expressed readiness to accept aid from the West—in his own inimitable way: "Please add my vote to those who are in favor of receiving food and weapons from the Anglo-French imperialist robbers."

Yet, from the very beginning, Lenin made it clear that Russia was to be preserved not just as an ordinary state but also as the powerhouse of world revolution. These two basic and contradictory strains of Soviet diplomacy were already enshrined in Lenin's first foreign policy statement, the Decree on Peace, which simultaneously appealed to all established governments for peace, and to their populations to rise against those very governments. The same combination of incongruous principles baffled the German representatives at Brest-Litovsk —and have continued to baffle many other dignified diplomats of the old school ever since.

Brest-Litovsk was the turning point: from that time on, the "capitalist" West has, step by step, come gradually to acknowledge the Soviet Union's right to conduct its foreign policy along previously unthinkable lines—*i.e.*, combining orthodox diplomacy with organized subversion. Thus, a new style of diplomacy was born—one that is now being increasingly adopted by governments of the "Third World" and can justifiably be called the 20th-century style of diplomacy. Its features are utter realism in power relationships; the end of the old "gentlemanly" conventions; contempt for accepted international law; the use of propaganda as diplomacy and of diplomacy as propaganda; insistence on the legal right of nations, in peacetime, to subvert other recognized governments; a system of double moral standards; and an attitude which regards international treaties as worth no more than the power sustaining them.

This last was probably the most important of Lenin's foreign policy principles. Professor Ulam formulates it as "the clear assumption that there was no nonsense about the sanctity of treaties; once power relations were changed, Soviet Russia would claim her own." This principle has been pursued undeviatingly by Lenin's successors. Even the rather colorless Molotov showed a nice sense of humor in his negotiations with von Ribbentrop, remarking that the proposed Soviet-German non-aggression pact might be modeled on the Soviet Union's existing treaties with Poland, Latvia and Estonia—*i.e.*, on the very agreements he was now pledging to destroy. (The Nazi-Soviet Pact was probably the only treaty ever broken by the Russians' treaty *partner;* hence their constant pained references to Nazi "perfidy.")

The 1939 episode is now widely regarded as an instance of pure Stalinist wickedness. Nothing could be further from the truth. Lenin viewed international agreements—with equal, if not greater, cynicism—as measures of expediency to be annulled as soon as the "revolutionary" situation permitted. In 1919 he consoled a heartbroken Bukharin: "We shall conquer power, wait a while, and then go as far as you like." An opportunity presented itself in 1920, and Lenin promptly declared a national and revolutionary war against Poland. When it failed, the "revolutionary situation" was said to be temporarily at an end—until better times. Meanwhile, however, the Bolsheviks quietly

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annexed Georgia and made Mongolia the first Soviet satellite on the old Russian principle of "taking whatever lies around badly guarded" *(brat chto plokho lezhit)*. Such earthy Russian sayings perhaps have no place in the rarefied vocabulary of the social scientists, but this one conveys the essence, as well as the menace, of what is usually referred to approvingly as "Soviet flexibility" far better than such euphemistic formulae as, for example, Professor Herbert Dinerstein's (about whose book more later) novel concept of a "rolling" or "movable" status quo. In practice, the latter means much the same thing—*i.e.*, piecemeal Soviet expansionism—but how infinitely more soothing and scholarly it sounds!

ON THE OTHER HAND, practical "flexibility" has always been the obverse of ideological intransigence. The international Communist movement was inevitably, rapidly and ruthlessly transformed into an instrument of Russian policy, and the "Russian path to socialism" was imposed upon every Community party. This was generally accepted, for was not Russia the sole "socialist" state? At the Second Comintern Congress, the German Communist leader Paul Levi, in a fit of enthusiasm, exclaimed (in English): "Russia expects everybody to do his duty!" Levi soon discovered that he was not quite up to it, but there were always others—and then still others.

Ideology remained pure, but the revolution was defeated in the West. Whereupon Lenin arrived at the idea of an alliance between Soviet communism and nationalist movements in Asia (and Africa). Here, again, true to form, he was far more "flexible" than in his dealings with Western Communists. "Don't paint nationalism red," he warned. Gradually it came to be accepted (though never explicitly stated) that in the West "imperialism" could only be destroyed by force of Soviet arms, while elsewhere nationalism would do the job.

Such, by and large, have been the basic principles of Soviet foreign policy through fifty years. Stalin enriched them by his Byzantine savagery; Khrushchev added his demagogy and recklessness; Brezhnev & Co. have superimposed their own brand of oafish brutality. Yet the essentials are unchanged. Even more remarkable than this consistency has been the Western world's persistent failure to recognize the glaring truth. The "liberal" West, it seems, has never really understood the nature of the thing that hit the world in 1917. Western statesmen and experts have spent nearly fifty years in a futile search for Soviet "moderates" whom they could support against the "doctrinaires" (or "doves" against "hawks," in more modern parlance). A particularly striking example of such self-deception was the late U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius' notion that Russia started the cold war because "Marshal Stalin had difficulties with the Politburo . . . for having been too friendly and for having made too many concessions to the two capitalist nations."

Indeed, nothing better epitomizes Western failure to comprehend the realities of Soviet foreign policy than the wartime conferences between the USSR and the Western Allies. While the Russians were fighting tooth and nail for territories, boundaries, puppet governments, and spheres of influence, the Americans were striving to obtain Stalin's signature to various declarations, statements and charters of the highest nobility of purpose. This was seemingly regarded as a fair *quid pro quo*. As Harry Hopkins remarked to President Roosevelt at Yalta, "The Russians have given in so much at the conference (over UN voting procedure) that I don't think we should let them down (over yielding up Eastern Europe)." Twenty years later, the Russians still retained the same nonchalant attitude toward platitudinous moral declarations: Professor Ulam makes the telling point that while the Americans acclaimed the 1963 nuclear test-ban treaty as "a major breakthrough in the cold war," the Soviets could hardly have cared less.

BUT HOPE SPRINGS eternal in the human breast —even that of a Western Sovietologist. Professor Dinerstein's brief account of postwar Soviet-American relations—rather inaccurately entitled *Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy*—exudes hope, optimism, satisfaction and general good feeling. It would seem that all is for the best in the best of all possible bipolar worlds. Cold war? According to the author, it has been over for ages. And to the extent that it ever did exist, it was due largely to "misperceptions": the West misperceived the Soviets, the Soviets misperceived the West, and both misperceived each other. Furthermore, in Mr. Dinerstein's view there is nothing about those "misperceptions" that can't be solved with a little goodwill on both sides. He sees goodwill everywhere—even in the Soviet reaction to the U-2 flights, which provided Russia's leaders with "reassurance that Eisenhower was pursuing his moderate policy toward the Soviet Union in full knowledge of the great disparity between Soviet

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and American forces. Had Eisenhower's moderation been based on overestimates of Soviet strength, it might have been abandoned when he became undeceived." Why, then, did Khrushchev have a U-2 shot down? Pure high spirits, Mr. Dinerstein suggests, no more: he "yielded to the temptation" to indulge in some "rough joshing" of the American president.

Professor Dinerstein is no less sanguine in his estimate of trends in Eastern Europe. "Few on both sides," he writes, "foresaw in the late 1940's that Soviet control in Eastern Europe would start to recede so soon." I hate to have to say it, but in the light of what has transpired in Czechoslovakia, I would venture that even fewer people foresee this in the late 1960's.

The fact is that while a lot has no doubt changed in the USSR in the last fifteen years, Soviet foreign policy is today even more ossified and uncompromising than it was under Lenin or Stalin. Professor Ulam is right when he remarks that Stalin's death put an end to "the prospect of any fundamental and lengthy *détente* with the United States." In an autocracy only an autocrat can change the direction of foreign policy decisively. Even such lesser Tsars as Peter III and Paul I were able to switch alliances in mid-war; and Stalin could treat with Hitler without seeking anybody's permission. Today, however, the Soviet Union is that terrifying thing—an autocracy without an autocrat. The "collective leaders" are slaves of the past, of old commitments and old rhetoric, of fixed boundaries and fixed mentalities. They have no leeway; they cannot afford to sign anything away, to effect the slightest change in the status quo. All they can do is cling to power for dear life.

"It is unlikely," remarks Professor Ulam, "that their wartime experience with American diplomacy left the Russians with an excessive respect for it." It seems even less likely, one might add, that their postwar experience in the same area—save, perhaps, for the Truman interlude—would have increased that respect. The history of the past fifty years is the story of how, on the one hand, the Bolsheviks parlayed a few almost non-existent assets into a great military empire, and of how, on the other hand, first the British and then the Americans frittered away a seemingly impregnable dominance.

As a consequence, Western diplomacy has lost one opportunity after another in dealing with the Soviet Union. "What," exclaims Professor Ulam despairingly, "could a really enterprising diplomacy do if confronted with a conflict of the magnitude and complexity of the Sino-Soviet one!" What, indeed? With a little more insight and imagination, it might well be able to alter the whole world balance of power and put the Russians on the defensive for the first time since the war. But, of course, it will not happen unless the West comprehends that the search for a *détente* with the Kremlin is about as realistic as chasing a will o' the wisp. To gain this comprehension, a reading of Professor Ulam's magnificent book is mandatory.

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Friendship without Friends

MICHAEL P. GEHLEN: *The Politics of Coexistence: Soviet Methods and Motives.* Bloomington, Ind., and London, Indiana University Press, 1967.
ROBERT H. MCNEAL, ED.: *International Relations among Communists.* Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967.
ADAM BROMKE and PHILLIP E. UREN, EDS.: *The Communist States and the West.* New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.

Reviewed by William Zimmerman

IN THE PAST DECADE we have witnessed major changes in the style and tactics of Soviet policy towards Western states, Communist states, and non-ruling Communist parties. Consequently, it has become increasingly evident that a thorough re-examination of the nature of both East-West and inter-Communist relations is in order. To what extent do the tactical changes reflect a transformation of Soviet motives and goals in the international arena? Is the assumption, so common at one time, that ideology is paramount in Soviet foreign policy still valid? Given the far-reaching transformation of the world Communist movement, to what extent have the changes in inter-Communist relations—and especially those between the CPSU and other parties—altered the nature of East-West relations? These—among others—are the questions examined by the authors of the books under review.

Of the three, Mr. Gehlen's *The Politics of Coexistence* goes furthest towards reassessing the motives behind Soviet foreign policy and the relationship between Soviet ideology and behavior. It is Gehlen's view that Leninist concepts have played a modest role at best in determining the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy since 1965. The major exception is the Leninist doctrine of imperialism, which continues to facilitate the identification of the main enemy and "makes the Soviet leaders especially sensitive to some policies of their opponents, such as emphasis on military strength, and dulls their vision of other policies, such as occasional voluntary withdrawal from colonial countries" (p. 250). But the author points out that at the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev adapted Lenin's views on imperialism to the atomic era by rejecting the inevitability of war, by admitting the possibility of peaceful Communist accessions to power, and by making peaceful coexistence relevant for an entire period of historical development and not merely a strategy or tactic. Gehlen finds that Soviet decision-makers have since shown little propensity for risk-taking and have avoided the use of force except when reacting to situations which, in their view, have directly threatened Soviet security, *e.g.*, the 1956 Hungarian revolution. (It would be interesting to know whether the author would consider the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, which occurred after he had written his book, a parallel to the events in Hungary in 1956.)

Specialists may dispute some of Gehlen's major arguments. (For instance, to bolster his contention that recent Soviet foreign policy has been fundamentally cautious, the author attempts—not very convincingly—to explain away five of the eleven

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crisis situations he mentions as having "occurred between May 1960 and November 1962, the period in which members of the old guard reasserted their influence in Moscow"—p. 149.) More troubling is the fact that his analysis is at times superficial and a bit dated. For one thing, Mr. Gehlen does not go far enough in emphasizing the extent to which Khrushchev extricated Soviet foreign policy from the encumbrances of Lenin's *Imperialism.* It may be argued, for instance, that Khrushchev, by the time of his ouster in October 1964, no longer considered the United States the main enemy. In any case, it is clear that Soviet analysis of American foreign policy in the early 1960's was appreciably more sophisticated and less ideologically structured than it had been.

Gehlen makes no mention, moreover, of Khrushchev's thesis that in the atomic age peaceful coexistence has a new content involving both struggle *and* cooperation, and he fails to emphasize Khrushchev's doctrinal innovation to the effect that capitalism had entered a third stage of "general crisis"—an innovation which implied that Lenin's analysis of imperialism was no longer applicable to current conditions or, put differently, that it had been historically *transcended.* Nor does the author convey a clear understanding of the diverse influences at work in the Soviet decision-making process. For example, he treats V. D. Sokolovsky's *Military Strategy* as an authoritative expression of established doctrine, but this reviewer is inclined to construe it as an effort on the part of the military establishment to improve its chances of obtaining larger allocations and enlarging the scope of its decision-making competence.

Finally, as a result of his relative inattention to the period since October 1964, Gehlen overestimates the degree of continuity between Khrushchev and his successors—at least in doctrinal matters pertaining to coexistence. Consequently, the reader of *The Politics of Coexistence* may fail to realize that peaceful coexistence is no longer chief among the goals of Soviet foreign policy, having been reduced to a position of parity with "proletarian internationalism."

NEVERTHELESS, in its treatment of ideology and power, *The Politics of Coexistence* has much to recommend it—an observation which, unfortunately, cannot as easily be made with regard either to McNeal's *International Relations Among Communists* (in which these questions are treated in a rather elementary fashion), or to parts of the volume edited by Bromke and Uren, *The Communist States and the West.* In the latter, one finds (in a chapter by a Canadian scholar, Jean Ethier-Blais) not only an essentially Gaullist appraisal of ideology—*i.e.*, one which makes no distinction among the motives of the three major "imperialist" powers, the US, the USSR, and Communist China—but even the astonishing view (expressed by Franz Michael) that "there is . . . no conflict between the ideological views expressed by the Soviets and the Chinese Communists" (p. 136).

Both the McNeal and the Bromke-Uren volumes do contain a good deal of useful information, much as it may be vitiated by certain questionable generalizations on the part of the authors. The first, for instance, contains excerpts from major Communist documents of the past five decades, thus providing the reader with important background material to inter-Communist relations. The latter are described by McNeal, in his introductory essay, as "distinctive within the entire field of international relations"—in itself perhaps an unobjectionable comment if it did not lead the author to suggest that Communists, in their dealings with one another, are impervious to outside influences. In his view, "theirs is a closed network of alignments and antagonisms which non-Communists cannot pentrate."

In fact, however, the boundaries which separate Communist international relations and other international relations have become increasingly blurred. It is no longer really possible, as John Kautsky points out in his essay in *The Communist States and The West,* to distinguish between "Communist and non-Communist modernizing movements" (p. 216). For that matter, much of what the Sino-Soviet split is about concerns the question of who is a true Communist. Moreover, as the Sino-Soviet dispute prolongs itself, non-Communist states are clearly becoming indirectly involved in it: for example, Peking accuses Moscow of participating in a new "Holy Alliance" (embracing the United States, the USSR, India, and Japan) directed against China.

If, therefore, international communism is interrelated with the overall international system, decisions taken by non-Communist policymakers will have an impact on relations among Communists, and this will in turn have ramifications for the future of East-West relations. *The Communist States and the West* focuses on this interpretation of East and West, and the analyses by Bernard Morris, Richard Lowenthal, and Harald von Riekhoff are of particular interest. Morris goes furthest in developing the theme of interpenetration

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when he asserts, prematurely in my view, that "one can no longer properly speak of East-West relations" (p. 20). A more accurate description of these relations is suggested by von Riekhoff, who systematically interrelates "the recent proliferation of East-West contacts and transactions" (p. 59). It remains for Richard Lowenthal to make what is the crucial point concerning the diminished cohesiveness of the "socialist camp" and its bearing on East-West relations; namely, that "the Sino-Soviet rift has given the West for the first time the chance to choose its priorities in dealing with its two major opponents" (p. 189). It is hoped that his words will earn the attention not only of fellow scholars, but also of those who shape the policies of the Western nations.

What Price Victory?

IVAN MAISKY: *Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador.*
New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967.
MARSHAL VASILI I. CHUIKOV: *The Fall of Berlin.*
New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967.
A. M. NEKRICH: *June 22, 1941.*
Translated and edited by V. Petrov.
Columbia, S. C., University of South Carolina Press, 1968.

Reviewed by R. Kolkowicz

THE "GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR" of 1941-45 has in recent years become the Russians' grand passion. Generals, diplomats, historians, and party hacks have been vying with each other in the publishing stakes, pouring out a long delayed flood of books, monographs, and articles on that drama of near perdition and ultimate triumph.

During Stalin's time, before the myth of the deified dictator was shattered by Khrushchev, the war had been depicted by Soviet writers as a titanic struggle between a super-Stalin and the vast Nazi hordes. The panegyrics on the dictator's single-handed victory over the enemy frequently reached the bizarre and absurd, blotting out the roles of the Red Army, the Communist Party, and the Soviet people themselves. In the late 1950's Nikita Khrushchev, under prodding from the marshals and generals, encouraged Soviet historians and memoirists to take a new look into the historical record.[1] His main objective in this "liberalization" of historiography was not so much historical truth as the glorification of Khrushchev and his associates. What he got was probably more than he had bargained for. Hundreds of frustrated military officers, forced over the years to remain silent about *their* war and *their* exploits, flooded the market with military memoirs.[2] Historians and diplomats contributed to the avalanche, and the party itself commissioned several massive official studies of the war.

[1] See, for example, *Voprosy istorii* editorial, No. 5, 1955.
[2] See this reviewer's *The Soviet Military and Communist Party*, Princeton University Press, 1967, for a partial bibliography (pp. 387-404) of military memoirs and other historical works. See also Matthew P. Gallagher, *The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, Memoirs, and Realities*, New York, Praeger, 1963.

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By and large, these works represent worm's-eye views of relatively obscure people intent on presenting their small vision of the apocalypse. Occasionally, however, the presses have ground out historical works by prominent members of the Soviet "Establishment," whose elevated vantage point might have been expected to yield broader views and possibly new revelations about the war. Usually the reader has been disappointed, for few suppressed secrets, or even fresh and honest points of view, have emerged in print. Conditioned by the implicit and explicit proscriptions of the party, most writers have not really attempted to "tell it like it was"—or if they have, their efforts have not gotten past the censor. Those historians or memoirists who may have been eager to probe, to analyze, to insinuate and even to theorize, have found themselves in a straitjacket of party prohibitions. The intent of these restrictions is clearly implied in directives issued in 1963 by the chief party historian, B. N. Ponomarev:

The historian is not merely a detached narrator who describes events . . . within a scientific schema. He is a fighter whose goal is to use the history of past events in the struggle for communism.[3]

Ponomarev instructed historians to

rely in their research on Communist "partiinost" [party consciousness] as a methodological principle that permits the only objective, correct understanding of social history . . . the correct general point of view.[4]

In short, history has remained chained to the purposes of the party and the state; no less than in Stalin's day, it is deemed an instrument of policy to be bent and adjusted to the needs of the moment—and if the true facts of a great war for survival are lost in the process, so be it.

Nonetheless, the recent crop of war chronicles are not without value. With careful sifting, they yield some new glimpses and inside views of a number of unsavory "secrets" of the war and postwar periods: Stalin's personal role in the initial military disasters on the Russo-German front; the wartime consequences of his 1937 purge of the Soviet high command, directly reflected in the poor showing of the Red Army in the early stages of the war; the overwhelming vanity which led the dictator to relegate his wartime rivals for public acclaim to obscure posts in the hinterland once the hostilities were over; and finally, the more recent infighting among various Soviet generals and marshals for larger shares of historical recognition. The books under review offer recollections of the war from three quite different vantage points: one is written by a diplomat, one by a soldier, and one by a historian.

THE MEMOIRS OF Ivan Maisky, former Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom, cover the years 1939-43. Maisky's book is undistinguished for its style, for its personal comments on the events of the time, or for its insights drawn from living in wartime London. It is a "safe" book despite the author's assertion that he "sought to reproduce genuine historical truth"—and despite the publisher's blurb calling this the "first major work by a high-ranking Soviet official that represents so candidly the Soviet position on many controversial issues in the early stages of World War II."

Maisky provides some interesting descriptions of Churchill's and Eden's attitudes towards a Stalinist Russia which, as a result of Hitler's attack, had suddenly become the unlikely ally of England. The Soviet envoy was being bombarded by Moscow with instructions to press the British, themselves facing the threat of Nazi invasion, to send the Russians vast arms supplies and to open a second front. Maisky was successful in arranging a visit by Foreign Secretary Eden to Moscow and in winning British agreement to supply the Soviets with arms shipments.

In curious fashion, Maisky's book recalls the 19th-century genre of diplomatic memoirs. There are constant references to garden parties in the country as well as to the hardships of wartime England which adversely affected Maisky's wardrobe and table; expressions of veiled contempt for his superiors in Moscow who did not understand the subtleties and mores of the English; and cultured references to poets and artists. He also gets in a few oblique remarks about Stalin's cruelty and coarseness in personal relations and his obtuseness in trying to pressure the British into sweeping postwar concessions at a time when the German armies were on the outskirts of Moscow.

By and large, the book makes little contribution to serious diplomatic history, repeating as it does the obscure and ideologically sanctified rationales for the Nazi-Soviet Pact, for the hostility of the West toward the Soviet invasion of Finland, and for the failure of the British and Americans to open a second front early in the war.

[3] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1, 1963.
[4] *Ibid.*, No. 12, 1962.

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OF QUITE A different order is the book of Marshal Chuikov, an outspoken, brusque and soldierly recollection of the war at its most degrading—and its most intoxicating. Chuikov is not a modest man. He frankly states: "I do not believe people who assume an unreal modesty and allege that they do not think of themselves, of their own dignity. Nonsense! . . . Could I, in this situation, be indifferent to the fighting fame of my regiments? Of course not!" [5]

The book presents a fairly straightforward account of how the Soviet military steamroller crushed its way from Eastern Poland in 1944 to the heart of the German empire. But it is hardly a "veritable El Dorado" for historians, as Alistair Horne describes it in his somewhat breathless foreword. The bulk of the factual descriptions of the various battles, of strategy and operational procedures, have already been written up—albeit rather tediously—in other, more massive studies. What is primarily interesting and refreshing about the book is that it provides many personal insights into day-to-day events as well as into the attitudes of the military brass and the common foot-soldier.

If the book has any theme, it is how Chuikov and his troops overcame various kinds of adversity, as well as the enemies obstructing them, in order to participate in the capture of Berlin. Chuikov's enemies were a triad: the Germans, his arch-rival Marshal Zhukov, and himself—although he would hardly admit the last. As for his German military opponents, Chuikov, despite his condemnation of Nazi atrocities, treats them with the traditional respect of generals for a worthy adversary. Not so Zhukov, his superior, whom he acutely dislikes and repeatedly criticizes in oblique ways. During Khrushchev's reign, when Marshal Zhukov was an "unperson," Chuikov openly baited and humiliated the hero of Moscow and Berlin.[6] Now, with his old rival restored to respectability, Chuikov no longer indulges in outright sarcasm. But he makes it clear that in his view Zhukov bungled the Berlin operation, delaying it by weeks through timidity and lack of tactical skill.

Chuikov presents himself in this and previous memoirs as a Russian Patton. Impatient with headquarters, desk warriors, and the requirements of integrated and careful operational planning, he is happiest on the move with his officers and soldiers, ranging over the battlefields in the thick of the fighting. He identifies with the ordinary soldier and rejoices in the company of rough-and-tough front-line troops. Yet, despite his usual terseness, he occasionally turns lyrical in describing lines of damaged enemy tanks as "black, humped shapes, like camels on their knees," or in expressing his ecstacy at the beginning of a battle: "At such moments . . . one feels the keenest happiness. The joy of victory holds a strange excitement; it is a spring of new energy. . . ." (p. 82)

BY FAR the most interesting of the three books is that of A. M. Nekrich, skillfully translated and edited by V. Petrov. Publication of the book in the Soviet Union a few years ago brought down on Nekrich's head the wrath of the party and its loyal servants in the historical establishment, for he had attempted the right thing at the wrong time—namely, to expose the basic responsibility of Stalin, and indeed of the Stalinist system in general, for the disastrous setbacks suffered by the Red Army in the initial stages of the war. Nekrich points to Stalin's irrational rejection of all the evidence of Nazi preparations to launch a Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union and tells how the dictator had reduced the high-level Soviet military leaders to cowardly and obsequious yes-men afraid to tell him the unhappy truth or to make urgent decisions on their own.

Of particular interest is the reaction of Soviet historians, both military and academic, to Nekrich's bold undertaking. At a stormy meeting reliably reported to have taken place in Moscow in February 1966, numerous historians and military officers are said to have voiced passionate approval and support of Nekrich's book. If these reports are authentic, they demonstrate how deep is the hatred of many members of the military and intellectual elite towards Stalin, and even more towards the whole system which created so many opportunists at all levels of party and government. To read the proceedings of the Moscow meeting is to experience a jolting glance into the peculiar Soviet world where truth is a dangerous luxury, human emotions are smothered by absurd agitprop jargon, and right and wrong are determined by the uncertain vagaries of politics. Nekrich's cardinal mistake was that he was out of step with political trends. At the height of destalinization, his book would hardly have

[5] See p. 28. Chuikov's braggadocio style has been severely criticized over the years by his own military colleagues. See *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, op. cit.*, pp. 200-19.

[6] See Chuikov's essays in *Oktiabr*, Nos. 3-5, and in *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, No. 2, 1965, especially p. 2.

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caused a ripple. Now, however, when a revival of Stalinism is the order of the day in the Soviet Union, his book is an embarrassment to the leaders and a challenge to their efforts to reinstate the dead dictator in the Communist pantheon.

WHAT DO THESE three books tell us? First, that history in the Soviet Union is the jealously guarded property of the party and state, which are the protectors of its ideological and political "purity"; that it is viewed by the Soviet leaders as an instrument for rationalizing party mistakes, shaping the minds of men, projecting the future and carrying the message of the Communist millenium. It is a political and ideological expedient.

Secondly, that history in the USSR is a false mirror which is expected, as in the fable of Snow White, to give back the same unvarying answer to perennial and troublesome questions about the quality of Soviet life. The expected answer: The Communist way of life is the best and most beautiful in the world.

Thirdly, like Hitler's "*Gott ist mit uns*" imprinted on every Nazi belt-buckle, history in the Soviet Union is invoked as a higher imperative and an "objective" justifier of what *is*—"History is with us."

But history, or rather historiography, can also be a vehicle for expressing a personal or institutional viewpoint, for offering veiled dissent, for talking about "then" but meaning "now" and "what about the future." This is why the party so carefully guards its prerogative to decide what is proper to ask and discuss, and what sort of history is acceptable for the Soviet people.

China: An Overview

FRANZ SCHURMANN and ORVILLE SCHELL, EDS.: *The China Reader.* (3 vols.)
I: *Imperial China.* II: *Republican China.* III: *Communist China.*
New York, Random House and Vintage Books, 1967.

Reviewed by Harold C. Hinton

THE WAR IN VIETNAM, Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and Chinese nuclear testing have heightened public interest in China everywhere in the world—but especially in the United States—to a level unknown since the Korean War. Among the American public, this interest has been motivated to a large extent by a natural anxiety over the possibility that Communist China and the United States may be on a "collision course" in, or over, Vietnam. Yet, despite the growing public concern about China, few books are both readable and sufficiently general, authoritative, and up-to-date to provide the concerned reader with an adequate basis for forming intelligent judgments.

The three-volume work under review comes about as close to meeting these requirements as can reasonably be expected—even though its senior editor, Professor Franz Schurmann, an able and respected student of Chinese history and politics, has strong personal views on Chinese communism which, though by no means uncritical, are often of a sympathetic nature.

Volumes I and II demonstrate that there has been, at least since World War II, a great deal of perceptive and literate writing produced in the United States on the subject of traditional and modern (pre-Communist) China—perhaps more than anywhere else. The first volume on Imperial

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China, apart from providing the minimum necessary background on traditional Chinese culture, focuses principal attention on the decline and fall of the imperial order in its Manchu incarnation in the 19th and early 20th centuries. A judicious mixture of original and secondary sources of the highest order of "relevance and readability" (the editors' criteria for inclusion) conveys very well the agony of a culture unable either to fend off, or—because of self-satisfaction and inertia—to cope with, the new technology and international order created and forced on China by the West.

Like more current writing on prerevolutionary China, the selections and commentary offered here show a tendency to idealize the Confucian tradition and to attribute China's major problems either to departures from this tradition by emperors, officials, and gentry or to intrusions by the West, rather than to defects in the Chinese tradition itself. The reviewer, on the contrary, would hold that the Chinese have displayed an almost unique capacity for evolving and clinging to unviable philosophies. Among these, Confucianism succeeded in gaining the greatest favor because of its moderate and pragmatic quality. But China's high rate of population growth, based on an exceptionally productive agriculture, made the rather rigid Confucian order workable only so long as empty arable land was available, and this condition largely ceased to exist during the 19th century. Since the decline of Confucianism in the late 19th century, only ideologies of foreign inspiration—though subsequently Sinicized almost beyond recognition—have been able to transcend the deeply divisive forces at work in China and produce a transistory semblance of national unity.

THE SECOND VOLUME deals with the period (1911-1949), during which disunity, chaos, and war plunged China into an abyss of misery and despair, finally leading the Chinese to turn to the latest of these foreign-inspired ideologies—*i.e.*, Marxism Sinicized into the "thought of Mao Tse-tung"—for their salvation, much as the Germans clutched at Hitlerism as seemingly their best hope of escape from a comparable agony. The approach here is perhaps somewhat too historical, with the result that detail tends to obscure analysis. The intellectual and literary quality of the selections is also not quite as high as in the less controversial first volume. There is a tendency to treat the Communist victory as in some sense inevitable, whereas in all probability it would not have occurred without the Japanese aggression of 1937-45, and even then might have been fended off had the Kuomintang had better leadership. The Japanese invasion and Kuomintang ineptitude combined to present the Communists with a historic opportunity—of which they took full advantage—to prove that a party of the Marxist-Leninist type could unify and reinvigorate China as no other post-Confucian movement had yet succeeded in doing. It is all the more ironical that Mao Tse-tung, in his dotage, should have turned against the very party organization that he is usually credited with having built up. One key to this riddle lies in the fact that the party (or at least the party apparat) is in reality not so much the creature of Mao himself as of those very colleagues whom he has been denouncing.

THE THIRD VOLUME, which is almost as long as the other two combined, deals of course with China since 1949. It contains a somewhat excessive number of selections from Chinese sources, many of which are presented without adequate commentary and are therefore likely to strike the general reader as incomprehensible or absurd, or both. The entire subject is treated with great solemnity, which is to say, without a proper sense of proportion. Where humor does creep in, it is one-sided: why not balance the Chinese poem satirizing US refusal to allow some shrimp of Chinese Communist origin to be transported through American territory en route to Canada with, say, *The Economist's* superb poetic commentary on Mao's celebrated July 1966 swim in the Yangtze, entitled "But Has He Tried Walking on It?"

There is virtually nothing in the third volume to prepare the reader for that new manifestation of Mao's penchant for "uninterrupted revolution" which has become known as the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." Even the epilogue, which was written in the autum of 1966 when the GPCR was just going into full swing, is not very enlightening on this subject. In all fairness, however, it must be said that no outside observer of China, including this reviewer, could have done significantly better at that time. The fact nevertheless remains that the book has already been outdated by the events of the GPCR. These events have done more than simply add another chapter to contemporary Chinese history; they have brought into relief certain elements that call for a reappraisal of past interpretations of developments in China. Even if we ignore the more lurid absurdities of the wall pos-

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ters, the disclosures flowing from the GPCR show policy-making in Communist China since the early or mid-1950s to have been a process of interaction between Mao Tse-tung's jacobin idealism and the more professionally and bureaucratically-oriented views of many of his colleagues, with Chou En-lai probably serving as the main bridge between the two until 1965 or 1966, when he chose—outwardly at least—to take his stand with Mao.

The treatment of foreign policy in the third volume is less than satisfactory, and the commentaries in particular abound in extraordinary propositions. It is impossible, for example, to justify the assertions that in 1950 the Soviet Union threw its nuclear shield over Communist China in exchange for complete Chinese subordination to Moscow (p. 233); that China's recent foreign policy setbacks have occurred only in the ideological realm and not in the area of "pragmatic policy" (p. 336); or that the Afro-Asian conference of 1965 failed to meet because of Algerian President Ben Bella's overthrow (p. 539) rather than because a number of the participants disliked the arrogant line which the Chinese were taking with regard to the conference and used Ben Bella's ouster as an excuse for shelving the meeting. The editors also take note of China's "sudden but limited attack on India" in 1962 without further explanation and without any qualification of their contention that Communist China is essentially non-expansionist (p. 557).

Indeed, the basic theme of the commentaries on Chinese foreign policy, if not of all the selections, is that Peking, contrary to views held widely in the United States, is not expansionist, and that a US policy of containment is not only unnecessary but likely to lead to a Sino-American war. There is a logical problem here which critics of containment never fully face. If one comes upon a town in which the crime rate is low and the police force large and efficient, it does not necessarily follow that the latter is unnecessary and should be disbanded. Even if one concedes that the Chinese have little or no interest in invading other countries, it still seems reasonable to believe that, in the absence of a countervailing US presence (including a military presence), not only would there be heavy pressure on China's non-Communist Asian neighbors to accommodate themselves to the demands of Chinese policy, but even such accommodation might not suffice to protect them against active Chinese support of efforts by local Communist parties to seize power. The current Chinese fixation on Vietnam seems due in large measure to a felt need on Peking's part for a victory of the Maoist strategy of "people's war" in order to counterbalance failures and setbacks in other areas once thought to be promising, notably Indonesia and the Congo (Leopoldville). None of this suggests to the reviewer that containment is either unnecessary or bound to lead to war with Communist China, although the latter must be admitted as a possibility.

In conclusion, it must be said that, in spite of the shortcomings of these volumes, they are nonetheless important and useful and should be read by everyone wishing to augment his knowledge of a complex country which will unquestionably exert considerable influence on the future course of world affairs.

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Reviews in Brief

The Early Internationals

JULIUS BRAUNTHAL: *History of the International, 1864-1914.* F. A. Praeger, New York, 1967.

THIS COMPREHENSIVE and informative account of the origins, activities, and fate of the First and Second Internationals (presented here in easy and fluent translation from the original German) is almost more than one could expect from the labors of one man. Mr. Braunthal's book is obviously the product of prodigious industry and unrivaled knowledge, and at the same time of a profound commitment to the movement he is writing about. For while he writes impartially, he is not dispassionate—his sympathies are unmistakable.

Mr. Braunthal traces the origins of the First International, which was founded in 1864, to two sources: (1) the universalist ideas and claims of the French Revolution; and (2) the demands of early 19th-century radical and reformist political thinkers and associations for the abolition of private property—an idea which was first advanced by Babeuf.

The International Workingmen's Association, as the First International was formally christened, began with total resources of £3.3.0, collected from among the members of the General Council at its first meeting, and its highest annual income (for 1869-70) was £51.7.1. Mr. Braunthal makes a careful attempt to estimate its membership, but the figures are too incomplete to yield any satisfactory result. Unquestionably, however, the total was small.

Given its small size and meager resources, the fears that the International aroused appear both startling and ludicrous. To the Pope, it was "the enemy of God and man." Thiers, who was largely responsible for the sickening brutality with which the Paris Commune of 1871 was suppressed, wanted its adherents treated as the Spanish Inquisition had treated heretics. The International was accused of conspiring with both Bismarck and Louis Napoleon, and some even laid the Chicago fire of 1871 at its door.

But it is rather to the conflicts within the International that Mr. Braunthal devotes his main attention. From the beginning there were sharp differences between Marx and his followers on the one hand and sundry groups on the other: the Proudhonists, who opposed political action; the purists, who disapproved of even temporary alliances with middle-class radicals; and, fatally for the International, the followers of of Bakunin. In dealing with these conflicts, Mr. Braunthal follows an orderly procedure, first giving a brief theoretical analysis of the dispute, then discussing it in the context of the different national groups affiliated to the International, and finally tracing its course within the International itself.

By the time the Second International was founded in 1889, well-organized socialist parties and trade unions with views and problems of their own had been established in a number of countries. It took eleven years for the International to establish a permanent central body (in Brussels) to act and speak on its behalf, and even then it functioned only as a loose federation of autonomous national parties. Most of these parties regarded themselves as Marxist, but when the English anarchosyndicalist leader William Morris, who attended the inaugural congress, was asked what he thought of Marx and the theory of surplus value, he replied that much of political economy struck him as "dreary rubbish." "It is enough political economy for me," he added, "to know that the idle class is rich and the working class is poor, and that the rich are rich because they rob the poor." It did not matter whether the robbery was effected by surplus value, slavery, or brigandage. "The whole system," Morris declared, "is monstrous and intolerable."

Like its predecessor, the Second International was plagued by internal conflict. Although its stated principles, its philosophy of history, and its economics were broadly Marxist, there was no agreement on whether capitalism could be overthrown by legal means or only by revolution, on the use and dangers of the general strike, on the threat of war and how to avert it, on the attitude to be taken toward colonies. In most of the debates the real problems were evaded, and virtually nothing was resolved before the outbreak of war engulfed all the participants and the societies they were challenging.

Looking back, these men—here brought vividly to life—may seem like starry-eyed dreamers. In this "apostolic period of socialism" they were advancing a new set of values in sharp and shining contrast to prevailing standards. *The Times* (London) wrote of the First International that "one has to go back to the time of the birth of Christianity and the rejuvenation of the ancient world by the Germanic nations to find anything analogous to the workers' movement . . .," and that its aim was "surely the most comprehensive . . . to which any institution apart from

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the Christian Church has ever aspired."

With the outbreak of World War I, the socialist parties for the most part began to integrate into existing society—to become, as it were, domesticated. The change was no doubt inevitable, but the loss is no less real. And the movement, or movements, that have since taken over the succession are more practical but less attractive.

One word of criticism: it is a pity that the titles of many of the books quoted are not given in their original language. Aulard and Mathiez appear as the authors of German books, and the dating of some publications is misleading.

Jane Degras

From "Soso" to Stalin

EDWARD ELLIS SMITH: *The Young Stalin: The Early Years of an Elusive Revolutionary*. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1967.

THE PRINCIPAL THESIS of this study is the author's contention that Stalin—as the young Dzhugashvili—was recruited into the service of the Tsarist Okhrana (secret police) in the summer of 1899, and that for some fourteen years thereafter, until his final arrest and deportation to Siberia in 1913, his effort to rise in Social Democratic circles was financed by the Russian Imperial Treasury.

This interpretation is based on two hitherto unavailable sources, recent Soviet historiography aimed at destalinization of the prerevolutionary Bolshevik movement and the newly opened Okhrana Collection at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

The author's use of the documents is imaginative. He gives us a good idea of the structure and *modus operandi* of the Okhrana, especially its handling of agents. In this respect it is to be hoped that Smith will some day write a book akin to Sidney Monas' *The Third Section*, which covered the period of Nicholas I.

Unfortunately, neither recent Soviet revelations nor the Hoover documents support the author's thesis. Smith quotes from many sources but none of these names Dzhugashvili as an agent. The writer's approach is hypothetical and inferential. His hypotheses, based on circumstantial evidence, are ingenious and may some day turn out to be correct, but definitive conclusions will have to await more solid evidence.

There is no record of what Stalin did for several months after his expulsion from the seminary. Therefore, Smith suggests, it is very possible that the Okhrana contacted "Soso" and offered to finance his penetration of the Menshevik organization in Tiflis with the understanding that he would try to split it by pushing an extremist line.

Smith would have his cake and eat it too. If Soso is not arrested in an Okhrana raid, it is evidence of his collaboration; if in the next raid he is arrested, it is part of his cover story. If he prints and distributes literature, the police must have paid for it; if he is inactive in the movement, his leisure must be financed by the Tsar. Such inferences may be correct, but they are purely speculative.

Smith bases his principal thesis on two questionable assumptions. First, he views the Okhrana as a highly efficient organization whose infiltration of the various revolutionary groups was almost total; in fact, were it not for World War I, he asserts, there would have been no revolution. It is unthinkable to Smith that Stalin could have escaped from exile and returned safely to his usual haunts around Tiflis without police complicity. In short, the author cannot acknowledge that the Tsarist security apparatus was quite capable of making mistakes.

Secondly, the author accepts uncritically Trotsky's contemptuous denigration of Stalin's role in the Georgian revolutionary movement, as adumbrated in his unfinished biography of the late dictator. This leads the author to place even more emphasis on the "double agent" motif. Since he assumes that the young revolutionary was disliked by all his comrades and was therefore ineffective in the movement, he concludes that the Social Democrats would not have helped him escape from exile, supported him financially, or supplied him with passports for travel abroad. Therefore, the police must have assisted him. The notion of Stalin's unimportance within the movement is accompanied by a conflicting thesis suggesting that he *did* advance in Georgian Social Democratic circles—but through the help of the Okhrana's Special Section in St. Petersburg. How the Okhrana could have been effective in the Caucasus and not in the country as a whole is not even explained, let alone corroborated. But then, that is in keeping with the rest of this rather quixotic volume.

William J. Parente

RAFFAELLO UBOLDI: *Stalin*. Milan, Della Volpe Editore, 1966.

MR. UBOLDI is an Italian journalist who served in Moscow in the early 1960's. His life of Stalin is part of an Italian series, "Contemporaries," that will include William Shirer's book on Hitler and Robert Payne's on Lenin. The book is thus meant for serious, intelligent readers, but not for scholars in the field. It is a "journalistic" work —that is to say, pungent, anecdotal, distinctly negative, and based on the assumption that important public figures really do make history.

Mr. Uboldi read many Western works on Stalin and spoke to many people in the USSR. One can't tell if any of this research was done in Russian. The book contains no new information on Stalin's career and no new interpretations of it, save for some observations made by the author in the autumn of 1961 about the reactions of the Moscow populace to the second round of destalinization initiated by Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress.

Yet to say that there is little "new" in the book is not to damn it. It was written for publication in Italian, in which there is less reliable literature on Stalin than there is in English. It embodies much of the best Western scholarship on the subject, which can only enhance public discussion in a country where Marxism and the Communist Party are matters of intense intellectual and political concern. Mr. Uboldi does not ignore the impersonal aspects of Stalin's regime, such as party institutions and the economic buildup, but he emphasizes Stalin's personal role in gaining and wielding power, thus striking what is certainly a sensible balance.

In the course of the book, the author offers his opinions on some interpretative issues that have long divided Western analysts of the USSR. This reviewer cannot agree that "Stalin was not an ideologist . . . but above all a practical

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man." On the other hand, Mr. Uboldi is right to insist that while Lenin was alive, Stalin was "an obedient Leninist tool." He thinks that after Lenin's death Stalin was motivated chiefly by an insatiable drive for power, which is a bit simple. He does not give Stalin much credit for winning World War II, which is a bit harsh. Only after the War, he says, did Stalin become "the insufferable idol," which is a bit generous.

Mr. Uboldi's most interesting chapter is probably "The Purge of the Military," which relates the Nazi deceptions that led Stalin to decimate his own high command. In his last chapter he discusses one of the limits of destalinization, which he terms the *omerta* of Khrushchev's successors—the Mafia-like silence they assume to protect and preserve the system. Mr. Uboldi believes that in spite of all the changes, the USSR is still essentially the society that Stalin built. He may be right.

Francis B. Randall

Workers in the USSR

ROBERT CONQUEST, ED.: *Industrial Workers in the USSR*. New York, 1967.

ROBERT CONQUEST'S *Industrial Workers in the USSR* quite adequately performs the mini-function designed for it by the editors of Praeger's Contemporary Soviet Union Series. However, this is one case where the briefer the coverage the less attractive and engrossing the results.

To be sure, Mr. Conquest successfully assembles pertinent information on employment policy, labor contracts, labor discipline, wages, working conditions, unemployment, trade unions, *etc.*, in less than 200 pages. Indeed, the book's chief merit lies in his adroit writing and sense of priority. Although his emphasis is on contemporary developments, he also provides short (though at times less than adequate) historical sketches. There is some suggestion of analysis and commentary, but little more than a suggestion. Mr. Conquest's views about Soviet labor do, however, shine through, and the book should be useful as a concise, if limited, survey of this field.

In his discussion of contemporary developments, Mr. Conquest points out that the introduction of economic reforms has helped to focus attention on the urgent need for a better deployment of labor and for the alleviation of difficulties that confront the unemployed. The broader powers and independence now granted to industrial managers in the interest of greater efficiency are making the unemployment problem more acute as managers increase their dismissals of redundant labor. Furthermore, the absence of any institution to help balance the supply and demand of manpower leaves some areas with a surplus and others with a shortage.

Reversing a position of long standing, the Soviet authorities now publicly acknowledge the existence of unemployment. They also admit that the unemployed suffer, and that the placement system does not always meet the needs or desires of the workers. To remedy these problems, Kosygin, in 1965, called on *Gosplan* to study regional labor resources in order to promote a more rational allocation of industrial development. Since then, the press has discussed many eminently workable accommodations towards improving the lot of the unemployed or misemployed workers. The formation of a large network of labor exchanges for adult workers and the reintroduction of unemployment insurance for workers dismissed as redundant are among the more important proposals.

Mr. Conquest also emphasizes the high rate of unemployment among university graduates and teenagers. From the 1950's onward, educated youngsters wishing to join the labor force have not always been able to find jobs for which they have been trained and have been dismissed more readily than older workers. School "dropouts" have, just as in the United States, experienced longer periods of unemployment and greater frustrations than those who complete school. But in the USSR the juvenile unemployment problem has been compounded by efficiency-minded managers who resist employing those under 18 and—failing that—fire them at the earliest opportunity. To be sure, juveniles are often apathetic workers because scant attention is paid to their job preferences in the first place.

The government is aware of the obstacles confronting the prospective young worker and has taken certain steps toward removing at least some of them. In 1966, the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree establishing what in effect is a youth employment service. It provided for the immediate employment of "drop outs" and for a large increase in the number of jobs available to young people with college training. Some headway has been made, yet in February 1968 *Novyi mir* reported that half of the university-trained specialists were employed outside their fields and that the Soviet labor force had room for only one-fourth of all high school graduates in the country.

It is most impressive that although unemployment and misemployment are among the more topical domestic problems in the Soviet Union today and are officially recognized as such, the Soviet leadership appears to be unable or unwilling to adopt measures strong enough to cope with them. Policymakers are split over the course of action to pursue. Their policy at best is one of muddling through, and it appears that for the moment the price of not doing anything is lower than that of unsettling the status quo. But then, this seems to be a good part of the story of post-Stalin Russia.

Jay B. Sorenson

Trade and Aid

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN: *Soviet Foreign Aid*. New York, F. A. Praeger, 1967.

THE AUTHOR OF the present study, Professor M. I. Goldman of Wellesley College, reveals himself in the early pages of his book as an unabashed factologist proposing to make a complete inventory of the bricks and mortar that went into building the edifice of Soviet foreign economic aid—as it were, from the ground up. He has painstakingly assembled a comprehensive yet highly readable record—on a country-by-country basis—of the terms of aid agreements, the location and purpose of individual projects, costs of construction, levels of output, amounts of credit, and such operational details as he was able to ascertain in the course of a personal tour of a number of countries on the receiving end of the Soviet economic aid program. It is a fair guess that the book will remain, for

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some time to come, the best single, encyclopedic account of the recent activities of the Soviet Union on this new and still largely untested plane of international diplomacy.

The author has gone beyond the usual confines of "foreign aid" (*i.e.*, aid to underdeveloped and politically uncommitted countries) to include an account of Soviet economic relations with other Communist-ruled countries in Europe and Asia and since the end of World War II. In this portion of his survey, he succeeds in putting together, in two short chapters, a compact description of the unique patterns of commerce and capital-flow that have evolved within the Communist world in recent years. In addition, he provides a particularly useful summary of recent economic relations between the USSR and Communist China, showing the dramatic shift that occurred in 1960 from outwardly enthusiastic economic cooperation to studied contempt for each other's economic well-being. The author also includes here an interesting tabulation of economic aid agreements concluded by the two competing Communist giants with a number of influential underdeveloped countries during the short period leading up to the ill-fated "Second Bandung" Conference which was ultimately cancelled by the host country, Algeria, in June 1965.

The main body of the book consists of a rewarding observation tour of the "Third World," with extended stops in India and the United Arab Republic, followed by briefer stops in Afghanistan and Indonesia, and the remaining areas of Soviet aid activity covered in four subsequent chapters. A painstaking interviewer and researcher, Professor Goldman demonstrates that the economic arrangements between these countries and the USSR are frequently not strictly bilateral in their intended impact. In the case of India, for instance, the Soviet aid program bolstered that country's bargaining position vis-à-vis the commercial interests of the West. Specifically, by accepting an offer from the USSR and Rumania to build several oil refineries and to bring some additional crude oil into the country, India succeeded in curbing the economic power of the large Western oil companies in the local market. There was, for a time, unmistakable evidence of bruised feelings while these companies adjusted to the new situation. In the upshot, however, the author suggests that the injection of economic competition from the East probably helped to stabilize relations between India and the big Western oil companies on a new basis.

It is rather surprising that Professor Goldman says so little about the motives that have impelled the Soviet Union to become involved in the costly business of foreign aid. After all, he is undoubtedly aware that, under Soviet conditions of full employment of resources, the export of capital goods on long-term credit reduces the supply of goods available for investment at home and thus tends to depress the rate of economic growth. More than that, the types of equipment, plant, or facility which are required to sustain a typical program of foreign aid are very often in short supply within the Soviet economy. Yet, we find the Soviet Union exporting to the developing countries such installations as fertilizer plants, power-generating facilities, grain elevators, etc., even though such exports are likely to intensify the conditions of a chronic sellers' market with which the Soviet domestic economy has long had to contend. Surely there must be some overriding considerations which impel the Soviet Union to accept the economic sacrifices inherent in so costly a program of economic aid.

To say, as Professor Goldman does, that one of the "earliest stimuli" to Soviet interest in the less developed countries was "the desire and need to maintain trade relations" raises more questions than it answers. If commercial motives alone were at work, the commodities supplied by the Soviet Union would be finished goods rather than the plants to produce them. On this point, *Pravda* (May 9, 1968) has been quite explicit—if not very revealing: "If one should approach this [foreign aid] problem from a purely commercial point of view, then it would be more advantageous for the Soviet Union to build with these funds new plants within our country and to export finished goods. The Soviet people are far removed from such a purely commercial attitude in their relations with countries to which they extend economic aid."

Nor is Professor Goldman's assertion that "the Russians feel they have an obligation as Communists and human beings to facilitate the industrialization of these [underdeveloped] areas" (p. 186) particularly convincing. For the key question still remains: What criteria are used in selecting the beneficiaries of Soviet largesse? The reader is left puzzled as to why the Soviet leaders favor countries led by charismatic dictators, supplying them with scarce capital equipment and perishable military hardware. One can only surmise that the fiery anti-imperialist rhetoric of these dictators gives the Soviet leaders some kind of psychic satisfaction, assuring them that Soviet economic aid represents a worthwhile investment in waging the "anti-imperialist struggle," with its promise of an eventual shift in the world balance of power in favor of the socialist system.

Leon Herman

The Soviet Military

MALCOLM MACKINTOSH : *Juggernaut: The Russian Forces, 1918-1966.* New York, The Macmillan Company, 1967.

SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S downfall in 1964, Soviet military historians have been engaged in a rather heated debate over the matter of how far to carry the rehabilitation of Stalin's wartime reputation, which had been badly damaged during the destalinization process of the Khrushchev decade. Among the questions at issue has been the extent to which Stalin should continue to bear the responsibility before history for Soviet unpreparedness and for the setbacks suffered at the outset of World War II, or whether in fact it might not be better to drop the argument over his wartime mistakes altogether in the interest of avoiding "negative" depictions of the Soviet war effort. Although it may be a long time, if ever, before Soviet historians find it possible to settle upon a reasonably objective analysis of Soviet difficulties in the early phase of the war, this recent historical study of the Soviet armed forces by a distinguished British student of Soviet affairs gives us, among other things, a balanced appraisal of the various factors accounting for these difficulties.

As Malcolm Mackintosh reconstructs the situation, the German attack caught the USSR in the process of reorganizing and reequipping its forces after the unhappy lessons of the Finnish campaign, which had ended 15 months earlier. Given more time, which Stalin

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mistakenly thought he had bought from Hitler, the Soviet forces might have been in better shape. As it was, however, they were in the midst of a confused period of changeover from old methods and equipment to new. The confusion attending this process of reorganization was due as much to hesitation and disagreement within the military leadership itself as it was to Stalin's political miscalculations or to the shortcomings in industry which held up the output of new weapons and equipment. On top of these factors, both political and military leaders shared a belief that the Soviet armed forces could not be taken by surprise, and that they could contain any German attack in the frontier areas. The setbacks that ensued when these conceptions proved mistaken could thus be laid not only at Stalin's door, but at that of his military chiefs as well.

The manner in which the Red Army recovered from its early reverses and fought through to victory takes up approximately half of the Mackintosh account, which, in addition to standard Soviet and Western materials, makes careful use of the Soviet six-volume *History of the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45*, a source not yet available when most of the earlier Western literature on this subject was produced. The remainder of the Mackintosh study deals with both the prewar and postwar periods of Soviet military history, and its special merit for the casual reader lies in providing a concise and well-integrated view of the growth and development of the Soviet armed forces during the past half century. Unfortunately, the somewhat garish choice of title, for which one suspects the publisher and not the author must answer, tends to convey a sensational flavor out of keeping with the sober and balanced treatment which Malcolm Mackintosh has brought to his subject.

Thomas W. Wolfe

Communism in Rumania

STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI: *The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic*, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1967.

THIS BOOK, Volume 10 in the MIT series "Studies in International Communism," is an important contribution to the literature on Eastern European governments and politics. Both the Director of the University's Project on International Communism, Dr. William E. Griffith, and the author of this work, Professor Stephen Fischer-Galati, should be congratulated for enriching our knowledge of the controversial "dissident ally" of the Soviet Union.

As Prof. Griffith observes in his editorial foreword, this study "represents the first major revision of contemporary Rumanian history." It is also the first to emphasize the Rumanian Communists' preoccupation with historic continuity. The author states his principal thesis early in his book: "The present Rumanian regime . . . regards itself as the heir to the historic tradition, as the Communist executor of the nationalist legacy of Greater Rumania."

The narrative begins with the fascist period of Marshal Antonescu and the short reign of King Carol. The author cautiously reevaluates the Marshal as a relatively "efficient and enlightened dictator compared to his European counterparts of World War II." Recent historiography should certainly bear him out in this value-judgment. The bulk of the book deals with the intricate socio-economic maneuverings and diplomatic acrobatics of the late Gheorghiu-Dej. This reviewer was impressed by the author's astute analysis of the Rumanian Communist Party's steady growth on the crucial "road to independence" (1960-1964). In a few brief years, beginning in 1955, the membership of the party grew from less than 600,000 to almost 850,000, with the inner core of "activists" reaching 150,000. A detailed evaluation of the Georghiu-Dej era reveals that, in addition to establishing a thoroughly ruthless and Stalinoid domestic system, it also generated a widespread and often exuberant spirit of nationalism among the masses of the people. It was at this time that the Rumanian Communists began to espouse the line that the country's liberation from fascism was essentially the achievement of the Rumanian party and the Rumanian armed forces "assisted" by Soviet comrades in arms.

A brief concluding chapter examines the events of 1966-67. The developments of these two years have justified two of the author's earlier conclusions:

a) Ceausescu's "New Rumania" has been unlike Gheorghiu-Dej's in several important respects. It is not as dependent on the West, on the USSR, or on any other external power. The ideology of Gheorghiu-Dej, influenced by men with a generally pro-Western orientation, was in many ways equated with a Rumanian pattern of "revisionism." Ceausescu's approach, on the other hand, is more doctrinaire and provincial in domestic matters and more forcefully nationalistic in international relations.

b) In the author's opinion, the Rumanian course in 1966-1967 was less spectacular than it was in the days of Gheorghiu-Dej. It represented essentially a period of consolidation of the gains already achieved under the previous party leadership, particularly in the realm of "desatellization," made possible by a reorientation of Soviet foreign policy and a shrewd exploitation of all "objective conditions" in intra-Soviet bloc as well as world political relations. Ceausescu's leadership thus appears to be less colorful, but also less controversial than that of his more quixotic predecessor.

Andrew Gyorgy

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The Comintern and the Geneology of the "Brezhnev Doctrine"

By William Korey

A socialist state that is in a system with other states constituting a socialist commonwealth cannot be free of the common interests of that commonwealth.

This was the core of the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" as elaborated in a long *Pravda* article of September 26, 1968, affirming the "limited sovereignty" of individual socialist states and upholding the Warsaw Pact powers' military intervention in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak "self-determination," the *Pravda* writer maintained, had infringed the "vital interests" of the commonwealth and required "the Soviet Union and other socialist states, in fulfillment of their international duty to the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia and in defense of their own socialist gains, . . . to act. . . ." First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev subsequently gave the "doctrine" his personal imprimatur when, in addressing the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in November, he commented:

. . . when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of a restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country—a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole—this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem—the concern of all socialist countries.[1]

If these doctrinal assertions stunned and dismayed large segments of the Communist leaderships in various parts of the world, they recalled to a considerable extent, and in a curiously perverse manner, the ideological and organizational principles that underlay the birth of the Communist International fifty years ago. These principles, even after taking on various transmutations reflecting vastly altered political circumstances and relationships in the Communist world, have still found a remarkable echo in the recent statements of Soviet leaders on the rights and obligations of individual socialist states.

When, on March 2, 1919, a motley band of 52 delegates assembled inside the snow-swept walls of the Kremlin to create the Communist International, or Comintern—the institution which Lenin described as the "forerunner of the international

Dr. Korey is a recognized authority on Soviet affairs with a special interest in the history of the Bolshevik movement.

[1] *Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1968.

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republic of Soviets" [2]—the leaders were agreed on the concept of a "socialist commonwealth": *i.e.*, a political, ideological and territorial entity whose interests would transcend those of its various national components. The invitation of January 24, 1919, which had been extended to 39 parties or groups, spoke of the need for a central organ with the function of "subordinating the interests of the movement in each country to the common interest of the international revolution." [3] And the Bolshevik leaders, looking ahead to the consummation of the internatonal revolutionary process, projected the extension of the Soviet structural concept to the world arena. Lenin, in his closing speech to the First Congress, declared that "the International Soviet Republic will be achieved" following the victory of the "workers' revolutions throughout the world." [4] Zinoviev had spoken earlier of "an International Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" that would take shape following the completion of the revolutionary process.[5]

Inherent in the idea of an "International Soviet Republic" was the belief that the nation-state had become an outmoded institution whose basic features, including national decision-making, must be eliminated. This was precisely the point made in the "manifesto" adopted by the First Congress. Dubbed the "second Communist Manifesto" by Zinoviev, this declaration aimed some of its sharpest barbs at nationalism and the nation-state, describing them as vestigial remnants of an antiquated system that hampered progress.[6]

Where decision-making power would reside was made clear by V. Vorovsky, one of the two secretaries chosen at the First Congress. On May 13, 1919, he wrote that the "worldwide Soviet republic" would have "the Communist International at its head." [7] The idea was a logical extension of the relationship between the Soviet national governmental structure and the Russian Communist Party, as conceived by Bolshevik ideologists. Just as the Russian Communist Party was to monopolize decision-making authority in the national Soviet apparatus, so would the Comintern wield equivalent power in the "International Soviet Republic."

Like the Russian Communist Party, too, the Comintern was to be a highly centralized organization. On March 2, the opening day of the inaugural gathering, Zinoviev wrote in *Pravda* that the Third International must create "a strong guiding center . . . which will be able to lead, in ideas and organization, the movements in all countries." The detailed nature of this authoritarian structure was spelled out the following year (1920) with the adoption by the Second Comintern Congress of the so-called "Twenty-One Points." Here, it need only be observed that the principle of centralization had already been clearly enunciated at the very birth of the Comintern.

At the heart of the Comintern structure as elaborated by the First Congress was to be the Executive Committee of the Communist International, or ECCI, which was empowered to act in the name of the Comintern in the intervals between congresses. Its similarity to the Bolshevik Central Committee is obvious. Initially it was to consist of representatives of the Communist Parties of Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Balkan Federation, Scandinavia and Switzerland, and other parties that joined the Comintern before the next congress were to receive seats on it. Paralleling the Politburo of the Bolshevik Central Committee, a Bureau of five members was to be elected by the ECCI, although its precise function was not defined.

It was assumed from the start that the "International Soviet Republic"—or, in modern parlance, the "socialist commonwealth"—would have but a single capital. Internationalism and centralization were both at the core of Bolshevik thinking in 1919, and the very idea of a polycentric socialist system —such as was to find expression much later in the concept of "multiple paths of socialism"—was completely alien to this cast of mind. The aims of the Comintern, as formulated in the preliminary letter of invitation and subsequently spelled out in Lenin's theses submitted to the First Congress, included the universal establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the replacement of parliamentary democracy by "self-rule of the masses through their own elected organs." [8]

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[2] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, 3rd ed., Vol. XXIV, Moscow, 1935, p. 26.
[3] Jane Degras, ed., *The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents*, Vol. I, London, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 5.
[4] Quoted in Julius Braunthal, *History of the International*, Vol. II, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1967, p. 162.
[5] G. Zinoviev, *Sochineniia*, Vol. VIII (2), Leningrad, 1926, p. 219.
[6] Degras, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-47.
[7] V. Vorovsky, *Sochineniia*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1933, p. 475.
[8] See Braunthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-66.

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Centralized authority did not preclude the establishment of subordinate regional bodies. In the fall of 1919, the Comintern set up a "Western European Secretariat" in Berlin, with the principal function of disseminating Comintern documents and information about Soviet Russia. Whether it would have developed into an alternative center of influence had the ensuing wave of revolution in parts of Germany, Hungary and elsewhere succeeded in engulfing sections of Western Europe cannot be known, but its weakness was almost immediately felt. In July 1920, it was described as "limited, narrow . . . and not international." [9]

The exercise of the Comintern's claimed central authority over revolutionary movements outside Soviet Russia was severely handicapped in 1919 by the practical isolation of the country. Blockade and civil war made it difficult, and at times impossible, for the Comintern to make contact with the leaders of local Communist movements: couriers rarely got across borders safely, and wireless communication was frequently obstructed or garbled. However, the limited contacts that did take place between Russian Bolshevik leaders and the short-lived Red regime in Hungary provided an indication of the sort of relationship that the Comintern aspired to establish vis-a-vis its national components. The Hungarian revolutionary regime, comprising both Socialists and Communists, came into existence in March 1919 under the leadership of Bela Kun, who had been a war prisoner in Russia and had become converted to Bolshevism. Two days after its formation, the revolutionary government asked the Comintern in Petrograd for instructions with regard to a name for the merged Socialist and Communist parties, whereupon Lenin called on Kun to provide assurances that the new regime would be Communist rather than Social Democratic. Meanwhile Zinoviev notified Budapest that the ECCI expected the Hungarian revolutionaries to establish a "Communist Party" which would give the regime a "clearly formulated Communist program." [10] What this episode demonstrated was that Bela Kun recognized the Comintern as the repository of a higher sovereignty than that of any national revolutionary government. Again, in April, when Kun became involved in a dispute with the Austrian Socialist government over procedural issues, he attempted to persuade Austrian Foreign Minister Otto Bauer to submit the dispute to the Comintern for a final decision. Bauer made it clear that he considered the Comintern merely a Russian instrument, whereas Kun argued that it was a legitimate multinational institution possessing supranational authority.

Defining the relationship of the Soviet state to the Comintern was, of course, far more compli cated. The Bolshevik regime had been in power for some eighteen months prior to the establishment of the Comintern and provided that organization with its very life's blood. Yet, writing in the Comintern's official journal in October 1919, Georgy Chicherin, then head of the state's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, described the new International in terms that had hitherto been applied only to sovereign states.[11] The Comintern, he wrote, conducted a "*foreign policy*" of its own which had as its objective "the task of struggling to guarantee and strengthen the international position of the revolutionary Soviet governments" (the use of the plural suggests that the article was probably written in the summer before the Hungarian and Bavarian Soviet regimes were crushed.)

Interestingly enough, the Foreign Commissar felt obliged to acknowledge—somewhat apologetically—the necessity for Soviet governments to engage in traditional forms of international relations. "As governments existing *de facto* among other existing governments," he observed, "[they] are compelled to place themselves in certain relations with the latter, and those relations impose on them obligations which have to be taken into account." It should be noted, however, that these obligations did not prevent Chicherin himself from writing in the Comintern journal and issuing flaming appeals for world revolution. At least for him, the goal of proleterian revolution transcended normal rules of diplomatic discourse.

From a practical standpoint, the question of whether the Comintern stood in a superior or inferior relationship to the Soviet state was entirely academic in 1919 since the leaderships of both virtually coincided. As Zinoviev frankly admitted a year later, the ECCI was "a Russian organization." [12] Its chairman and secretary were key fig-

[9] *Der Zweite Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale*, Hamburg, 1921, p. 590.
[10] *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 1, 1919, cols. 83-84.
[11] G. Chicherin, "Mezhdunarodnaia politika dvukh Internatsionalov," *ibid.*, No. 16, 1919, cols. 817-28.
[12] *Vtoroi kongress Kominterna*," Moscow, 1934, p. 407.

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ures of the Bolshevik Party: Zinoviev and Radek; and the five-man Bureau selected by the Committee included four Russians: Zinoviev, Lenin, Trotsky, and Rakovsky (the sole non-Russian was a Swiss, Fritz Platten). The Comintern's funds and stipends came from the Soviet state treasury, and its apparatus was housed partly in Moscow and partly in Petrograd's Smolny Institute, where Zinoviev had his headquarters as chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. Writing in the Comintern journal, Lenin candidly acknowledged that "the new third 'International Workingman's Association' had *already begun to coincide* in a certain measure *with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*." [13]

Still, the Bolsheviks anticipated that with the spread of revolution to Western Europe, the Comintern would take on a less Russian character. Shortly after the First Congress, Zinoviev told a party gathering that "we shall be glad if we can succeed in transferring the seat of the Third International and the Executive Committee as quickly as possible to another capital, for example, Paris." [14] Trotsky, in an article in *Izvestia* on May 1, 1919, added London and Berlin as possible alternatives to Paris. But it was clear that such a move depended upon the culmination of the revolutionary movement in the West. "An international Communist congress in Berlin or Paris", wrote Trotsky, "will mean the complete triumph of the proletarian revolution in Europe . . ."

Had these circumstances become reality, the question of the Comintern's place in an international Soviet commonwealth would perhaps have been clarified. The Bolsheviks, in their vision of the future Communist world order, saw the Comintern as the locus of supreme power, and belief in its supranational authority lingered on even after the revolutionary wave of 1919-20 subsided. Thus, in 1922, 22 members of the "Workers' Opposition" group within the Russian Communist Party appealed over the party's head to the Comintern for redress of their grievances. But by then, such action was virtually meaningless; a Comintern investigatory commission simply rejected the appeal.

If the idea of a "socialist commonwealth" involving limitations on the national sovereignty of its members was an integral feature of early Bolshevik thinking, so also was the belief that members of the commonwealth had the moral right to engage in military intervention in furtherance of world socialist revolution. As early as 1915, Zinoviev had established a reputation as the leading authority on the Marxian ethic of war, which he elaborated in a two-hundred page treatise published as part of a larger work.[15] Military intervention, he argued, is to be judged by the criterion of whether it serves the forces of capitalism or the forces of socialism. Wars which contribute towards the destruction of the old capitalist order are *ipso facto* "just" regardless of whether they are aggressively initiated by a state which has already established socialist property relations within its own borders. Since, in the 20th century, capitalism as a system of production relations is an obstacle to the fullest development of productive forces and "only socialism is historically progressive," it follows that a state taking the socialist path can legitimately and justly wage war against capitalist societies. Foreshadowing a line that is still echoed in Moscow, Zinoviev also placed "national liberation wars" waged by the people of a colonial or "semi-colonial" country against the "imperialist" power in the category of "just" wars.

Throughout 1919, the articles, speeches, and messages of the Comintern chief were studded with references to military intervention. In January, while invitations to the founding congress were being readied, he wrote that he was looking forward to the time when the Red Army could be sent "to the assistance of our German comrades . . . and destroy the oppressors of the German people." [16] On another occasion, he told a group of Red Army officers to be prepared "to lead in battle . . . the workers and peasants of France, Germany and other countries." [17] In October 1919, he declared that if a Communist regime were to win power in Germany, Soviet Russia would join it in intervention "against bourgeois Paris and imperialist London"; or, if proletarian rule first came to Paris, the Russians and French would intervene militarily "against Ebertist Berlin." [18]

The subsequent Soviet military attack upon Poland was perfectly consistent with the thinking of Comintern leaders. When a German comrade wrote

[13] Lenin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. XXIV, p. 247.
[14] *Protokoly VIII sezda RKP (B)*, Moscow, 1933, p. 139.
[15] Zinoviev, *Sochineniia*, Vol. VII (1), pp. 15-214.
[16] *Petrogradskaia pravda*, Jan. 19, 1919.
[17] Zinoviev, "Die Sowjetmacht und der Offizierstand," in C. Rakowski, *Die Seele des Sieges*, Petrograd, 1919, pp. 70-71.
[18] Zinoviev, "Russkaia revoliutsiia i mezhdunarodnyi proletariat," *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*," No. 6, 1919, p. 793.

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in the Communist periodical *Rote Fahne* that revolutions must not be accomplished through military intervention by an outside Communist state, Zinoviev scoffed at such a "personal opinion." For him, the preparation of the Red Army to take "the offensive with the bayonet" was an essential ingredient in the strategy of "proletarian world revolution." [19]

The Comintern leaders, moreover, did not restrict the use of military force to the extension of proletarian rule. They regarded it as equally vital to intervene militarily to protect an already established Communist regime which faced a threat to its survival. Thus, for example, the ECCI dispatched a message to the beleaguered regime of Bela Kun in Hungary promising to "send you all the help that it can," [20] and in August 1919 Red Army units were in fact alerted to go to the aid of the threatened Hungarian Communists, only to find that insurmountable obstacles made their passage through the Ukraine impossible.

It was a fundamental assumption of the Comintern leaders that the forces of the bourgeoisie in all countries constituted a single camp which was bound to challenge the existence of any proletarian regime that established itself anywhere. Thus, in June 1919, the ECCI declared that the "chief blow" of the "international bourgeoisie" was being "directed against those countries where the working classes are . . . victorious." [21] And another early Comintern message warned that the establishment of Communist rule in Bulgaria could be expected to trigger a counterrevolutionary response. Such warnings were intended to lay the groundwork for intervention by Communist military forces if armed action proved feasible.

It is also interesting to note, in connection with last year's Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia, that the Comintern leaders of 1919-20 drew sharp distinctions between different working-class parties. Those that were not considered genuinely revolutionary were viewed with as much, if not more, hostility than were bourgeois parties. Thus, the "Platform" adopted by the First Comintern Congress stressed that the need of the moment was "to break not only with the outright lackeys of capital and the hangmen of the Communist revolution—the part played by the right-wing Social Democrats—but also with the 'Center' which, in the most critical moments, deserts the proletariat in order to flirt with its avowed enemies." [22] Indeed, the First Congress placed less emphasis on the struggle against capitalism than on the fight against Social Democracy. A unanimously-adopted resolution declared that "one of the most important tasks" of the Comintern was to expose the "Judas-work of the social-chauvinists" and "with armed hand, to make this counterrevolutionary party harmless." [23] The reference to "armed hand" carried a particularly ominous implication in view of Zinoviev's advocacy, in the event of the establishment of Communist rule in France, of joint intervention by French and Soviet military forces against the predominantly Social Democratic regime in Germany. No doubt, he would even have urged unilateral Soviet intervention if the Soviet regime had possessed the requisite armed strength.

Thus, from the moment of its birth, the Comintern saw itself as the directing center of proletarian world revolution invested with the authority to pass on the revolutionary *bona fides* of all working-class movements everywhere. In the view of its Bolshevik leaders, the interests of the "social commonwealth" made it imperative that "heresy" in one of its parts be exterminated lest it contaminate the other parts and undermine the commonwealth as a whole. Military intervention thus had a built-in rationale reinforced by an ethic that looked upon armies as potential handmaidens of historical progress.

But the key question was: How could the Comintern, as constituted, assume the right to judge any individual proletarian party or regime? Was it entitled to take a collective decision in the name of the entire "socialist commonwealth?" If the interests of the whole commonwealth were at stake, then those interests could properly be registered only through a consensus reached among genuinely equal partners. Surely, arbitrary decision-making by a non-representative center would make a mockery of the whole structural concept of a "socialist commonwealth."

[19] Zinoviev, *Die Weltrevolution und die III Kommunistische Internationale*, Hamburg, 1920, p. 47.
[20] *Izvestia*, March 23, 1919.
[21] *Ibid.*, June 20, 1919.
[22] Degras, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
[23] Braunthal, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

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In fact, this concept had no real applicability from the start. The Comintern was in no sense a conjoining of a number of national Communist parties of relatively similar strength. Rather, there was a single large and successful party—the Russian—to which were harnessed a number of weak and, in some cases, embryonic workers' parties. The perceptive Rosa Luxemburg recognized almost immediately that the Comintern would take on a distorted shape.[24] She expressed strong fears that a Communist International created in early 1919 would be based fundamentally on the Russian party and would therefore inevitably succumb to the latter's domination. And her concern was compounded by the character of the Bolshevik party. Its elitism had long revolted her, and she had repeatedly polemicized against it. Were the Comintern to come under Bolshevik hegemony, she believed, the very future of socialism would be jeopardized.

Luxembourg contended that a Third International must be based upon mass parties, and with the support of three prominent German Communists (Leo Jogiches, Eugen Levine, and Paul Levi), she urged that its establishment be postponed until such mass parties had emerged, especially in Western Europe.[25] Determined to block Lenin's proposal, she instructed the two German delegates chosen to attend the founding meeting in March 1919 (Levine and Hugo Eberlein) to oppose the immediate creation of a Third International and to threaten the German party's refusal to affiliate if the meeting were to go ahead with its establishment. Indeed, Eberlein was later instructed to leave the Moscow gathering if such a decision was taken.

The tragic murder of Luxemburg and her coworker, Karl Liebknecht, on January 15, 1919, silenced the single most powerful voice of opposition to the Bolshevik plan for a new International. Six days later, in a letter to the West, Lenin suggested that the martyred leaders had endorsed the idea of a Third International. He wrote that with the creation of a German Communist Party in December 1918, "the foundation of a truly proletarian, truly revolutionary Third International—the Communist International—became a fact." [26]

Levine was arrested at the German border and never got to Moscow for the founding congress, but Eberlein did arrive with the intention of fulfilling Luxembourg's mandate. Despite intense efforts by Lenin to persuade him to reverse his position, Eberlein made it clear on the first day of the meeting (March 2) that his party stood for postponing the formation of a new International in order "to test the available strength and review the political foundations on which we can unite." The next day, he continued to express vigorous objections, noting that "real Communist parties exist in only a few countries" and that "the whole of Western Europe" was still "missing." [27] But the Bolshevik view already held sway, and Eberlein found it convenient simply to abstain from voting on the resolution to establish the Comintern.

The consequences of this decision were as predicted by Rosa Luxembourg: decision-making for the Comintern would be largely, if not exclusively, a Bolshevik prerogative. On the heels of the First Congress, Zinoviev himself openly declared that "ideological hegemony in the Third International belongs unconditionally to the Russian Communist Party." He went on to say that the delegates to the First Congress had "recognized that the ideological leadership of . . . world revolution must belong to the Russian Communist Party." [28]

The openly condescending tone taken by the Comintern's first boss toward other Communist parties would rarely be repeated in later years: it would have been considered impolitic to do so. But in 1919 there was still a refreshing candor in the remarks of the Bolshevik leaders, and if a certain note of contemptuousness emerges, it simply reflected their view of reality. Zinoviev told a Bolshevik audience that the Russian party must play the role of "big brother" to the other Communist parties:

. . . we must help our [foreign] comrades in the task of organization. . . . They will not be able to work illegally, not because they are a different [kind of] people but because they have had a different history. And I think our party . . . will send material forces to the aid of workers in other countries and give them all its organizational support.[29]

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[24] See J. W. Hulse, *The Forming of the Communist International*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1964, pp. 8, 19; Braunthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-64.

[25] During 1920, mass working-class parties affiliated with the Comintern did emerge in Germany, France and Italy, but the fact that revolutions failed to take place in the West made inevitable the continued dependence of the Comintern upon the Soviet party. Indeed, this dependence deepened with time.

[26] Lenin, *Sochineniia*, XXIII, pp. 494-95.

[27] *Der I. Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale*, Hamburg, 1921, p. 134.

[28] *Protokoly VIII sezda RKP (B)*, p. 138.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

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Throughout the life of the Comintern up to its formal dissolution in 1943, the "ideological hegemony" of the Soviet Communist Party within the international organization was never to be seriously questioned. The prestige of the party, coupled with its command of powerful levers of influence and authority by reason of its possession of state power, prevented any serious challenge to its dominance. Only after World War II, when a few other Communist parties succeeded in capturing state power on their own, in countries not occupied by Soviet troops or lying within the shadow of the Red Army (*i.e.*, in Yugoslavia, China, and Albania), was the Soviet party finally compelled, however unwillingly, to recognize alternative centers of ideological autonomy. The appearance of these centers, abetted later by the diminution of the cold war and the burgeoning of national consciousness, encouraged other Communist parties in turn, whether or not in command of the levers of state power, to strike out along independent policy lines. The concept of "multiple paths to socialism" merely rationalized the emergence of a polycentric universe of Communist states.

Brezhnev himself, at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966, acknowledged that no Communist party "can find the right conclusions for the problems" facing it better than that particular party itself.[30] An authoritative work on the "world socialist system," published in Moscow early in 1968, was even more explicit in recognizing "the indisputable right of each people [within the socialist system] to decide independently the fate of their country. . . ." [31]

The old Comintern concept of a centrally-governed socialist commonwealth—and with it the Bolsheviks' contempt for the nation-state—had seemingly been jettisoned. Indeed, the collapse of Bolshevik hopes for the rapid spread of Communist revolution to Western Europe in the early 1920's had already made it necessary for the Soviet leaders to accept the nation-state as a responsible institution. Under the Stalinist principle of "socialism in one country," the interests of the Soviet state, rather than "proletarian internationalism," became the principal concern of the Communist leadership of the USSR. Since then, the preservation of Soviet state power and the promotion of its security objectives have been the major aims of the leadership, even if masked behind the verbiage of revolutionary ideology.

It was precisely these aims that provided the basic motivation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. When it appeared to the Soviet oligarchy that its power and security were imperiled by the ideological challenge emanating from the Communist reformers in Czechoslovakia and threatening to spread to other parts of the "socialist commonwealth," then the formula of "multiple paths to socialism" was shoved into the background, and the old language and ideas of the Comintern founders were resurrected. It was hardly accidental that on February 28, 1969, the Dubcek leadership, harassed but still displaying more than a flicker of resistance, commemorated the 50th anniversary of the Comintern's founding with a statement condemning any "return to [its] outdated centralist forms." [32]

[30] *Pravda*, March 30, 1966.

[31] A. P. Butenko, *The World Socialist System and Anti-Communism*, Moscow, 1968: quoted in Leopold Labedz, "Czechoslovakia and After," *Survey* (London), October 1968, p. 10.

[32] Prague dispatch to *The New York Times*, March 1, 1969.

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Individual Liberty and Czechoslovakia's Freedom

EDITORS' NOTE: The two most persevering dissenters on the Soviet scene during the past few years have been former General Piotr Grigorenko and the former chairman of a Latvian collective farm, Ivan Yakhimovich (now imprisoned). Three of their latest petitions or declarations of protest appear below. The first is a letter addressed to A. R. Rudenko, Procurator General of the USSR. Dealing with a number of issues, chiefly the struggle of the Crimean Tatars for complete rehabilitation and the repressive measures taken against him personally, Grigorenko presents, in effect, a devastating indictment of current police terror in the USSR. The second document is a declaration composed by both men after the suicide of the Czech student, Jan Palach, calling upon all citizens of the Soviet Union to repudiate the continued occupation of Czechoslovakia. Finally, there is a letter written by Yakhimovich on the eve of his arrest by KGB officials on March 25, 1969. It is an appeal to "people whose names are sealed in [his] memory and heart" not to forget the injustices that are still being committed in the Soviet Union, and not to forget the truth about him as "a flood of lies and hypocrisy" comes out of the court. For further information about the previous protest activities of Grigorenko and Yakhimovich, see Problems of Communism, *July-August 1968, Documents 10, 17, 18, 25, 34 and 44.*

1. Police Provocation: Letter by P. G. Grigorenko (abridged)

To: Comrade A. R. Rudenko, Procurator General of the USSR.

On November 19 of this year, a search was made of my apartment, lasting from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m.

I will not go into the fact that the person nominally in charge of this operation did not have the slightest comprehension of procedural rules or even of elementary politeness; he is a man accustomed to deciding arbitrarily the fate of persons placed in his hands. This can be substantiated by those who witnessed the behavior and actions of Justice Councillor Berezovsky, investigator for Especially Important Affairs of the Procurator's Office of the Uzbek SSR. I was not obliged to endure his boorish conduct for too long a time. By way of protesting the illegal actions of those conducting the search, I refused to take further part in it half an hour after it had begun. Accordingly, I shall mention only the basic violations for which those conducting the search were alone responsible.

1) The search was made on the basis of a warrant issued by Justice Councillor Berezovsky. . . . The warrant was endorsed by Malkov, Procurator of the City of Moscow. It stated that during the investigation of the case of Bariev and others, it had been established that documents containing slanderous fabrications against the Soviet governmental and social order might be found in the apartment of P. G. Grigorenko.

I affirm and I am prepared to bear full responsibility for this affirmation, that no evidence whatsoever of the possible existence of such documents in my apartment was presented to Procurator Malkov. This is because, first, there is no "case of Bariev and others"; and second, there have never been, nor could there be, any documents containing slanderous statements against the Soviet governmental and social order that could be even indirectly linked with the name of Bariev and his comrades.

What, then, *is* involved here?

It is a case of ordinary *police provocation* against people who take up the fight against the tyranny of the authorities. You surely know that on April 21 of this year, in the Chirchik City Park of Culture and Rest, the Uzbek police (for some reason, they are still called militia) attacked a peaceful festive gathering of Crimean Tatars commemorating the birthday of the founder of

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the Soviet state and the initiator of Crimean-Tatar national autonomy—V. I. Lenin. Completely unsuspecting people who were peacefully strolling, dancing and singing national and revolutionary songs, as well as amateur actors staging theatrical performances, were subjected to high-pressure blasts of cold water and chlorine emulsion, which knocked them to the ground, ruined their clothes, and inflicted indelible moral and psychological damage. Then the police clubs went into action. The whole idea behind this was to goad the outraged people into defending themselves and then to charge them with resisting the authorities. But the people displayed unbelievable restraint and did not respond to the provocation. [Instead,] they staged a peaceful protest demonstration against the humiliation to which they had been subjected. As a result, over 300 persons were arrested. Of this number, 12—most of whom had not participated in the gathering and were arrested at home—were later tried and *convicted* of "disturbing public order."

Aider Bariev, a tractor driver, who managed to avoid arrest, flew to Moscow the same day, and already on the morning of April 22, he sent to the Procurator's Office of the USSR a telegram describing in detail the Chirchik events—this unprecedented encroachment on *human rights* and infringement of the norms of *human ethics*. Naturally, he did not express himself in polite terms. In the simple language of a workingman, he called a spade a spade. He stayed on in Moscow as the authorized representative of the people who had sent him, making fruitless visits to the institution headed by you and to other state and social organizations. Using every available means, he and other representatives of his people tried to obtain the punishment of the Chirchik hoodlums and an end to the unlawful judicial persecution of the victims of the Chirchik pogrom. You in no way reacted to the personal telegrams and letters of Bariev or to the collective appeals of all the representatives of the Crimean-Tatar people in Moscow at that time. Not once did you or any of your deputies receive any of these representatives, nor did you even try to get to the bottom of their complaints. . . . You, as the supreme guardian of Soviet law, were not touched by the fact that people were rounded up like wild animals on the streets of the capital of our homeland and forcibly transported, under brutal conditions, to hateful places of administrative exile. You, a jurist and an expert in the law, were not even swayed by the fact that these were not merely individuals but people's representatives, *i.e.*, citizens who did not have the right to decide to leave without the consent of those who had sent them. You passed over this fact just as you passed over the tragedies involving individuals who—trying to be worthy of the trust placed in them—resorted to desperate measures, such as jumping out of the windows of a rapidly moving train in order to escape their police escorts and continue fulfilling the mandate imposed on them by their people.

Just as soon as Bariev was replaced in Moscow by another person, he returned to Chirchik and was put under arrest. This [arrest] was based [in part] on the above-mentioned individual and collective letters of representatives of the Crimean-Tatar people who had been sent to various Soviet institutions, including the Procurator's Office of the USSR, to social organizations, and to various representatives of Soviet society [*obshchestvennost*]. It was also based on communications sent back from Moscow by the people's representatives. . . . According to the rulings handed down by individuals of the Berezovsky type, all these documents contained slanderous statements against the Soviet state and social order. I shall not attempt here to explain how a document containing a true description of an actual happening can somehow be transformed into something slanderous. I shall merely confine myself to asking you several questions that are directly related to such fabrications.

I ask you, as the supreme defender of Soviet law, whether anyone has the right to make a person criminally answerable for writing a complaint to you, a complaint which you did not find time to examine, and the facts of which you did not verify!

I ask you: Is it possible, even by the wildest stretch of the imagination, to ascribe the bloody batttle in Chirchik to a violation of public order and not to a gross police provocation aimed at providing grounds for severe reprisals against a people justly struggling for national rebirth?!. . . .

So much for the legal justification for searching my apartment. If it were only a matter of the issue at hand, I would not go on any further. But I must add that it is not clear to me—or rather, I am completely in the dark—as to your personal role in both the Chirchik affair itself and the court trials of Crimean Tatars that took place following the September 5, 1967, ordinance of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as well as in the trials that are now being prepared. The illegal and often flagrantly provocative nature of these trials are so obvious that one marvels that this cannot be seen by a jurist of international standing, a person who is at pains to teach the entire world how to combat crimes against mankind!

2) Having established the utter lack of connection between myself and the Uzbek matters, let us attempt to determine the real reason why this search was carried out, and who deemed it necessary. An exhaustive answer is provided by the composition of the "investigating" group and the official-departmental-agency affiliation of the person who actually directed the search. In addition to Berezovsky, *seven* KGB agents and three "witnesses"—also state security agents—were present at the search. And so for one official of the Uzbekistan procurator's office—take note of this—there were *ten* Muscovites, not counting those who barred entry to the house from the street. And all of them were from the KGB. The search was also directed by a KGB agent—Aleksei Dmitrievich Vragov. This was all I was able to find out about him through Berezovsky. Vragov himself refused to reveal not only his position but also his place of work—the Moscow Administration or Center—even though he was required by law to inform me of both. It was this half-obscure, quasi-official person, then, who directed the search. It was directly from him that Berezovsky received his instructions. It was he who was empowered to decide such debatable matters as whether or not to confiscate this or that document. It was he who directed the activities of the other KGB agents during the search. The only thing that Berezovsky, the nominal head of the search, did was to dictate the titles of the documents assembled by the KGB agents to the agent of the same organ who was writing up the protocol [of search].

Thus, the search was made by the KGB, which used the "Bariev case" as a pretext and connived with the investigator in charge of that case. It marked the conclusion

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of yet one more stage in the relations between the KGB and myself. As you know, the first stage ended with my release from the most terrible prison in the Soviet Union —the so-called special psychiatric hospital—where I was "placed" by the KGB, which was frustrated by its failure to produce any justification for my arrest or to obtain an "open-hearted confession" from me. The next stage began two or three months after my release, when the KGB organs, without any provocation on my part, once again took an interest in me. For more than three years I have been subjected to continuous surveillance: constant, round-the-clock trailing of myself, members of my family, and my visitors; uninterrupted observation of my apartment by visual and other special means; the tapping of my telephone, inspection of my correspondence, and the confiscation of some of my letters. Twice during these years my apartment has been secretly searched. I complained of all these actions in a letter addressed to Yu. V. Andropov, chief of the KGB. As is usually the case in our country, I received no answer. The only thing that happened was that the police-spy surveillance became less obvious. . . . It is evident that some new provocations are being planned for me, and I do not intend to await them supinely.

I am a Communist, and as such I detest with all my soul organs of illegal force and tryanny based on caste. In our country these organs include the organization created by Stalin and today called the KGB. . . . I conceal from no one my hatred for this organization. I consider it to be hostile to the people, and I shall fight by all legal means available to me for its early liquidation. Therefore, I do not wish to enter into any kind of relations with it, and I do not recognize its right to interfere in my life and in my social activity. This parasitic organization, which devours limitless quantities of the people's wealth while taking away their best sons and causing irreparable moral damage, must disappear from our society forever, and the sooner the better.

I have long known that the courts and the organs of the procuracy stand in a relationship of subordination to the KGB. If this requires illustration, the search conducted in my apartment is extremely revealing. The procuracy organs in this case were mere errand boys. They can continue to perform this little-esteemed role in the future, but not with respect to me. By my life, by my participation in the defense of the homeland, by virtue of the blood I have spilt for it, and by virtue of my Communist convictions, I have won the right to consider myself a co-master of my country and an equal member in the family of Soviet peoples. I am entitled to tread my native soil freely, without police-spy surveillance, to defend my convictions freely, and to enjoy all the rights vested in me as a citizen of the USSR by the Soviet Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. No one—least of all such an organization as the KGB—has the right to deprive me of these rights. Moreover, the procuracy organs have an obligation to help citizens fight for their legal rights and not to help organizations that are attempting to rob them of these rights.

3) After all the foregoing, it only remains to be seen just why the representatives of this organization for which I have so little esteem came [to my apartment], what they wanted from me, what they are fighting against now and—it would seem—in the future. Let us attempt to find the answer by analyzing the confiscated material.

The fact of the matter is that the confiscated material had nothing to do with "slanderous fabrications" and did not in fact conform to the stipulations in the search warrant. What was confiscated was all my typewritten and handwritten documents, letters, and notes. There was nothing slanderous and certainly nothing anti-Soviet in any of them. They contained anti-Stalinist materials and open statements of protest against violations of Soviet law by the authorities, against judicial tyranny, and against continuing acts of discrimination and genocide directed at the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, and certain other small national groups. This is what was confiscated:

Numerous letters, both individual and collective, addressed to me by Crimean Tatars and embodying the *cri de coeur* of a suffering and disenfranchised people; and materials pertaining to the popular movement of the Volga Germans to regain their national rights.

Copies of my letters to the Politburo of the CC-CPSU, including those relating to the arbitrary acts committed against me personally (illegal expulsion from the party, demotion from general to private, deprivation of deserved pension) and those exposing judicial tyranny and the falsification of history to the benefit of renascent Stalinism.

A handwritten copy of a brochure by Academician Sakharov [1] and my review of this brochure.

All the works of the tireless fighter against Stalinism, the writer-Bolshevik, participant in the revolutionary movement since 1912 and member of the Bolshevik party since 1916, who spent three years in Tsarist prisons and 17 years in Stalinist torture chambers and death camps on Kolyma: Aleksei Yevgrafovich Kosterin.

A manuscript assembling and analyzing all the facts that had come to my knowledge pointing to the implementation, after the October (1964) Plenum of the CC-CPSU, of a concealed but firm policy directed toward a *rebirth of Stalinism.*

Notes on open court trials (criminal in form, political in substance) of Crimean Tatars who participated in the movement for national equality, and of free-thinking people in Moscow (the trials of Daniel-Siniavsky, Khaustov, Bukovsky, and others; the trial of Galanskov-Ginzburg and others).[2]

Biographical data on those sentenced for a Red Square demonstration against the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops and against the spilling of brotherly blood by Soviet soldiers and Czechoslovak citizens.

The manuscript of a work by Academician Varga [3] entitled "The Russian Road to Socialism."

A copy of a letter by a group of Soviet intellectuals (Artsimovich, Kapitsa, Kataev [4], Leontovich [5], Plisetskaia, Sakharov, Chukovsky, and others) to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, expressing alarm at trends toward a rebirth of Stalinism.

A copy of a letter written by 23 persons, all children of Communists who were barbarically annihilated by Stalin (Yakir, Petrovsky, Antonov-Ovseenko, Berzin, Yenukidze, Bukharin, Vavilov, Piatnitsky, and others), voicing [similar] concern over trends towards a rebirth of Stalinism and silence about the crimes committed by Stalin and his henchmen, and also recalling the decision of the 22nd Congress to erect a monument in Moscow to the victims of Stalinism.

Translations from Czechoslovak newspapers (The "Two

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Thousand Words" manifesto, Smrkovsky's speech over Czechoslovak radio, etc.).

A list of persons subjected to party and administrative reprisals for having signed various documents protesting violations of Soviet law and of elementary human rights by the courts, the procuracy, and the KGB.

A typewritten text of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man reproduced in the USSR in a small number of copies and only for the use of jurists.

A typewritten text of the (unpublished in the USSR) Pacts on Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly two years ago, the Pact on Social and Economic Rights, and the Pact on Political Rights. . . .

Notes on all speeches made at the funeral of writer A. Ye. Kosterin.

Among the literary works confiscated were Anna Akhmatova's [6] "Requiem", dedicated to those who suffered in Stalin's dungeons, including her only son; a number of Marina Tsvetaeva's works not publsihed in the USSR; "Tanka," an unpublished poem by N. Korzhavin and a profound work on the morally corrupting influence of Stalinism; the book *My Testimony* [7], by A. Marchenko, describing present-day prisons for political prisoners; and a typewritten copy of Hemingway's book *For Whom the Bell Tolls.*

The foregoing list is fairly indicative of the principles on which the confiscations were based. In light of this, I hardly need add that everything that I myself had written was confiscated—even scraps of paper bearing a single word written by my hand. Thus I was deprived of the materials of my scientific work, my personal correspondence, drafts of various documents, including those that had been disseminated as well as those that had never left my desk. In general, everything that was typewritten, handwritten, or not published in the USSR was confiscated. Clearly, if I had not, just the night before, given into other hands Korolenko's *Letters to A. Lunacharsky*, Gorky's *Untimely Thoughts*, and the verses of Osip Mandelshtam, these would have been confiscated too.

I had a copy of a book manuscript dealing with the start of the last war—*Notes of an Intelligence Agent* (the memoirs of Reserve Colonel V. A. Novobrantsev), with an inscription by the author. When this book was also earmarked for confiscation, I vigorously protested that it could in no way be classified as falling in the category of materials authorized for confiscation. Whereupon Justice Councillor Berezovsky, obeying Vragov's command to "Confiscate!," decided to demonstrate the book's slander on Soviet society and government by reading the following from the author's foreword: "Stalin is dead, but the poisonous seeds sown by him continue to germinate."

After that, I refused to remain any longer at the search. But my presence wasn't really needed anyway. After less than half of the items earmarked for confiscation had been recorded in writing, all the rest were dumped in a bag, sealed with the seal "KBG-14," and taken away. . . . Judge for yourself the degree to which the integrity of the bag's contents is guaranteed. All the more so since the [subsequent] unsealing of the bag, in which I refused to participate because of its utter senselessness, was performed in the presence of "witnesses" who themselves were agents of the organ conducting the search. Not a single one of the witnesses I insisted upon was summoned.

This is how legality was observed in each concrete instance. But I am not interested in this case alone. What I would like to know is the attitude of the organs of the *Soviet* procuracy towards *Soviet* law. My personal experience indicates that in political matters these organs are engaged solely in selecting those paragraphs [of the laws] that lend an appearance of legality to the unbridled tyranny of the authorities. But I naively assumed that even for this it was necessary to know the law. It turns out that this is not necessarily so. The necessary paragraphs are evidently selected by "specialists" on law. The practical enforcers [of the laws] are in no way interested in the laws they enforce. They do what they are ordered to do, without investigating to see whether it is legal or not. Berezovsky came to make the search without any copy of the Criminal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, and only when I caught him in violations of the law with the aid of my own copies of these documents—and even then in just a few instances and very unwillingly—did he alter his behavior. . . .

4) In conclusion, I would like to try, with your assistance, to answer one more question: *Why was all this done?*

Perhaps it was an attempt at intimidation? Not very likely. The KGB and I know each other too well for either of us to expect this kind of thing to happen.

Well, then, perhaps it was motivated by the hope of finding something that could be used to build a "case" and put me away in some remote place from which my voice would not be heard? Entirely possible, but if so—stupid. To stage a trial based on trumped-up charges is risky these days, and to count on my really engaging in criminal activities. . . . No, the KGB knows me too well to count on such a thing. I, too, have never counted on the stupidity of my enemy.

Accordingly, we're left with only one assumption—namely, they wanted to find out the nature of my present activities, and at the same time to hinder my work by depriving me of my materials and my "tools of production." The latter is borne out particularly by the fact that both my typewriters (office and portable) were taken away despite the fact that there was no official authorization for this action. Moreover, the confiscation of typewriters under our existing conditions is so wildly arbitrary that it makes me uncomfortable even to mention it. Judge for yourself: Taking a sample of a typewriter's print requires only a few minutes. Furthermore, it should be done in the presence of the typewriter's owner. Why, then, are typewriters confiscated and hauled away? At best, to deprive the owner of the possibility of using them. And at worst? At worst—if you don't already know this, I will tell you—to prepare falsifications [to be used] against the typewriter's owner.

When I protested that I had not checked the confiscated documents, Investigator Berezovsky said: "What's the matter, are you suspicious of something?" . . . I fear that you, too, may ask the same question, and I will answer in precisely the same way that I answered Berezovsky: "I am suspicious of nothing. I am merely indicating the possibilities resulting from procedural violations. What will actually develop out of these possibilities, the future will tell." But I have no desire to wait idly by to see what the outcome will be. I therefore insist that all the violations of law committed against me be nullified.

Accordingly, I demand:

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1) That all documents and both typewriters confiscated from me be returned immediately;

2) That all illegal actions with respect to me and my family be discontinued: police-spy surveillance, observation of my apartment both by visual means and with the aid of special apparatus, the tapping of telephone conversations, and the reading and confiscation of correspondence.

I assume that your authority and prerogatives—judging of course, on the basis of the law—are entirely sufficient to compel the appropriate persons to fulfill my demands. It is with this expectation that I shall await your reply.

I trust that you will take due cognizance of the fact that I have refrained from filing a complaint for the past fourteen days, thereby giving the "investigators" time to examine what they confiscated. Hoping that you will take this into consideration, I shall count on receiving your answer not later than the time limit of two weeks set by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet [for responding to such requests].

P. GRIGORENKO

Grigorenko, Piotr Grigorevich
Moscow, G-21, Komsomolskii prospekt
Building 14, Apt. 96, Tel. 2-46-27-37

SOURCE: *Possev* (Frankfurt-am-Main), January 1969.

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[1] "Sakharov on Freedom", Document 59, *Problems of Communism*, No. 5, 1968, p. 32.—Ed.

[2] "The Moscow Trials of 1967," *Problems of Communism*, No. 4, 1968, pp. 31-72.—Ed.

[3] Varga, Yevgeny S. (1879-1964), renowned economist, born in Hungary. Fled to the USSR in 1920 and joined the CPSU. In 1927 he became director of the Institute of World Economy and World Politics of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1946, he was severely criticized for predicting a future "crisisless" development of both the socialist and capitalist systems.—Ed.

[4] See Biographic Notes in *Problems of Communism*, No. 5, 1968, p. 115.—Ed.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] See "At Anna Akhmatova's Grave" by Lev Kopelev, *Problems of Communism*, No. 5, 1968, p. 91.—Ed.

[7] See "In Defense of Czechoslovakia", Documents 74, 75 and 76, *ibid.*, pp. 59-62.—Ed.

2. Petition on Czechoslovakia: by P. G. Grigorenko and I. Yakhimovich

To the Citizens of the Soviet Union:

The campaign of self-immolation started by Prague student Jan Palach on January 16, 1969, as a protest against interference in the internal affairs of the CzSSR is not abating. One more live torch, the latest so far, burned in St. Wenceslas Square in Prague on February 21.

This protest, which has taken so horrible a form, is addressed primarily to us, the Soviet people. It is the unsolicited and completely unjustified presence of our troops that brings forth such anger and despair among the Czechoslovak people. Not in vain has Jan Palach's death aroused the entire working people of Czechoslovakia.

We all bear some part of the guilt for his death and for the deaths of other Czechoslovak brothers who have committed suicide. By approving the armed forces' intervention, by justifying it, or by simply remaining silent, we contribute to the continued burning of live torches in the squares of Prague and other cities. The Czechs and the Slovaks have always considered us their brothers. How, then, can we permit the word "Soviet" to become for them synonymous with the word "enemy"?

Citizens of our great country!

The greatness of a country lies not in the might of its armed forces brought down upon a numerically small, freedom-loving nation, but in its moral strength.

Shall we then continue to look on in silence while our brothers perish?

It is now clear to all that the presence of our troops on the territory of the CzSSR is based neither on the defense of our fatherland nor on the interests of the countries of the socialist community.

Is it possible that we lack the courage to admit that a tragic mistake has been made and to do everything in our power to correct it?! It is our right and our duty!

We call on all the Soviet people to use every legal means, without taking hasty and ill-considered action, to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and the renunciation of interference in her internal affairs! Only thus can the friendship between our peoples be restored.

Long live the heroic Czechoslovak people!

Long live Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship!

PIOTR GRIGORENKO
IVAN YAKHIMOVICH

Moscow
February 1969

SOURCE: *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* (New York), March 19, 1969.

3. On the Eve of Arrest: I. Yakhimovich

The days of my liberty are numbered. On the eve of imprisonment, I appeal to people whose names are sealed in my memory and my heart—hear me out! . . .

I am compelled to talk about myself because soon a flood of lies and hypocrisy will come out of the court. I am compelled to talk about myself because my fate is the fate of my people and my honor is their honor.

I am accused, under Article 183 of the criminal code of Latvia, of spreading false fabrications deliberately slandering the Soviet state and social system. The maximum sentence is three years' deprivation of freedom. . . .

Bertrand Russell: You are a philosopher, so perhaps you can see more quickly what the accusations are founded on. . . . What laws have I broken? The constitution of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic and the

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Declaration of Human Rights allow one to write and distribute things, and to demonstrate, etc. . . . Whom does my freedom threaten, and why is it essential to take it away from me?

Comrade Alexander Dubcek: When seven people went out onto Red Square on August 25 [1968] with the slogans "Hands Off Czechoslovakia" and "For Your Freedom and Ours," they were beaten until they were bleeding; they were called "anti-Soviet slanderers," "Yids," and the like. I could not be with them, but I was on your side and I shall always be on your side as long as you serve your people honestly. "Remain firm, the sun will rise again. . . ."

Aleksandr Isaevich [Solzhenitsyn]: I am happy that I had the opportunity to read your works. May "the gift of the heart and the wine" be yours. Pavel [Litvinov] and Larisa [Daniel]: We welcomed your gladiator-like courage. "Hail, Caesar, we who are about to die salute you." We are proud of you. . . .

Peasants of the Young Guard Collective Farm: I worked with you for eight years. That is long enough to get to know a person. Judge for yourselves, and may your judgment serve the truth. Don't let yourselves be deceived.

Workers of Leningrad, Moscow and Riga, dockers of Odessa, Liepai and Tallinn: To save the honor of his class, the worker Vladimir Dremliuga went onto Red Square to say "No" to the occupiers of Czechoslovakia. He was thrown into jail. . . . Who will help a worker if not another worker?

Comrade Grigorenko, Comrade Yakir: You are hardened fighters for truth. May life preserve you for the just cause! . . .

I address myself to people of my own nationality—to the Poles wherever they are living and wherever they work. Do not keep silent when injustice is being done. Poland is not yet lost while we still live.[1]

I address myself to Latvians, whose land has become my homeland, whose language I know as I know Polish and Russian. Do not forget that in the labor camps of Mordvinia and Siberia are thousands of your fellow countrymen! Demand their return to Latvia. Watch carefully the fate of everyone deprived of freedom for political reasons.

Academician Sakharov: I heard your "Reflections." I regret that I did not manage to write to you. The debt is mine.

Communists of all countries, Communists of the Soviet Union: You have one lord, one sovereign—the people. But the people is made up of living persons, of real lives. When human rights are violated, especially in the name of socialism and Marxism, there can be no two positions. Then your conscience and your honor must command.

Communists to the fore! Communists to the fore!

Above all, it is dangerous for Soviet power when people are deprived of their freedom because of their convictions, for it will not be long before it, too, loses its freedom.

The strong of this world are strong because we are on our knees.

Let us arise!

IVAN YAKHIMOVICH

Moscow
March 25, 1969

SOURCE: *The New York Times*, April 13, 1969.

[1] These are the first lines of the Polish national anthem.—Ed.

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